General
- Target 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
- Size 2.1MB
- Sample260817-bcczma1amd
- SHA256 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4
- MD5 282ba59582d916398073d7907effd023
- SHA1 065df5a64c110188349d15f6c537159c20088328
- SHA512 f8b5e5df21a250a3d25c37d7898df430914bca5e324ab30c92d692ebdcc406880daa340d7456782ca5ce165b1bfc22cbf072c36593b83fbda012bbab3eec4cf1
- SSDEEP 24576:WiE1gn4LroFyeEZe+Yw/ibT++Z5oqiH6bKD39t9s5gYUzfr2Wd4/C:sqn4X7Y/n++Z5rbKD3ls5gYUzfr2S
- TLSH T127A5BD42F748A97AC8F7433246794622616BCC268B83D6876C4C363C1DB7AD84F59FC8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
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tanglebot
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https://icq.im/AoLH5bRXfAE6eCtbw1I
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https://t.me/zedezededeed
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https://twitter.com/doplghas
Targets
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- Target 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
- Size 2.1MB
- SHA256 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4
- MD5 282ba59582d916398073d7907effd023
- SHA1 065df5a64c110188349d15f6c537159c20088328
- SHA512 f8b5e5df21a250a3d25c37d7898df430914bca5e324ab30c92d692ebdcc406880daa340d7456782ca5ce165b1bfc22cbf072c36593b83fbda012bbab3eec4cf1
- SSDEEP 24576:WiE1gn4LroFyeEZe+Yw/ibT++Z5oqiH6bKD39t9s5gYUzfr2Wd4/C:sqn4X7Y/n++Z5rbKD3ls5gYUzfr2S
- TLSH T127A5BD42F748A97AC8F7433246794622616BCC268B83D6876C4C363C1DB7AD84F59FC8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Family: TangleBot
TangleBot is an Android SMS malware first seen in September 2021.
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TangleBot payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service
Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
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Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking
Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.
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Silent screen capture via MediaProjection
Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Hide Artifacts
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1