General
- Target 1077e767d28e8b97be3ebc98ceab110c14335260b47a3a0fdfcb77b6a2ccf080.apk
- Size 1.1MB
- Sample260812-3nwdwswhrf
- SHA256 1077e767d28e8b97be3ebc98ceab110c14335260b47a3a0fdfcb77b6a2ccf080
- MD5 d2af9e50ce0a5247366b40d394d52da1
- SHA1 827eae96973affe208d1b08413d39e673f8d3e52
- SHA512 6e47dbe1e9bb00c28458a5db3ba63353e982eebac5388edd8e8eb2e3b45a09d10398b1ccb4df2a27023cff99eba757eaa3b1d78e203513490ddca85c1b2299b6
- SSDEEP 24576:WBsMgncanrgBot6EqCPlEA4nxTvZAvFIbh7JMudzA0Xn:WBX16rgo0CSJnxhAANPzA0Xn
- TLSH T1C3451242F7C9CA23D4BA57384AA7C3E952347D40DF00466B6946B31D0D736D2CEA3B6A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1077e767d28e8b97be3ebc98ceab110c14335260b47a3a0fdfcb77b6a2ccf080.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
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octo
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https://64.89.161.32/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://64.89.163.37/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://46.151.182.213/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://a93f6d2b7SDSGx0k1m9q4r8s5v.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://h6d23bsdgsdsgsd8d7f1qk4m5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://5f46236sdgagjkkfhfhdxzh1k9m8s7q4x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://34g9s7b6sdgjkkjkhjkgdsg0f6k1m8q5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://344d9g3sdgsgs8d1kjhjfjghdkhk7m5f2x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://54sdf7sdskjjghgfkmdg3b6a0d1k9m8q.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
Extracted
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octo
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https://64.89.161.32/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://64.89.163.37/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://46.151.182.213/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
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https://a93f6d2b7SDSGx0k1m9q4r8s5v.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
-
https://h6d23bsdgsdsgsd8d7f1qk4m5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
-
https://5f46236sdgagjkkfhfhdxzh1k9m8s7q4x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
-
https://34g9s7b6sdgjkkjkhjkgdsg0f6k1m8q5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
-
https://344d9g3sdgsgs8d1kjhjfjghdkhk7m5f2x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
-
https://54sdf7sdskjjghgfkmdg3b6a0d1k9m8q.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/
Targets
-
- Target 1077e767d28e8b97be3ebc98ceab110c14335260b47a3a0fdfcb77b6a2ccf080.apk
- Size 1.1MB
- SHA256 1077e767d28e8b97be3ebc98ceab110c14335260b47a3a0fdfcb77b6a2ccf080
- MD5 d2af9e50ce0a5247366b40d394d52da1
- SHA1 827eae96973affe208d1b08413d39e673f8d3e52
- SHA512 6e47dbe1e9bb00c28458a5db3ba63353e982eebac5388edd8e8eb2e3b45a09d10398b1ccb4df2a27023cff99eba757eaa3b1d78e203513490ddca85c1b2299b6
- SSDEEP 24576:WBsMgncanrgBot6EqCPlEA4nxTvZAvFIbh7JMudzA0Xn:WBX16rgo0CSJnxhAANPzA0Xn
- TLSH T1C3451242F7C9CA23D4BA57384AA7C3E952347D40DF00466B6946B31D0D736D2CEA3B6A
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Family: Octo
Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.
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Octo payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking
Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.
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Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
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Silent screen capture via MediaProjection
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Reads information about phone network operator.
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Input Injection
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Discovery
Software Discovery
1Security Software Discovery
1System Network Configuration Discovery
3