General
- Target c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d.apk
- Size 4.2MB
- Sample260818-yd5glaygmb
- SHA256 c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d
- MD5 8b6c4905f8f93af27e60b502621e03f6
- SHA1 5e5afc1c4cb35a5c2236ee75caba1fd062079c2f
- SHA512 e53ac001ad16641b58debb254e79696ae8883f60a7ad2fc74ead3473b85e5082acf649f97992a8af7f0abb309f599a12b5e63594b9f8169367648b9535c4b10a
- SSDEEP 98304:VuI2jB0TbH87hFHKC+dcmGhQZC34dfbZjhwmWm8WLtkh+I:VuvV4buHd+dzGhT3GbZGVWLtkcI
- TLSH T18E162317FE9EE026D433E179D2699A47440A441A0A08FE1BAE27535C4EFBD409B43FED
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d.apk
- Size 4.2MB
- SHA256 c4290560c6776b09f188deb80d27250bddaae123c201ac29391be4aef523f48d
- MD5 8b6c4905f8f93af27e60b502621e03f6
- SHA1 5e5afc1c4cb35a5c2236ee75caba1fd062079c2f
- SHA512 e53ac001ad16641b58debb254e79696ae8883f60a7ad2fc74ead3473b85e5082acf649f97992a8af7f0abb309f599a12b5e63594b9f8169367648b9535c4b10a
- SSDEEP 98304:VuI2jB0TbH87hFHKC+dcmGhQZC34dfbZjhwmWm8WLtkh+I:VuvV4buHd+dzGhT3GbZGVWLtkcI
- TLSH T18E162317FE9EE026D433E179D2699A47440A441A0A08FE1BAE27535C4EFBD409B43FED
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
FluBot payload
- Custom signature
Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
- Custom signature
Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
- Custom signature
Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
- Custom signature
Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
Queries information about active data network