General
- Target fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2.apk
- Size 3.3MB
- Sample260819-bjhtfscd39
- SHA256 fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2
- MD5 af9f032aecbb2c3a4f5eed9b5f675419
- SHA1 a0ab0777891553d9c1dced5fdafe2b9e1d5b341e
- SHA512 abec508e52c01e4b2dd822d029629eb82304faba5b8f43c0cb3566f17490ef82e644ff5e270bcfdc595d49e81ca54d40e1c59341f659e5a66bf9f97792fbe2ed
- SSDEEP 98304:Q7KGt3ZuI7y690JAD/oD4bSMI6/LTdCH93:QeGfuI7y2oDbV
- TLSH T1A7F52216FEDEE91AD087E13CD1649897440844484A08FF1B9B2692DC8FFAD44AB87FDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
-
- Target fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2.apk
- Size 3.3MB
- SHA256 fc45b5f85cee56830a9f7e3001dca42026a9691445afa8f429b57203fc47a1b2
- MD5 af9f032aecbb2c3a4f5eed9b5f675419
- SHA1 a0ab0777891553d9c1dced5fdafe2b9e1d5b341e
- SHA512 abec508e52c01e4b2dd822d029629eb82304faba5b8f43c0cb3566f17490ef82e644ff5e270bcfdc595d49e81ca54d40e1c59341f659e5a66bf9f97792fbe2ed
- SSDEEP 98304:Q7KGt3ZuI7y690JAD/oD4bSMI6/LTdCH93:QeGfuI7y2oDbV
- TLSH T1A7F52216FEDEE91AD087E13CD1649897440844484A08FF1B9B2692DC8FFAD44AB87FDD
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Queries information about active data network