General
- Target 2026-07-08_fa0ae85a8ca12e858d3740aafe0cc973_dcrat_drokbk_elex_glassworm_njrat_quasar-rat_rhadamanthys_smoke-loader_stealc_stop_tofsee
- Size 2.8MB
- Sample260708-yemceafw7l
- SHA256 2c3a16774e0be99d9027731be508f56b923796f916d6dbfc936ac5c985df6810
- MD5 fa0ae85a8ca12e858d3740aafe0cc973
- SHA1 8879ab711b5821b9cfb5e7f809a0f540615dabb7
- SHA512 243c59e9f5270816bbe82add58d7492fb0150c8f705ba445474ccf4f155cede0581678921f5cafbcf19566d0e0c58e52178c0af81486dd08c44f75283549d5fe
- SSDEEP 49152:QsJsM/Oa9GJ4eX/J1YlanZFRcQFkQTA5Qw7CSikJo54clgLH+tkWJ00:/j/Oa4DX//YUnRc6aH+ZqcKHgkWJ00
- TLSH T11DD5120037E88667E6BF57B4D0B295E1C7B2B522B22ED7CF685415FD2D22390CA21397
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-07-08_fa0ae85a8ca12e858d3740aafe0cc973_dcrat_drokbk_elex_glassworm_njrat_quasar-rat_rhadamanthy.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
14 signatures
150 seconds
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 2026-07-08_fa0ae85a8ca12e858d3740aafe0cc973_dcrat_drokbk_elex_glassworm_njrat_quasar-rat_rhadamanthys_smoke-loader_stealc_stop_tofsee
- Size 2.8MB
- SHA256 2c3a16774e0be99d9027731be508f56b923796f916d6dbfc936ac5c985df6810
- MD5 fa0ae85a8ca12e858d3740aafe0cc973
- SHA1 8879ab711b5821b9cfb5e7f809a0f540615dabb7
- SHA512 243c59e9f5270816bbe82add58d7492fb0150c8f705ba445474ccf4f155cede0581678921f5cafbcf19566d0e0c58e52178c0af81486dd08c44f75283549d5fe
- SSDEEP 49152:QsJsM/Oa9GJ4eX/J1YlanZFRcQFkQTA5Qw7CSikJo54clgLH+tkWJ00:/j/Oa4DX//YUnRc6aH+ZqcKHgkWJ00
- TLSH T11DD5120037E88667E6BF57B4D0B295E1C7B2B522B22ED7CF685415FD2D22390CA21397
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Detects Echelon Stealer payload
-
Detects executables containing bas64 encoded gzip files
-
Detects executables packed with VMProtect.
-
Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers
-
Detects executables referencing many VPN software clients. Observed in infosteslers
-
Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, crypt
-
Detects executables referencing many email and collaboration clients. Observed in information steale
-
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.
-
Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
-
Looks up external IP address via web service
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.