General
- Target 96dce9c6bbd0e2f156408e1e1adb7223d8748825fae80b966e80a2b34027aad1
- Size 2.3MB
- Sample260812-rqqewaygmc
- SHA256 96dce9c6bbd0e2f156408e1e1adb7223d8748825fae80b966e80a2b34027aad1
- MD5 3b5dbf89e3609e0cc34d201dc0ebc0f3
- SHA1 ace1d889a3cfcb880191abadb771a15833af08fb
- SHA512 47a5c8af74b5d057f5077ba299746b1d46722c7441a87c5fbc482bd8756221f1e8f95fa74a36de30349708770ebdb8ec4fda9071cb053182bd72c25df10f0cc5
- SSDEEP 49152:65TJfEYfEdY28G1jv8CcFeV2qFmat9vdenEunq6o4K7eBm0gtfBGCb8n:6VffE+tqoCcFsLdt9vde+4K7EmHfwCbM
- TLSH T140B5338D8796DDDDE6C49270313738500F0603F38DCA696454AF0B4F59E8BAC96AEBE1
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
0dd34e1326f18ab113be5ec91003577845f62ce25bbed8f92bff0b4077fe45da.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20260513-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
0dd34e1326f18ab113be5ec91003577845f62ce25bbed8f92bff0b4077fe45da.exe
Resource
win11ltsc2024-20260709-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 0dd34e1326f18ab113be5ec91003577845f62ce25bbed8f92bff0b4077fe45da.exe
- Size 2.5MB
- SHA256 0dd34e1326f18ab113be5ec91003577845f62ce25bbed8f92bff0b4077fe45da
- MD5 e63e41e15e86489a98dbeb2e6cb44e8a
- SHA1 5815d349a375f5cdf090ababcff86b3946ed6c07
- SHA512 749d9580ac631916fbc1db207f0f48ed2ff9979f0cd8e352633cd86edfe7bd5bbb6da90b014e0b8ad639f8b9e567498f07353ef907ce2bd6dfa5536d3079991e
- SSDEEP 49152:p+9pcEvA81ugLUKnGkFfHTvdlhylPdVkdL6rMD0uVVePR2EW:ktLUm3FfzvojKdLCAoPR2V
- TLSH T135C5230A6DED4AF5EB69D770DAB200932A21FC10DA3585C13DDB909FC4436389B68F6D
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Family: MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload
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Deletes shadow copies
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
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Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
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Renames multiple (1175) files with added filename extension
This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.
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Drops file in Drivers directory
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Checks BIOS information in registry
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Checks computer location settings
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
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Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
Suspicious access to Credentials History.
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Adds Run key to start application
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Checks whether UAC is enabled
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Drops desktop.ini file(s)
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Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Direct Volume Access
1Indicator Removal
4File Deletion
4Modify Registry
2Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
1Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
2Credentials from Web Browsers
1Windows Credential Manager
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1