General
- Target 4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110.apk
- Size 4.0MB
- Sample260816-3wefcazvg1
- SHA256 4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110
- MD5 6f049fc4e5f85d53d1aaa158412edca3
- SHA1 d23d638b224dbbdb6ace0bdc3271fc17a924007c
- SHA512 084ade2f99dbc69de0d4c84535756da2db8f894b56f610826437d80e3747de39a08508c4411f2f2cfeef05639534a13e47e2737e0033c6b881f60781d2d20fde
- SSDEEP 98304:hL881QpaMRm8T2zisTfW1IK/hf9Usl6pLsH1WyN/MR:lBQp5/T2zi2e3ZmD6WyN/MR
- TLSH T17C16222AFF9EE41AC147E275815695F3D01414AA0620F65F2B3E815C2DE7C82BB0BEDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110.apk
- Size 4.0MB
- SHA256 4d3ea6e701b950516b89a4be889a31635e9f892705f34345017d323bfcd6e110
- MD5 6f049fc4e5f85d53d1aaa158412edca3
- SHA1 d23d638b224dbbdb6ace0bdc3271fc17a924007c
- SHA512 084ade2f99dbc69de0d4c84535756da2db8f894b56f610826437d80e3747de39a08508c4411f2f2cfeef05639534a13e47e2737e0033c6b881f60781d2d20fde
- SSDEEP 98304:hL881QpaMRm8T2zisTfW1IK/hf9Usl6pLsH1WyN/MR:lBQp5/T2zi2e3ZmD6WyN/MR
- TLSH T17C16222AFF9EE41AC147E275815695F3D01414AA0620F65F2B3E815C2DE7C82BB0BEDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries information about active data network
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Requests changing the default SMS application.
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
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Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1