General

  • Target
    09dcc7dcdb4827bcb6e8750016a8faabdc956902d55451e208d777064f634490.apk
  • Size 1.6MB
  • Sample260812-25pr1avvbv
  • SHA256 09dcc7dcdb4827bcb6e8750016a8faabdc956902d55451e208d777064f634490
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://tunelyapimuhendislik.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiprojesistem.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikentseldonusum.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikontrolmerkezi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapihizmetleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiinsaatteknolojileri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiguvensistemleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiulasimcozumleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapisismikdirenc.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikaplamateknigi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigeoteknikbilgi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapisehirplanlama.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapibilimselanaliz.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikaziteknikleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigurbetciler.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapidepremdirenci.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapihidrolojikcalisma.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapimalzemebilgisi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigemiteknolojisi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapitasarimprojeleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

rc4.plain

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://tunelyapimuhendislik.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiprojesistem.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikentseldonusum.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikontrolmerkezi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapihizmetleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiinsaatteknolojileri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiguvensistemleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapiulasimcozumleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapisismikdirenc.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikaplamateknigi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigeoteknikbilgi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapisehirplanlama.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapibilimselanaliz.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapikaziteknikleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigurbetciler.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapidepremdirenci.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapihidrolojikcalisma.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapimalzemebilgisi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapigemiteknolojisi.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

  • https://tunelyapitasarimprojeleri.xyz/MzhiMTg0NTAwOTY5S/

AES_key

Targets

    • Target
      09dcc7dcdb4827bcb6e8750016a8faabdc956902d55451e208d777064f634490.apk
    • Size 1.6MB
    • SHA256 09dcc7dcdb4827bcb6e8750016a8faabdc956902d55451e208d777064f634490
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

      Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

      Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

      Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests accessing notifications (often used to intercept notifications before users become aware).

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

    • Requests modifying system settings.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks