Family: Hydra

Android banker and info stealer.

Hydra payload

Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection

DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.

Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation

Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.

Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft

Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban

Silent screen capture via MediaProjection

Acquires a MediaProjection session and pipes the virtual display into an image reader or encoder, enabling continuous capture of everything shown on screen including credentials and one-time codes. Combined with accessibility auto-approval this runs without further user interaction.