General
- Target 2026-07-08_96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0_amadey_darkgate_elex_luca-stealer_lynx_njrat
- Size 3.2MB
- Sample260708-ezba4aax7v
- SHA256 058a108151ab8b3a44ba7610939c8b5ea91bc8bf3ec21d8cc0ab9a4fee6649e1
- MD5 96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0
- SHA1 f0eff2e381edc9244744f67abcc016d9711fe1fb
- SHA512 65e4e8888af3b72eb09040022f73070d786756d76c3e44960d73a51c173ba60c02e6b7635efdfb74dbf2e61302cc07285d5c80ddd6250ceba1e1b29562ba00dc
- SSDEEP 49152:ghgxd02qItsVrJjyCwAeyfvE0Z3R0Tnxn1o2d5HTEPKu6sh:gWdvqItsV9gAeKtwnW2APb
- TLSH T1DAF5AF31B2918120E5B39370297EB7EA5B75BC256F76808F32DCB6390B725C09D35B26
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-07-08_96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0_amadey_darkgate_elex_luca-stealer_lynx_njrat.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-07-08_96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0_amadey_darkgate_elex_luca-stealer_lynx_njrat.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260706-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 2026-07-08_96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0_amadey_darkgate_elex_luca-stealer_lynx_njrat
- Size 3.2MB
- SHA256 058a108151ab8b3a44ba7610939c8b5ea91bc8bf3ec21d8cc0ab9a4fee6649e1
- MD5 96aa30434075e8f4e7b45f934fc3add0
- SHA1 f0eff2e381edc9244744f67abcc016d9711fe1fb
- SHA512 65e4e8888af3b72eb09040022f73070d786756d76c3e44960d73a51c173ba60c02e6b7635efdfb74dbf2e61302cc07285d5c80ddd6250ceba1e1b29562ba00dc
- SSDEEP 49152:ghgxd02qItsVrJjyCwAeyfvE0Z3R0Tnxn1o2d5HTEPKu6sh:gWdvqItsV9gAeKtwnW2APb
- TLSH T1DAF5AF31B2918120E5B39370297EB7EA5B75BC256F76808F32DCB6390B725C09D35B26
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers
-
Detects binaries and memory artifacts referencing sandbox DLLs typically observed in sandbox evasion
-
Detects executables built or packed with MPress PE compressor
-
Detects executables packed with ConfuserEx Mod
-
Detects executables packed with Goliath
-
Detects executables packed with Themida
-
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.
-
Downloads MZ/PE file
-
Drops file in Drivers directory
-
Modifies RDP port number used by Windows
-
Patched UPX-packed file
Sample is packed with UPX but required header fields are zeroed out to prevent unpacking with the default UPX tool.
-
Sets service image path in registry
This determines the executable launched when a service starts. It can be used to establish persistence.
-
Checks BIOS information in registry
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
-
Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
-
Executes dropped EXE
-
Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
-
Loads dropped DLL
-
Checks installed software on the system
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
-
Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
-
ConfuserEx .NET packer
Detects ConfuserEx .NET packer.
-
Drops file in System32 directory
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
2Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
1Windows Service
1Event Triggered Execution
2Component Object Model Hijacking
1Netsh Helper DLL
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
2Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
1Windows Service
1Event Triggered Execution
2Component Object Model Hijacking
1Netsh Helper DLL
1Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses
1Safe Mode Boot
1Modify Registry
4Subvert Trust Controls
2Install Root Certificate
2Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1