dogerat | 7c92b5617af4da664343684530e88639e0624f21c53a2cadc61a1e6a57fc29d7

General

Target
7c92b5617af4da664343684530e88639e0624f21c53a2cadc61a1e6a57fc29d7.apk
Size 4.1MB
Sample260817-dydjdsdr4z
SHA256 7c92b5617af4da664343684530e88639e0624f21c53a2cadc61a1e6a57fc29d7
MD5 3acf9f6b6a813d018d643263766f06b5
SHA1 10bfc1b6b540b56386c335bff1399f20f63eafc9
SHA512 db814c7c68e3b837954e3f662e1874e7909b1eca3e008ed789c91ecfceaea6f2e403d9388602f5459b043879392bdf03774bb70d6e862515f230ea9bbb8a3f96
SSDEEP 98304:Gw1nfyCcWUCIFy7TEWhMOvKRhMD7h3UXrtQKDEqMn:G2nRVxA0zOOdD7VwrtPIqMn
TLSH
T10D162319BEAEE41EE007D139D220DA8799184C4F5A58FA9B3AB1518C4EFBC049743FDD
MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Targets

- Target
  7c92b5617af4da664343684530e88639e0624f21c53a2cadc61a1e6a57fc29d7.apk
- Size 4.1MB
- SHA256 7c92b5617af4da664343684530e88639e0624f21c53a2cadc61a1e6a57fc29d7
- MD5 3acf9f6b6a813d018d643263766f06b5
- SHA1 10bfc1b6b540b56386c335bff1399f20f63eafc9
- SHA512 db814c7c68e3b837954e3f662e1874e7909b1eca3e008ed789c91ecfceaea6f2e403d9388602f5459b043879392bdf03774bb70d6e862515f230ea9bbb8a3f96
- SSDEEP 98304:Gw1nfyCcWUCIFy7TEWhMOvKRhMD7h3UXrtQKDEqMn:G2nRVxA0zOOdD7VwrtPIqMn
- TLSH
  T10D162319BEAEE41EE007D139D220DA8799184C4F5A58FA9B3AB1518C4EFBC049743FDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Score

10^/10

banker collection credential_access defense_evasion discovery evasion exfiltration flubot impact infostealer otp overlay persistence sms stealer trojan
- Family: FluBot
  FluBot is an android banking trojan that uses overlays.
  banker trojan infostealer flubot
- FluBot payload
- Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
  Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
  stealer sms otp
- Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
  DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
  banker trojan overlay
- Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
  Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
  sms trojan exfiltration
- Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
  Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
  stealer otp banker
- Loads dropped Dex/Jar
  Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.
  evasion
- Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
  Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
  collection defense_evasion credential_access
- Creates a large amount of network flows
  This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
  discovery
- Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
  Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
  defense_evasion persistence
- Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
  Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
  evasion
- Queries information about active data network
  discovery
- Requests changing the default SMS application.
  collection impact
- Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
  defense_evasion
- Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
behavioral1 behavioral2 behavioral3