General

  • Target
    6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
  • Size 2.1MB
  • Sample260817-bcczma1amd
  • SHA256 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • tanglebot

C2
  • https://icq.im/AoLH5bRXfAE6eCtbw1I

  • https://t.me/zedezededeed

  • https://twitter.com/doplghas

Targets

    • Target
      6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4.apk
    • Size 2.1MB
    • SHA256 6098a436094f1e3e8721fb87ff36781a1a283711cc0388f608723a18132607c4
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: TangleBot

      TangleBot is an Android SMS malware first seen in September 2021.

    • TangleBot payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

      Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

      Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

      Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

    • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking

      Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

    • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

      Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks