Analysis

  • custom tags

    dropperobfuscatedotpoverlaysmsspywarestealer
  • max time kernel
    146s
  • max time network
    150s
  • platform
    android-11_x64
  • resource
    android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
  • resource tags

    arch:armarch:arm64arch:x64arch:x86image:android-x64-arm64-20260325-enlocale:en-usos:android-11-x64system
  • submitted
    13/08/2026, 01:53

General

  • Target
    339c5d83068577cb1f37c15f0fa1a5e57d813eb4b950ee3fe2c04769a97349c4.apk
  • Size 9.0MB
  • Sample260813-ca22eagb92
  • SHA256 339c5d83068577cb1f37c15f0fa1a5e57d813eb4b950ee3fe2c04769a97349c4
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://f129efc67ef088a55d8d92edf0231752.org

  • https://34d80bc9cdd9d129021fab27db1fbb1a.xyz

  • https://987bd16f38d7cbce26693b9b8a71b49e.com

  • https://e781080bbc62134c39dd3ba79c214d09.net

AES_key
AES_key

Signatures

  • Family: Octo

    Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

  • Octo payload 1 IoCs
  • Custom signature
    Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions 1 IoCs

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

  • Custom signature
    Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Custom signature
    Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection 1 IoCs

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

  • Custom signature
    Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Custom signature
    Keylogging via accessibility text-change events 1 IoCs

    Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.

  • Custom signature
    Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Custom signature
    Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Custom signature
    Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility 1 IoCs

    Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service 4 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

  • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

  • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps) 1 TTPs
  • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices) 1 TTPs
  • Acquires the wake lock 1 IoCs
  • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Reads information about phone network operator. 1 TTPs
  • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background). 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Checks CPU information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Checks memory information 2 TTPs 1 IoCs

Processes

  • com.dfast28cranehanded
    1⤵
    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar
    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
    • Acquires the wake lock
    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
    • Uses Crypto APIs (Might try to encrypt user data)
    • Checks CPU information
    • Checks memory information
    PID:4784

Network

        MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

        Replay Monitor

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        Downloads

        .global.com.dfast28cranehanded

        • Path /data/data/com.dfast28cranehanded/.global.com.dfast28cranehanded
        • Size 48B
        • SHA256 b66c1320cb063a1d391c94273572ea6edae76c8c8b0a07f8d75c88686f0df72a
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512

        EURtO.json

        • Path /data/data/com.dfast28cranehanded/app_call/EURtO.json
        • Size 1010B
        • SHA256 995e6459704d943b5290088377fe4b7e8a98abc869aaa909d73da3d3eb348798
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

        EURtO.json

        • Path /data/data/com.dfast28cranehanded/app_call/EURtO.json
        • Size 1010B
        • SHA256 fb4ee1031d14de970212bd0188241ecd279ec087453afe9171b3eabf5bf5e9e0
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH

        .u

        • Path /data/data/com.dfast28cranehanded/files/.u
        • Size 322KB
        • SHA256 c5684e792d1ebefea6aac09fed45911703fd58c899f8a08133d49dd91429a820
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
        • Path /data/data/com.dfast28cranehanded/oat/x86_64/[email protected]
        • Size 479B
        • SHA256 9536454f102b42fbb5fa02ea0f82537af227a9dfe315a0b66215666c5c953099
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH
        • Path /data/user/0/com.dfast28cranehanded/[email protected]
        • Size 526KB
        • SHA256 89fb18cde7c823198030bdfae29ec91a124af0c885f0bfcf0bc7093a56576a58
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

        EURtO.json

        • Path /data/user/0/com.dfast28cranehanded/app_call/EURtO.json
        • Size 1KB
        • SHA256 2f53a0ce13b29cd24866b6b6172d2fb8e283f1d3f9168bc119906693a8748126
        • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 TLSH