General
- Target 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
- Size 10.9MB
- Sample260817-dwp5eahc32
- SHA256 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e
- MD5 7622b200c3e9c4a12413b965b67a8ff4
- SHA1 e99fecf4e9edef9c7b44ef2181a814d093da48d5
- SHA512 23c9557dd9e999ecab15038314f4198093e8b5c10ad66a1f1151f73ad3ab35aa7d14e1e837e9adbf82fa3ea9d0fb92da337cd84f29a1e4fd26f524bc12323730
- SSDEEP 196608:7nB2N9RArFb+/nerbOoOpTik4rhRRplJRjWO1o2rkROBHx7okTT6mm2/vEqN/7aE:7QHarFbCnwtxHDlrjpL+ePdcWaLOp
- TLSH T176B63396AB40563BC876443241AB4B2277A76D9985A3DB1F3A08710CBC73A4C1FFDE5C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
1_f5558645c8.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Extracted
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octo
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https://7eeebb003348a6a550345107e015af3b.com
Targets
-
- Target 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
- Size 10.9MB
- SHA256 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e
- MD5 7622b200c3e9c4a12413b965b67a8ff4
- SHA1 e99fecf4e9edef9c7b44ef2181a814d093da48d5
- SHA512 23c9557dd9e999ecab15038314f4198093e8b5c10ad66a1f1151f73ad3ab35aa7d14e1e837e9adbf82fa3ea9d0fb92da337cd84f29a1e4fd26f524bc12323730
- SSDEEP 196608:7nB2N9RArFb+/nerbOoOpTik4rhRRplJRjWO1o2rkROBHx7okTT6mm2/vEqN/7aE:7QHarFbCnwtxHDlrjpL+ePdcWaLOp
- TLSH T176B63396AB40563BC876443241AB4B2277A76D9985A3DB1F3A08710CBC73A4C1FFDE5C
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
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Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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- Target 1_f5558645c8.cat
- Size 9.4MB
- SHA256 8daf9ed069291b148847ebf8ddb01d6e5dfa32ddc13117497cb94362e9e222b8
- MD5 b85f43c7ed38d7217e7413a5661bdb6c
- SHA1 0b9915c68c173f461f2356145c19abf269b0e120
- SHA512 efe8e97d8370827db2886331fe2d27b18d1d065bd7d08c04f1d68c31de9a397ea6c066d89fa587a788f69673166182da67f092dd1fb2b4eb4f1cd4728a9c7d62
- SSDEEP 98304:zk3tooj7GVKwC5iSRGAPRsGFa7Bdn+p0PIfEiLRTLs94dy2A4P7dTRBVLlnlwnWT:g3t/j7GU7rNRY7T5iZIS5V7hRBHlZ
- TLSH T163A6C01777864F39F88D7934814F13378513B91967A151DB096BC100EE2EBF2AEB9B82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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Family: Octo
Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.
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Octo payload
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Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions
Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service
Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Keylogging via accessibility text-change events
Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking
Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.
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Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch
Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.
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Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility
Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
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Acquires the wake lock
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
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Reads information about phone network operator.
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Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Foreground Persistence
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2Credential Access
Clipboard Data
1Input Capture
2GUI Input Capture
1Keylogging
1Discovery
Software Discovery
1Security Software Discovery
1System Information Discovery
2System Network Configuration Discovery
3