General
- Target 2026-08-08_5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe_elex_floxif_glassworm_stop
- Size 3.9MB
- Sample260808-wexf9swtbw
- SHA256 92c957a099c6ff2a2004247a52f5103a4a6d8e0607065fade6a087c9bb7389e2
- MD5 5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe
- SHA1 af57b9541738e7301af7661fd6d99813221135dc
- SHA512 ff4e5cc047139ab74052c584d854f850804102ad99e3acefd24e47a40624c9d6cd467bf2b6970dc05726ed979cf86f4189a257ea12f3ea6da3137909fb20ae78
- SSDEEP 49152:5yXCP7X3uQ3YlZfbM3DacNHHO0DZyL8x+2wmyrS5uDOzQazX7kfHWRHiaHSiBehl:wcKNZf8mGHVD5x+2wTRA4fHgCP
- TLSH T15516AF213FC1C43ED2630272D84DA35893F2D1B06E768557AAA9135D2F35EA3DE21E72
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2026-08-08_5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe_elex_floxif_glassworm_stop.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2026-08-08_5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe_elex_floxif_glassworm_stop.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 2026-08-08_5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe_elex_floxif_glassworm_stop
- Size 3.9MB
- SHA256 92c957a099c6ff2a2004247a52f5103a4a6d8e0607065fade6a087c9bb7389e2
- MD5 5fdf509584144b3fa5ae6ed79eb32cfe
- SHA1 af57b9541738e7301af7661fd6d99813221135dc
- SHA512 ff4e5cc047139ab74052c584d854f850804102ad99e3acefd24e47a40624c9d6cd467bf2b6970dc05726ed979cf86f4189a257ea12f3ea6da3137909fb20ae78
- SSDEEP 49152:5yXCP7X3uQ3YlZfbM3DacNHHO0DZyL8x+2wmyrS5uDOzQazX7kfHWRHiaHSiBehl:wcKNZf8mGHVD5x+2wTRA4fHgCP
- TLSH T15516AF213FC1C43ED2630272D84DA35893F2D1B06E768557AAA9135D2F35EA3DE21E72
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Detects Floxif payload
- Custom signature
UPX dump on OEP (original entry point)
Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes.
ACProtect 1.3x - 1.4x DLL software
Detects file using ACProtect software.
Loads dropped DLL
Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
Maps connected drives based on registry
Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.