General
- Target 6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599.apk
- Size 8.5MB
- Sample260817-chcrgsha66
- SHA256 6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599
- MD5 c4c012e2fb761d580bb6cf3cf07a5b4e
- SHA1 535744b03516d9ee9940ae315a8a5d8134a68867
- SHA512 f4ce534704675757dec7106280c3e28c65d1cce1b093d04f5c67f2a78be6b4fff62e9c9d848d8b745c0b7f1ec28db63678f03c41961c21fd7b39eef106fe132f
- SSDEEP 196608:jJtkwC/j6dPhBP5RXDQRBYCp5WFqWJwraOKeBQBv:YVb6lhLpDlCXEHJ8lQBv
- TLSH T14496017BE744B45EC6F7423306B55E2252077C268B439683394CB6385B7BAEC0E59BC8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
base.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
-
octo
-
https://24b39235d28899b2b11a69cf240d09af.com
Targets
-
- Target 6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599.apk
- Size 8.5MB
- SHA256 6d9fd3927896151176c9f84d128b78a94bdc3e432ba9d3885fa3080d7593a599
- MD5 c4c012e2fb761d580bb6cf3cf07a5b4e
- SHA1 535744b03516d9ee9940ae315a8a5d8134a68867
- SHA512 f4ce534704675757dec7106280c3e28c65d1cce1b093d04f5c67f2a78be6b4fff62e9c9d848d8b745c0b7f1ec28db63678f03c41961c21fd7b39eef106fe132f
- SSDEEP 196608:jJtkwC/j6dPhBP5RXDQRBYCp5WFqWJwraOKeBQBv:YVb6lhLpDlCXEHJ8lQBv
- TLSH T14496017BE744B45EC6F7423306B55E2252077C268B439683394CB6385B7BAEC0E59BC8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
-
Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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- Target base.apk
- Size 8.6MB
- SHA256 8dce7762af5f59fc1cce13d2cf9f63d83e40c3df0bd073000dd595ac06301eff
- MD5 f49f7df87a35557077c6a0d408ec31bc
- SHA1 6d113ce08d267729935b01ec5009a6af0a571365
- SHA512 594201c68bd6649a619f93399f18e25ccfa9017dca2647f6346ff3a10acb188142732e9a5a20306e78ac01ec882db61ac611c6e7d15c8177d78cb4a6770c1c37
- SSDEEP 98304:W5iSRGT8RsIN/dwj7MVK/y+/HWgffscbjc8tjlTxzbz1I:Wr3R3/qj7MUa+OgnTs8HTVG
- TLSH T19D969C13B7064C76D4CD767AA0BB9B11BB34684CE79397C70109D2B0AD633E5BE68386
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Family: Octo
Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.
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Octo payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service
Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.
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Keylogging via accessibility text-change events
Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
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Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility
Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Reads information about phone network operator.
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Input Injection
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1Discovery
Software Discovery
1Security Software Discovery
1System Information Discovery
2System Network Configuration Discovery
3