Extracted

• • Target
    6615ce1e651653426e799bc5e07823ed6628c89fea5e7ee372d7440968ef028e.apk
  • Size 3.5MB
  • SHA256 6615ce1e651653426e799bc5e07823ed6628c89fea5e7ee372d7440968ef028e
  • MD5 d61a1d957f3f509220adcd1e7f975153
  • SHA1 df6c31c0e052b861b73e12dbf15942a9d5aa7770
  • SHA512 5574cba6fbe072945a1e00f5889ee9a6fde336002e636046a8f6c4a865981465bf37f67213a3c8a41c65a53916da9b6607c5441ed83969ffee358e931c24be5c
  • SSDEEP 98304:ja/v95UTs3eUNcpmWGFx/MJXJHcWpNMAC/mndtRXAs1iQf:ja/v9sjZgiJXiWfxdtpAsYQf
  • TLSH
    T1A70633A27E94A1AFD8711B3175F38B0323760E940B51219F69403B3D51BBBF5A213BAD
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

  Score

  10^/10

  antivmbankercollectioncredential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoverydropperevasionexfiltrationhydrainfostealerloaderobfuscatedotpoverlaypersistenceratsmsspywarestealertrojan

  • Family: Hydra

    Android banker and info stealer.

    bankertrojaninfostealerhydra

  • Hydra payload

  • Custom signature

    Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

    Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    evasionpersistencedropper
  • Custom signature

    Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

    DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    bankertrojanoverlay
  • Custom signature

    Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

    dropperloader
  • Custom signature

    Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    persistence
  • Custom signature

    Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    smstrojanexfiltration
  • Custom signature

    Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

    Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    obfuscateddropper
  • Custom signature

    Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    stealerotpbanker
  • Custom signature

    Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

    evasionantivm
  • Custom signature

    Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    obfuscatedevasion
  • Custom signature

    Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

    Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    spywareratexfiltration

  • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

    Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    evasion

  • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

    Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    collectiondefense_evasioncredential_access

  • Contacts third-party web service commonly abused for C2

    Legitimate web (hosting) services can be abused by malware authors to host malware or C2s.

  • Looks up external IP address via web service

    Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

    discovery

  • Queries information about active data network

    discovery

  • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    discovery

  • Reads information about phone network operator.

    discovery
  behavioral1behavioral2behavioral3