General
- Target fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb.apk
- Size 2.8MB
- Sample260819-bgvp8scd35
- SHA256 fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb
- MD5 1109a987d8b8a210ee642ad90e719035
- SHA1 82eed0d1bfef5ffb02dd770c870a818c27372f98
- SHA512 7ff2ec5b5b6bffb387e92a14b7425532f07d854b143bedace33933a98be470b50139b794af1d36bc88ca8ecdcd4867d73447155e2f84fdbf6a95df6c2e2bfda4
- SSDEEP 49152:1jNy2ajxRFq0fcuTqNd7djWQQ0QSva9OkwJvZ/FhuL2H5WN18tdINvj:h+FTcuIl/SSzkwma5lnIp
- TLSH T11BD5339DBAC16324E467CA306ED05862725DC2F403B769A64D72B7928CDBC7A4F31F48
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb.apk
- Size 2.8MB
- SHA256 fc12f8a950b3eb4e56de5fefc2b57d7726222547b468ebd2fb5cf315bd1bb7cb
- MD5 1109a987d8b8a210ee642ad90e719035
- SHA1 82eed0d1bfef5ffb02dd770c870a818c27372f98
- SHA512 7ff2ec5b5b6bffb387e92a14b7425532f07d854b143bedace33933a98be470b50139b794af1d36bc88ca8ecdcd4867d73447155e2f84fdbf6a95df6c2e2bfda4
- SSDEEP 49152:1jNy2ajxRFq0fcuTqNd7djWQQ0QSva9OkwJvZ/FhuL2H5WN18tdINvj:h+FTcuIl/SSzkwma5lnIp
- TLSH T11BD5339DBAC16324E467CA306ED05862725DC2F403B769A64D72B7928CDBC7A4F31F48
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Cerberus payload
Family: Alienbot
Alienbot is a fork of Cerberus banker first seen in January 2020.
- Custom signature
Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
- Custom signature
Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration
Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.
- Custom signature
Encrypted or packed staged payload inside Android package
Extracted asset shows near-random entropy without a recognised container header, indicating an encrypted secondary payload staged for runtime decryption and loading. Correlate with any runtime class-loading detection on the same sample.
- Custom signature
Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
Queries account information for other applications stored on the device
Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.
Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)
Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
Queries the mobile country code (MCC)
Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution
1Broadcast Receivers
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Hide Artifacts
2Suppress Application Icon
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2System Checks
2