General
- Target d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30.apk
- Size 2.6MB
- Sample260818-1cmaqs1elb
- SHA256 d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30
- MD5 7aa3538e663b6f580f821a9b345ec187
- SHA1 37470bd54c24ec5b42ee982bcd8df2f6255f3fa9
- SHA512 f9b7c1ade63343d92e93781fbb728fa354c58b210095da3f01a681cd6e3a038a84ae14e303e505c67a4944ebdac1497836671cbfba3ae0e6709c2a4abb0444eb
- SSDEEP 49152:4mVRrmFXYEjfe1JVBm8V/nHNtENwbGO0Lav9QMmqW8bvtDEf3RW:4MrKZbSJVBdV/HTDb7P1QzsLtqW
- TLSH T110D51295FEAEE51AD103E134D164D8839608444CC988FB6F1A3A914E5EFBC44AB07FDE
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30.apk
- Size 2.6MB
- SHA256 d62843e7064553f995bb97b3e064922ebc93ac6591112f9b58b11b51c5ca8b30
- MD5 7aa3538e663b6f580f821a9b345ec187
- SHA1 37470bd54c24ec5b42ee982bcd8df2f6255f3fa9
- SHA512 f9b7c1ade63343d92e93781fbb728fa354c58b210095da3f01a681cd6e3a038a84ae14e303e505c67a4944ebdac1497836671cbfba3ae0e6709c2a4abb0444eb
- SSDEEP 49152:4mVRrmFXYEjfe1JVBm8V/nHNtENwbGO0Lav9QMmqW8bvtDEf3RW:4MrKZbSJVBdV/HTDb7P1QzsLtqW
- TLSH T110D51295FEAEE51AD103E134D164D8839608444CC988FB6F1A3A914E5EFBC44AB07FDE
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Queries information about active data network