General
- Target d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e.apk
- Size 3.8MB
- Sample260818-ztlvvsbd86
- SHA256 d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e
- MD5 1378457ca7e2373c450c9422eb9ca866
- SHA1 8dbe6385738c51819a9834611eb415f1eea9afab
- SHA512 7da8b609557b6b140cec3b06089e5140c019e2164f139d68ca57b81aa8ef5af44a13c4cd48b95f61f66d1f9d295f18d209926f65c192a386e09d422761b08264
- SSDEEP 98304:zmWywxtERg3J0i4eGsuTDXYoLaJWfqY1Lv:zmfEaPeGsuTjY7Y1Lv
- TLSH T14406231DFEAEE426E007F539D1E4958B5808849C4E46FA0B1A35928C4EFBD44A707FDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e.apk
- Size 3.8MB
- SHA256 d1340ed4d24a213ba11b01cc35341c101b25f2317cff99093f428152a2fc634e
- MD5 1378457ca7e2373c450c9422eb9ca866
- SHA1 8dbe6385738c51819a9834611eb415f1eea9afab
- SHA512 7da8b609557b6b140cec3b06089e5140c019e2164f139d68ca57b81aa8ef5af44a13c4cd48b95f61f66d1f9d295f18d209926f65c192a386e09d422761b08264
- SSDEEP 98304:zmWywxtERg3J0i4eGsuTDXYoLaJWfqY1Lv:zmfEaPeGsuTjY7Y1Lv
- TLSH T14406231DFEAEE426E007F539D1E4958B5808849C4E46FA0B1A35928C4EFBD44A707FDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
FluBot payload
- Custom signature
Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
- Custom signature
Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
- Custom signature
Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
- Custom signature
Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
Queries information about active data network
Requests changing the default SMS application.
Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1