User tags
Assigned on submission by the user, not by sandbox detections.
General
- Target 60122617f2fa47a7a0bc44ca7e2d9f5c_db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8.apk
- Size 2.0MB
- Sample260812-x83e2stdqf
- SHA256 db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8
- MD5 0204df0b02c9fbf18751c829c0a0990a
- SHA1 75d433e3a4d95a946eee1e6a9c6d1bf033aad5a3
- SHA512 cdc2071a732e7a8588719b07a807842a069a8e9807f75118c32f2b74b841b4bd9fc76bae200aa18a87b25f298caa2e1af405e6ccfc204e9410b2179f138520e9
- SSDEEP 49152:tLEuvMraFN9peB7dbtYoAWHS3Bzch5sH2ycabe:tLCqjp8dyAy3BQh5sH2fX
- TLSH T166A5334A9995FDA0C023F6338623F91576648DD727CDFFBB021718A09F26A105EE4E27
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
60122617f2fa47a7a0bc44ca7e2d9f5c_db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
60122617f2fa47a7a0bc44ca7e2d9f5c_db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 60122617f2fa47a7a0bc44ca7e2d9f5c_db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8.apk
- Size 2.0MB
- SHA256 db329505e2425bc20c329e58698f70408d5221f3816326fdc5ad0feb336310d8
- MD5 0204df0b02c9fbf18751c829c0a0990a
- SHA1 75d433e3a4d95a946eee1e6a9c6d1bf033aad5a3
- SHA512 cdc2071a732e7a8588719b07a807842a069a8e9807f75118c32f2b74b841b4bd9fc76bae200aa18a87b25f298caa2e1af405e6ccfc204e9410b2179f138520e9
- SSDEEP 49152:tLEuvMraFN9peB7dbtYoAWHS3Bzch5sH2ycabe:tLCqjp8dyAy3BQh5sH2fX
- TLSH T166A5334A9995FDA0C023F6338623F91576648DD727CDFFBB021718A09F26A105EE4E27
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Cerberus payload
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Family: Alienbot
Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
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Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Queries account information for other applications stored on the device
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2