Analysis

  • custom tags

    dropperloaderstealersmsotpc2suspiciousmasqueradingbankerevasionantivmtrojanexfiltrationspywareratpersistenceobfuscated

General

  • Target
    8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b.apk
  • Size 14.1MB
  • Sample260817-e9ljtatblf
  • SHA256 8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 1 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Cleartext HTTP C2 to a hardcoded public IP literal 1 IoCs

    Embeds an http:// URL pointing at a raw public IP address, frequently on a non-standard port. Modern applications use TLS and DNS names, so a hardcoded cleartext IP endpoint usually indicates a disposable command-and-control host chosen to survive domain takedown.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft 1 IoCs

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Third-party package squatting a reserved system namespace 1 IoCs

    Declares a package identifier inside a namespace reserved for platform or vendor components while carrying application code that does not belong to that vendor. This is done so the entry looks innocuous in the installed-application list and in process listings.

  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 3 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 14 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • 8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b.apk
    .apk 14.1MB

8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b.apk

  • SHA256 8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Cleartext HTTP C2 to a hardcoded public IP literal

    Embeds an http:// URL pointing at a raw public IP address, frequently on a non-standard port. Modern applications use TLS and DNS names, so a hardcoded cleartext IP endpoint usually indicates a disposable command-and-control host chosen to survive domain takedown.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

    Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Third-party package squatting a reserved system namespace

    Declares a package identifier inside a namespace reserved for platform or vendor components while carrying application code that does not belong to that vendor. This is done so the entry looks innocuous in the installed-application list and in process listings.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
fb22e580fd1f5bc30f25d04931f46508c8de699569d02305995514d87a6f13603ee2d45b37532f1de7efa20fc0ba7616b6a333f3a4b86edac14800c3ff3788f5
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.color.cool.wst

Android Permissions

8e5fa795072ebba12d16b2abf5e13a953fb1607d9fc04b1bfee26d5bd23dc77b.apk

Permissions

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS

android.permission.READ_SMS

android.permission.WRITE_SMS

android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS

android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS

android.permission.SEND_SMS

android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED

android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.CALL_PHONE

android.permission.READ_PROFILE

android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

android.permission.CAMERA

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO

android.permission.DOWNLOAD_WITHOUT_NOTIFICATION

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT

android.permission.ACTION_MANAGE_OVERLAY_PERMISSION

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

com.color.cool.wst.permission.FRAMEWORK_SECURITY

com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE

android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS

android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS

android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS

android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS

com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ

com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE

com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT

com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE

com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE

com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT

com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS

android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE

com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS

me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_READ