General
- Target 27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8.apk
- Size 3.1MB
- Sample260813-bfcs2ayejb
- SHA256 27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8
- MD5 aa294efd44594b64eb93904dbb3c7a2c
- SHA1 91639afbface1289c1f35ed1e822843ad75514a7
- SHA512 659ed5447cc8b6b79c162464e941547b63702f9387ec4b2ae01a4bea1c522ee2a66327fae35c98ea962b46feaba9ba7c8af74acb68b0f4ba90900e936f0ee43c
- SSDEEP 98304:1eVM3OTHHj0B8GJPl1LUV9dcKUQA1QgfJRbdpA52:sVM3OvGdLMdXUb1QMRhp02
- TLSH T1F8E533ACBB4AD115C0951E7164165DF7C308C39CA6C0AE675EC6EA4A8EB3D02FF12CE5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8.apk
- Size 3.1MB
- SHA256 27e0ec79dbb7c7f99b43c8c01a94188d1071d1245b1745d0e066ae774c78a8f8
- MD5 aa294efd44594b64eb93904dbb3c7a2c
- SHA1 91639afbface1289c1f35ed1e822843ad75514a7
- SHA512 659ed5447cc8b6b79c162464e941547b63702f9387ec4b2ae01a4bea1c522ee2a66327fae35c98ea962b46feaba9ba7c8af74acb68b0f4ba90900e936f0ee43c
- SSDEEP 98304:1eVM3OTHHj0B8GJPl1LUV9dcKUQA1QgfJRbdpA52:sVM3OvGdLMdXUb1QMRhp02
- TLSH T1F8E533ACBB4AD115C0951E7164165DF7C308C39CA6C0AE675EC6EA4A8EB3D02FF12CE5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Brata payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Android device-admin abuse for anti-uninstall persistence
Requests device administrator privileges and hooks the deactivation callback, a pattern used to resist uninstallation, force-lock the device, or trigger a factory reset. Frequently paired with ransomware and persistent spyware.
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Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload
Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.
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Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service
Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking
Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.
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Silent screen capture via MediaProjection
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
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Third-party package squatting a reserved system namespace
Declares a package identifier inside a namespace reserved for platform or vendor components while carrying application code that does not belong to that vendor. This is done so the entry looks innocuous in the installed-application list and in process listings.
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.