General
- Target 340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b.apk
- Size 2.3MB
- Sample260813-ccqfdsgb99
- SHA256 340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b
- MD5 fbce0fa1e53ef16d6ee54dab524dc638
- SHA1 cc8f2b3fd8cb8bc3f8162f76aada315cf04af25e
- SHA512 eb26bce41bddbe68959ed297ee4b75dacc1aa52de6c424088e852a3ea3c3ff10935e47b84abe8be1f0598b096b33c280b552c9afb8ac25820ef009427d90f000
- SSDEEP 49152:amikfiYdl5iD4PcZjyzW+fxN4msHghLVLuiG2E50Z1dtXvauye3Z9ISZ+4gUNOaY:agi45MqFW+fQmhfLuiG2EyfrXvQe3pyT
- TLSH T156B53385BE69C75DF61B98B3556744E6202D07103A85F46F2832EF8C14E6D326F23EE8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b.apk
- Size 2.3MB
- SHA256 340bfbd674dd9389b4c7148cf5ee004f641d0dc94753e1fe66acc98cd9ae525b
- MD5 fbce0fa1e53ef16d6ee54dab524dc638
- SHA1 cc8f2b3fd8cb8bc3f8162f76aada315cf04af25e
- SHA512 eb26bce41bddbe68959ed297ee4b75dacc1aa52de6c424088e852a3ea3c3ff10935e47b84abe8be1f0598b096b33c280b552c9afb8ac25820ef009427d90f000
- SSDEEP 49152:amikfiYdl5iD4PcZjyzW+fxN4msHghLVLuiG2E50Z1dtXvauye3Z9ISZ+4gUNOaY:agi45MqFW+fQmhfLuiG2EyfrXvQe3pyT
- TLSH T156B53385BE69C75DF61B98B3556744E6202D07103A85F46F2832EF8C14E6D326F23EE8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Silent screen capture via MediaProjection
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Looks up external IP address via web service
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
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Queries information about active data network
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Reads information about phone network operator.