Analysis

  • custom tags

    dropperloaderpersistenceevasionantivm

General

  • Target
    bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f.apk
  • Size 5.8MB
  • Sample260818-x2afpayfkc
  • SHA256 bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 1 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service 1 IoCs

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 1 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 4 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f.apk
    .apk 5.8MB

bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f.apk

  • SHA256 bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Boot-triggered restart with disguised foreground service

    Restarts itself on device boot and holds a foreground service with a low-visibility notification channel, keeping the process alive across reboots and outside normal background limits. Malicious use is distinguished by pairing this with surveillance or remote-control primitives.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
87bf9fb052b28cc8e16a53a3940da35f9cb4566451cf16cbe7ec85de9249ec9cd201697f883da44b6c6a880c75f3b632283196df1f8b93695753ecd2f2fd3cf7
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.alang.campro.translates

Android Permissions

bf965b33dabbf436747fa9ce347e2fcd1826b9de99391ddc0feeef10a6f99b4f.apk

Permissions

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE