General

  • Target
    4d134bc0f0ba1e53c46da971679bf81c7af18c598c2ceb03dde87278f8c08aba.apk
  • Size 1.4MB
  • Sample260816-3r3mdack2t
  • SHA256 4d134bc0f0ba1e53c46da971679bf81c7af18c598c2ceb03dde87278f8c08aba
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://ifn1h8ag1g.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://irha3wzuu.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://uhnazu3au.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://hbaruuau3h.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://8ibaub3bav.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://ifua88ahahgh.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://utabwbazuu.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • http://www.ip-api.com/json

rc4.plain

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://ifn1h8ag1g.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://irha3wzuu.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://uhnazu3au.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://hbaruuau3h.top/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://8ibaub3bav.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://ifua88ahahgh.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

  • https://utabwbazuu.com/MWNhMjI2OTkyNjA3/

AES_key

Targets

    • Target
      4d134bc0f0ba1e53c46da971679bf81c7af18c598c2ceb03dde87278f8c08aba.apk
    • Size 1.4MB
    • SHA256 4d134bc0f0ba1e53c46da971679bf81c7af18c598c2ceb03dde87278f8c08aba
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

      Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    • Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility

      Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.

    • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

      Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    • Opens Google Play Protect's app-scanning settings screen.

      Opens the Google Play Protect settings screen that holds the toggle for disabling on-device app scanning, weakening built-in protection.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests accessing notifications (often used to intercept notifications before users become aware).

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks