General
- Target 6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6.apk
- Size 2.6MB
- Sample260817-brscvsdj2s
- SHA256 6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6
- MD5 b65b16fb181011fdaf1fa4bcc22edf5b
- SHA1 93c3c66ede2d13c5ec2325ee0f774a6808c0d7af
- SHA512 6ea8a8c5ca4875707ac338236f9f945787a793ee125a41f8a4423d3e5b6339ddd8bf59432f17da5c1c98026001f797d0520b51bc0d16bafe68d931b202a10d76
- SSDEEP 49152:w2mWPAlycYeV11r5N1SlVF4VyNHBn9bsTaU6KbN39kpkOwdWp8fAV6uXhDL9Iqq:Mdlkeb1r5aPFIkHxFs+49PcfVXhvu
- TLSH T1E3D51219FEAEE06AE14BD1319120D647D90C014F679CF65F6BA28A888EF7D448742FDC
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target 6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6.apk
- Size 2.6MB
- SHA256 6323ac65167e8d48c3bd6c8b839eb600b5b9be9b942e582640147be8d98cedb6
- MD5 b65b16fb181011fdaf1fa4bcc22edf5b
- SHA1 93c3c66ede2d13c5ec2325ee0f774a6808c0d7af
- SHA512 6ea8a8c5ca4875707ac338236f9f945787a793ee125a41f8a4423d3e5b6339ddd8bf59432f17da5c1c98026001f797d0520b51bc0d16bafe68d931b202a10d76
- SSDEEP 49152:w2mWPAlycYeV11r5N1SlVF4VyNHBn9bsTaU6KbN39kpkOwdWp8fAV6uXhDL9Iqq:Mdlkeb1r5aPFIkHxFs+49PcfVXhvu
- TLSH T1E3D51219FEAEE06AE14BD1319120D647D90C014F679CF65F6BA28A888EF7D448742FDC
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries information about active data network
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Requests changing the default SMS application.
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
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Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1