Extracted

• • Target
    adguard.apk
  • Size 12.3MB
  • SHA256 672f00d58540265bfe81af09c2d416efac20b79f903cb470ceb8ebafd7a79d08
  • MD5 409f41947839c1e3d8df112a0f640187
  • SHA1 25203e351602485bb4eac832c404d9aeb9e63f6c
  • SHA512 cf97c3112289ef5df5d0eed14d491a99b7ea93e668973a8b5f6ce1c4705f78bcc189ab95cf2c70e92ff26d7c20f398183086c5a8b55ce0858a72e2f517340853
  • SSDEEP 196608:XDNrhGx01siAJA3G/wWq0KRhpv74rhd4UmbBNrv0N2lZx7ye1v1:5rh1siAm3G/w70+vMrhSUy/vQY2qv1
  • TLSH
    T179D6228AF708B92AC4F7433341B55B72560B4D268B43DBC75D54B23C99BB6E04E1ABC8
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  1^/10
  behavioral1
• • Target
    base.apk
  • Size 8.0MB
  • SHA256 f1076ec1b8bcc2746edb061099708d4f93fd64e115cc0aad8dcb60a8f99b4dae
  • MD5 387827e61299173bae1076a92cf2a9cf
  • SHA1 96a8d3a0c0ed8de6924dc58807968beb8aece354
  • SHA512 01cd6c8e872e43aab0e0c313e39e077dc4ecdbc2d11f3794b5e130e7ca5aa0107ef542ff04246e9e288123f6656d4dcb9f54012f7990f85f0669d3a430048fd5
  • SSDEEP 196608:mPyHu5YqiTGpsD4SwMkZJHJ5kpzvvaDYE:+zYqiypsD4DMYJ+pzaV
  • TLSH
    T1CE862353F718A66EC4E3833245BA0A7552074E16C383E69B5D2833783CBB9E45E46FD8
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  10^/10

  bankercollectioncredential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoveryevasionexecutiontrickmoimpactinfostealerpersistencetrojan

  • TrickMo

    TrickMo is an Android banking trojan with the capability to intercept 2FA codes first seen in September 2019.

    trojaninfostealerbankertrickmo

  • Trickmo family

    trickmo

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    collectiondefense_evasioncredential_access

  • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    collectioncredential_accessimpact

  • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    bankerdiscovery

  • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    discovery

  • Acquires the wake lock

  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    defense_evasionpersistence

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    discovery

  • Reads information about phone network operator.

    discovery

  • Listens for changes in the sensor environment (might be used to detect emulation)

    defense_evasion
  behavioral2