Extracted

• • Target
    13e537945c4c4cd720ee5d2f2de723ecb6c9a6f09760b47a4ffd3212e0430d56.apk
  • Size 21.7MB
  • SHA256 13e537945c4c4cd720ee5d2f2de723ecb6c9a6f09760b47a4ffd3212e0430d56
  • MD5 38fabad4c2be5856016e16f9c5738ff5
  • SHA1 907472edd1b460665ba8dc2fdd466c3d1590613e
  • SHA512 3bc052dda38d59b4788c098411e755b26d1b435f26e6f080f63cd517331f1817b9b9681961dca6fa86ba20fc9b950d4c95561d3a271ee469403a35b7fdf24bf4
  • SSDEEP 393216:uNQrhAIf5LZ3SBsVtYArvZVGQAyiRuLWuaVEmDel:UQpfH3iWtYav6QAyi8iuaVEh
  • TLSH
    T19337D15A37418F39E46D2931C04F13274117BE055EA152D729AAF20CE93FAF36EF5A82
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  9^/10

  bankerdefense_evasiondropperevasionobfuscatedotppersistencestealer

  • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

    Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    obfuscateddropper

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    stealerotpbanker

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    defense_evasionpersistence
  behavioral1behavioral2behavioral3
• • Target
    app
  • Size 10.5MB
  • SHA256 2e10c2615710765c4097eb5dd711f6cb5cf91942024119f762202e8f6a4c1360
  • MD5 1cc651ebb954749851908fb16de4cca3
  • SHA1 abd789082303a326d088aff0c9bb2027d4edee00
  • SHA512 03bf1f2a35cc2e75d05390a7626d517fdb286a9642e26b407551f1393ab90c46b82ee3c9d2b6f6693b089b62fe3667a774fead3770e346b0d5a6bd4c15a36e3b
  • SSDEEP 196608:DQrhU0cj76R2hIfSk8+pZ3SD+OsVyMrFQIYxpT3:DQrhAIf5LZ3SBsVtY/
  • TLSH
    T111B6D01737864F38F88D3934814F13278517B94967A152DB49ABC104EE1EBF3AEB5B82
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  10^/10

  bankerc2collectioncredential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoverydropperevasionexfiltrationoctoimpactinfostealerobfuscatedotpoverlaypersistenceratsmsspywarestealertrojan

  • Family: Octo

    Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    bankertrojaninfostealerratocto

  • Octo payload

  • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    evasionpersistencedropper

  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

    stealersmsotp

  • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    bankertrojanoverlay

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    persistence

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    smstrojanexfiltration

  • Keylogging via accessibility text-change events

    Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.

    stealerspywarebanker

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    stealerotpbanker

  • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking

    Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

    c2rat

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    obfuscatedevasion

  • Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility

    Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.

    bankerratoverlay

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    collectiondefense_evasioncredential_access

  • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    bankerdiscovery

  • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    discovery

  • Acquires the wake lock

  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    defense_evasionpersistence

  • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

    Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    evasion

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    discovery

  • Reads information about phone network operator.

    discovery

  • Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.

  behavioral4