General
- Target 55c111e642c6aebcb75fc9db89def8adcd73ae1d5eb6b11b7c8dc590d14d0804.apk
- Size 3.8MB
- Sample260817-afy6lazdpf
- SHA256 55c111e642c6aebcb75fc9db89def8adcd73ae1d5eb6b11b7c8dc590d14d0804
- MD5 14342a6a44d3b98598961ca1488b60cd
- SHA1 17dfb55d33abfa0db0ae5a5f0c89fe8be0fc21d2
- SHA512 1b9288060d72f9b92b9339c00ea393e47e966a539ea574ffba6289217960e631c9539bb221d939c91bb90678449fa7330d7c1de157504e45a5e932997b6a3c16
- SSDEEP 98304:lCELgDHeoURmekFpWTMpd8jZc3HTq7/GqdW:ljMDH6w+ToH3HO/W
- TLSH T10D062333EE9AD1DDC1B45E33C9C18DB591A47B5086D39217298CF29B26387FCCA18762
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
55c111e642c6aebcb75fc9db89def8adcd73ae1d5eb6b11b7c8dc590d14d0804.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
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octo
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https://45.74.16.46/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://567855erdhd2361211f9813c0c4d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://56785341f9813c0c4d18f3243242a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://567235dhd2361211f9813c0c4d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://5325d2361211f9813c0c4d1238f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://567855561211f9813c0c4234d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
Extracted
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octo
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https://45.74.16.46/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://567855erdhd2361211f9813c0c4d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
-
https://56785341f9813c0c4d18f3243242a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
-
https://567235dhd2361211f9813c0c4d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://5325d2361211f9813c0c4d1238f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
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https://567855561211f9813c0c4234d18f2a5f.com/YjQzOWMzYTQ4NzJm/
Targets
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- Target 55c111e642c6aebcb75fc9db89def8adcd73ae1d5eb6b11b7c8dc590d14d0804.apk
- Size 3.8MB
- SHA256 55c111e642c6aebcb75fc9db89def8adcd73ae1d5eb6b11b7c8dc590d14d0804
- MD5 14342a6a44d3b98598961ca1488b60cd
- SHA1 17dfb55d33abfa0db0ae5a5f0c89fe8be0fc21d2
- SHA512 1b9288060d72f9b92b9339c00ea393e47e966a539ea574ffba6289217960e631c9539bb221d939c91bb90678449fa7330d7c1de157504e45a5e932997b6a3c16
- SSDEEP 98304:lCELgDHeoURmekFpWTMpd8jZc3HTq7/GqdW:ljMDH6w+ToH3HO/W
- TLSH T10D062333EE9AD1DDC1B45E33C9C18DB591A47B5086D39217298CF29B26387FCCA18762
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Family: Octo
Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.
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Octo payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking
Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.
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Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
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Silent screen capture via MediaProjection
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Reads information about phone network operator.
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Requests accessing notifications (often used to intercept notifications before users become aware).
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
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Requests modifying system settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Credential Access
Access Notifications
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1Discovery
Software Discovery
1Security Software Discovery
1System Network Configuration Discovery
3