Analysis

  • custom tags

    stealersmsotpmasqueradingsuspiciousevasionantivmc2exfiltrationpersistence

General

  • Target
    91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3.apk
  • Size 3.3MB
  • Sample260817-ft54ystyfv
  • SHA256 91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • irata

C2
  • https://liveumusk.gq

Signatures

  • Family: Irata

    Irata is an Iranian remote access trojan Android malware first seen in August 2022.

  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation 1 IoCs

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Irata payload 1 IoCs
  • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking 1 IoCs

    Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Third-party package squatting a reserved system namespace 1 IoCs

    Declares a package identifier inside a namespace reserved for platform or vendor components while carrying application code that does not belong to that vendor. This is done so the entry looks innocuous in the installed-application list and in process listings.

  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 4 IoCs
  • Codesign digest Mismatch 1 IoCs

    File was altered after it was signed.

  • Insecure Codesign Algorithm 1 IoCs

    File was codesigned using an insecure algorithm.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • 91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3.apk
    .apk 3.3MB

91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3.apk

  • SHA256 91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration

    Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

    Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

  • Irata payload

  • Persistent WebSocket channel used for remote tasking

    Bundles a WebSocket client and opens a long-lived bidirectional connection, the transport typically used by Android remote-access tooling for live command dispatch and streaming. Suspicious when paired with surveillance capabilities rather than an obvious in-app messaging feature.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Third-party package squatting a reserved system namespace

    Declares a package identifier inside a namespace reserved for platform or vendor components while carrying application code that does not belong to that vendor. This is done so the entry looks innocuous in the installed-application list and in process listings.

  • Codesign digest Mismatch

    File was altered after it was signed.

  • Insecure Codesign Algorithm

    File was codesigned using an insecure algorithm.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
0909313656428f532a0cd9a89fad29565745fcfa
Digest Algorithm
sha1
Digest Matches
Not matched
Trusted
Not trusted
Signing Certificate
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Android,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US,1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#0c13616e64726f696440616e64726f69642e636f6d
Chains

Jan 1, 0001

ir.shz.shzkisi

Android Permissions

91f989ba53006d7710488227a800a5ee28e731cbaaa4ba71c5ab4f30c743cfe3.apk

Permissions

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.READ_SMS

android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE

ir.shz.shzkisi.permission.C2D_MESSAGE

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE

android.permission.SEND_SMS

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS