Extracted

• • Target
    3fe3d4f0cbdebb784d1a96dc7d9a4ecd4e9c080860bfa87e50084930aa0d4198.apk
  • Size 3.4MB
  • SHA256 3fe3d4f0cbdebb784d1a96dc7d9a4ecd4e9c080860bfa87e50084930aa0d4198
  • MD5 c34d943b9dc1618d424af57cbdfa4a6e
  • SHA1 6e6487c3b689201b43621b47319a7f6514fa64ea
  • SHA512 b46ae181e732b00c3eebef1b2e30db786a2a28075de072f98baf54c84cbff674c74500add8f0b58a674cc566f6b982c8c010629102dd3a1a94f8cd92996d78c3
  • SSDEEP 98304:IJQSVPA3KjAL5n1pP2yIYrpCaQTBUvEwuW9T7qMpj:3cg1ZIYdCa7vE4rJ
  • TLSH
    T101F533CD76681172D9E509735064D2BFA1318E8E66137192253AB3FCEC3A6D2E7630E3
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  10^/10

  antivmbankercollectioncredential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoverydropperevasionexfiltrationhydrainfostealerloaderobfuscatedotpoverlaypersistenceratsmsspywarestealertrojan

  • Family: Hydra

    Android banker and info stealer.

    bankertrojaninfostealerhydra

  • Hydra payload

  • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    evasionpersistencedropper

  • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    bankertrojanoverlay

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

    dropperloader

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    persistence

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    smstrojanexfiltration

  • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

    Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    obfuscateddropper

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    stealerotpbanker

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

    evasionantivm

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    obfuscatedevasion

  • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

    Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    spywareratexfiltration

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    collectiondefense_evasioncredential_access

  • Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2

    Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.

  • Looks up external IP address via web service

    Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

    discovery

  • Queries information about active data network

    discovery

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    discovery

  • Reads information about phone network operator.

    discovery
  behavioral1behavioral2behavioral3