Analysis

  • user interaction
    yes
  • max time kernel
    150s
  • max time network
    127s
  • platform
    windows11-ltsc_2024_x64
  • resource
    win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win11ltsc2024-20260709-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-ltsc_2024-x64systemwindows
  • submitted
    01/08/2026, 04:22

General

  • Target
    cw2.exe
  • Size 56KB
  • Sample260801-ey86qsdf22
  • SHA256 14d205bb959f90f2f303a133dcd700707aca95b5fb0a20d0470f7294eaba0eb5
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Using powershell.exe command.

  • Maps connected drives based on registry 3 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation 1 TTPs

    Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection.

  • Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 4 IoCs
  • Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs

    The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cw2.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cw2.exe"
    1⤵
    • Maps connected drives based on registry
    • Enumerates system info in registry
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:2652
    • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
      powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command "$k=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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');$d=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('ZXlKaGJHY2lPaUpTVXpJMU5pSXNJblI1Y0NJNklrcFhWQ0o5LmV5SnBjM01pT2lKemIyWjBkMkZ5WTJGQWMyOW1kSGRoY21sallTMDFNREUwTURjdWFXRnRMbWR6WlhKMmFXTmxZV05qYjNWdWRDNWpiMjBpTENKelkyOXdaU0k2SW1oMGRIQnpPaTh2ZDNkM0xtZHZiMmRzWldGd2FYTXVZMjl0TDJGMWRHZ3ZjM0J5WldGa2MyaGxaWFJ6SWl3aVlYVmtJam9pYUhSMGNITTZMeTl2WVhWMGFESXVaMjl2WjJ4bFlYQnBjeTVqYjIwdmRHOXJaVzRpTENKbGVIQWlPakUzT0RVMU5qRTNORFlzSW1saGRDSTZNVGM0TlRVMU9ERTBObjA=');$c=[System.Security.Cryptography.CngKey]::Import($k,[System.Security.Cryptography.CngKeyBlobFormat]::Pkcs8PrivateBlob);$r=New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.RSACng $c;try{[System.Console]::Write([System.Convert]::ToBase64String($r.SignData($d,[System.Security.Cryptography.HashAlgorithmName]::SHA256,[System.Security.Cryptography.RSASignaturePadding]::Pkcs1)))}catch{}"
      2⤵
      • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
      PID:4172
  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cw2.exe
    C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cw2.exe
    1⤵
      PID:748

    Network

          MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16

          Replay Monitor

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          Downloads

          memory/748-1-0x00007FF7124B0000-0x00007FF7124C4000-memory.dmp

          memory/2652-0-0x00007FF7124B0000-0x00007FF7124C4000-memory.dmp