General
- Target 06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f.apk
- Size 3.2MB
- Sample260812-2walqafn7y
- SHA256 06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f
- MD5 be0a0e5e44bfd1f88aacc9759eecb33f
- SHA1 115a112ab7ba770606b5a6dd64285351e578f189
- SHA512 f282934eeb74b318d484d75c30e43c71d1296d914370c311f390fb9e095055a7de9f5eacc0955e542cb797595e87125a812d15e076731b975dbc307d6833f7ea
- SSDEEP 49152:ADaiTrDeqky92+PpHiRuNEAaTvAz+dF7xxVQOoz/3sUJuzeaV3V1SAMLKCDNnC+v:ofeqF97A9TICdFlxOP5gt8LtNxdfD
- TLSH T1FAF53344A7D3594DC57742328287B30363662158BBDAA97F847F00A52CF7DA8CB0EDB6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
-
alienbot
-
http://34.89.151.222
Extracted
-
alienbot
-
http://34.89.151.222
Targets
-
- Target 06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f.apk
- Size 3.2MB
- SHA256 06cd6615089297c72da04561ffd8c65676304aba74d684ab0559159effbabf4f
- MD5 be0a0e5e44bfd1f88aacc9759eecb33f
- SHA1 115a112ab7ba770606b5a6dd64285351e578f189
- SHA512 f282934eeb74b318d484d75c30e43c71d1296d914370c311f390fb9e095055a7de9f5eacc0955e542cb797595e87125a812d15e076731b975dbc307d6833f7ea
- SSDEEP 49152:ADaiTrDeqky92+PpHiRuNEAaTvAz+dF7xxVQOoz/3sUJuzeaV3V1SAMLKCDNnC+v:ofeqF97A9TICdFlxOP5gt8LtNxdfD
- TLSH T1FAF53344A7D3594DC57742328287B30363662158BBDAA97F847F00A52CF7DA8CB0EDB6
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Cerberus payload
Family: Alienbot
Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.
- Custom signature
Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
- Custom signature
Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
- Custom signature
Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
- Custom signature
Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
Checks Android system properties for emulator presence.
Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
Queries account information for other applications stored on the device
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.
Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
Acquires the wake lock
Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
Reads information about phone network operator.
Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
3System Checks
3