General

  • Target
    7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
  • Size 10.9MB
  • Sample260817-dwp5eahc32
  • SHA256 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • octo

C2
  • https://7eeebb003348a6a550345107e015af3b.com

DES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target
      7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e.apk
    • Size 10.9MB
    • SHA256 7bb9d049ebd45bfc84e68d03db315f003d040af4a3856315ca75c5166a34503e
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package

      Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Target
      1_f5558645c8.cat
    • Size 9.4MB
    • SHA256 8daf9ed069291b148847ebf8ddb01d6e5dfa32ddc13117497cb94362e9e222b8
    • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
    • Family: Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo payload

    • Accessibility-driven UI automation to self-grant permissions

      Locates nodes in the Settings or package-installer user interface by text or view identifier and dispatches synthetic clicks. This lets the application approve its own permission dialogs, complete side-loading, and intercept attempts to reach the uninstall screen without any real user consent.

    • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

      Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

    • Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

      DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

    • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

      Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

    • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

      Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

    • Keylogging via accessibility text-change events

      Subscribes to text-change and view-focus accessibility events and reads the text of nodes belonging to other applications, capturing everything typed on the device including passwords entered into unrelated apps. Password-field flags are typically inspected so credential entry can be prioritised.

    • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

      Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

    • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking

      Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

    • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

      Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

    • Scripted prompt coaching the user to enable Accessibility

      Contains step-by-step instructional text walking the victim through enabling an accessibility service. Because Android deliberately makes this flow difficult, malware ships explicit coaching copy; the presence of such a script alongside an accessibility service is a strong abuse indicator.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16

Tasks