Analysis

  • custom tags

    spywareratexfiltrationpersistencedropperloaderevasionantivmobfuscated

General

  • Target
    f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667.apk
  • Size 19.3MB
  • Sample260818-3xtawsshke
  • SHA256 f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 1 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 2 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch 1 IoCs

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 1 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 5 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667.apk
    .apk 19.3MB

f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667.apk

  • SHA256 f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Runtime string decryption with reflective method dispatch

    Combines symmetric decryption or base64 decoding of embedded string tables with reflective class and method resolution, so sensitive API names never appear in plaintext. This defeats naive string-based detection and indicates deliberate anti-analysis engineering.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
b664c30e2ddec6ed2e539e4a25a271870d8e84282af103730faba97fa12934bbeba76d8f56ecbad2028e5045bdc7fed119a69bde23d23399bf447af19df729ac
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.plantzy.identification

Android Permissions

f26185fb9e0beb0eb4f05ea11044c51ae93e5d09cfac9935c92db3a4fcdca667.apk

Permissions

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.CAMERA

android.permission.VIBRATE

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.FLASHLIGHT

android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE