General

  • Target
    76798397118c81edf2ef4588a60578a8700017afb98b040657b39cccdbe30009.apk
  • Size 1.1MB
  • Sample260817-dnmdjsscpc
  • SHA256 76798397118c81edf2ef4588a60578a8700017afb98b040657b39cccdbe30009
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://64.89.161.32/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://64.89.163.37/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://46.151.182.213/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://a93f6d2b7SDSGx0k1m9q4r8s5v.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://h6d23bsdgsdsgsd8d7f1qk4m5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://5f46236sdgagjkkfhfhdxzh1k9m8s7q4x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://34g9s7b6sdgjkkjkhjkgdsg0f6k1m8q5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://344d9g3sdgsgs8d1kjhjfjghdkhk7m5f2x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://54sdf7sdskjjghgfkmdg3b6a0d1k9m8q.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

rc4.plain

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://64.89.161.32/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://64.89.163.37/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://46.151.182.213/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://a93f6d2b7SDSGx0k1m9q4r8s5v.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://h6d23bsdgsdsgsd8d7f1qk4m5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://5f46236sdgagjkkfhfhdxzh1k9m8s7q4x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://34g9s7b6sdgjkkjkhjkgdsg0f6k1m8q5x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://344d9g3sdgsgs8d1kjhjfjghdkhk7m5f2x.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

  • https://54sdf7sdskjjghgfkmdg3b6a0d1k9m8q.com/ZWFlY2Q1NjdmZmI3/

AES_key

Targets

    • Target
      76798397118c81edf2ef4588a60578a8700017afb98b040657b39cccdbe30009.apk
    • Size 1.1MB
    • SHA256 76798397118c81edf2ef4588a60578a8700017afb98b040657b39cccdbe30009
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

      Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

      Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking

      Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

    • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

      Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    • Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

      Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks