Analysis

  • custom tags

    dropperloaderevasionantivm

General

  • Target
    f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726.apk
  • Size 7.3MB
  • Sample260819-arax5stdqa
  • SHA256 f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload 1 IoCs

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Declares broadcast receivers with permission to handle system events 1 IoCs
  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 1 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 8 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726.apk
    .apk 7.3MB

f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726.apk

  • SHA256 f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Android dropper: runtime DEX/class loading of a staged payload

    Sample resolves and loads executable code at runtime via DexClassLoader/InMemoryDexClassLoader combined with reflection and asset or network payload retrieval. Legitimate apps rarely need in-memory DEX loading; this is the standard staging mechanism for Android droppers evading store review.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
36d1bb0ea3b8cb9149563c7c3fce071ba603e721401ce3d6c27290d3677b9215
Digest Algorithm
sha256
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Android,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US,1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#0c13616e64726f696440616e64726f69642e636f6d
com.emmtyggz.qvvtshu

Android Permissions

f6da0d9f1d74f2f80cd4d69183a78ccc1b3679689419262c9704787cea754726.apk

Permissions

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS

android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.REORDER_TASKS

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS

android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT

android.permission.REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES

android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS

android.permission.ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.WRITE_SMS

android.permission.SEND_SMS

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

android.permission.REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES

android.permission.READ_SMS

android.permission.CALL_PHONE