General

  • Target
    4067054f202cc8e87557915783d4468b54985c5cc7b0b57df98ffbb106475196.apk
  • Size 2.8MB
  • Sample260813-dbl71szfng
  • SHA256 4067054f202cc8e87557915783d4468b54985c5cc7b0b57df98ffbb106475196
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Targets

    • Target
      4067054f202cc8e87557915783d4468b54985c5cc7b0b57df98ffbb106475196.apk
    • Size 2.8MB
    • SHA256 4067054f202cc8e87557915783d4468b54985c5cc7b0b57df98ffbb106475196
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: TeaBot

      TeaBot is an android banker first seen in January 2021.

    • TeaBot payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

      Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

    • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

      Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

      Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    • Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility

      Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.

    • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

      Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks