General
- Target 2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392.apk
- Size 3.3MB
- Sample260813-bltnqsxtex
- SHA256 2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392
- MD5 ac773cd2c075d4ad82659d9eaa369155
- SHA1 6bc377e4a3e6e95ca74928837e3cced108cb625e
- SHA512 d672521118ff3811d53f4ec72ef7c8807564d1fc0106c1a3e47106e5ec009589b16845bf4cbae0cf3fd26404fd1bbc0d48f7406a0632c107feee4b4d05efece7
- SSDEEP 98304:utQGt3ZuI7y690JAD/oD4Itdl6/LTdCHwY:uCGfuI7y2oDRZ
- TLSH T1CFF52216FFFEE516D007E134D6649897840844484A0AFE1B7A2A925CCFFAD44AB43FED
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392.apk
- Size 3.3MB
- SHA256 2b26c52922e8d4f07e948f13970025d62c0d96bd0fe6802d0567fd2c73b94392
- MD5 ac773cd2c075d4ad82659d9eaa369155
- SHA1 6bc377e4a3e6e95ca74928837e3cced108cb625e
- SHA512 d672521118ff3811d53f4ec72ef7c8807564d1fc0106c1a3e47106e5ec009589b16845bf4cbae0cf3fd26404fd1bbc0d48f7406a0632c107feee4b4d05efece7
- SSDEEP 98304:utQGt3ZuI7y690JAD/oD4Itdl6/LTdCHwY:uCGfuI7y2oDRZ
- TLSH T1CFF52216FFFEE516D007E134D6649897840844484A0AFE1B7A2A925CCFFAD44AB43FED
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Queries information about active data network