General
- Target fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c.apk
- Size 4.2MB
- Sample260819-bq6h4acd63
- SHA256 fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c
- MD5 37be18494cd03ea70a1fdd6270cef6e3
- SHA1 4714aaa5195da29c6e74aeee9e9f19678af5c15b
- SHA512 5452d2e545c46b94d3209b332fea6e87727039371688e2ae63ad303c014db5e7b5d4222d4dcefd703fc4a4f15e6f685ec5e62cabe396573bed0e0f78a40d679f
- SSDEEP 98304:ObOoMyx7cvw6sscAANEowsE/6spqR9HTUzFRUkLqQU1K2b:HHyx8BAeowsEyNR2zFRUYab
- TLSH T109162315BEEED426D40FD13890A2D9CB8C280DBD5524F97F5622516C2EBAC84DB43EEC
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c.apk
Resource
android-x86-arm-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c.apk
Resource
android-x64-20260325-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c.apk
Resource
android-x64-arm64-20260325-en
Malware Config
Targets
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- Target fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c.apk
- Size 4.2MB
- SHA256 fe52bed001f28a4b218bcd0ad31b92fb59022778cf68a1445cf3e8c612a5e04c
- MD5 37be18494cd03ea70a1fdd6270cef6e3
- SHA1 4714aaa5195da29c6e74aeee9e9f19678af5c15b
- SHA512 5452d2e545c46b94d3209b332fea6e87727039371688e2ae63ad303c014db5e7b5d4222d4dcefd703fc4a4f15e6f685ec5e62cabe396573bed0e0f78a40d679f
- SSDEEP 98304:ObOoMyx7cvw6sscAANEowsE/6spqR9HTUzFRUkLqQU1K2b:HHyx8BAeowsEyNR2zFRUYab
- TLSH T109162315BEEED426D40FD13890A2D9CB8C280DBD5524F97F5622516C2EBAC84DB43EEC
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
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FluBot payload
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Android SMS interception and OTP exfiltration
Registers a high-priority SMS_RECEIVED receiver, parses inbound message bodies and aborts the broadcast to hide messages from the user, alongside network exfiltration primitives. This is the standard 2FA/OTP theft pattern used to complete fraudulent transactions.
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Android banker: accessibility service abuse with overlay injection
DEX references AccessibilityService event hooks together with window-overlay creation and credential-capture primitives. This combination is the canonical Android banking-trojan pattern: the app reads screen content and injects fake login windows over legitimate banking apps.
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Contact harvesting with SMS self-propagation
Reads the device contact list and sends messages to the retrieved numbers, the distribution mechanism behind SMS worm campaigns. The victim's own address book becomes the delivery channel, which is why these campaigns spread rapidly within a region.
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Notification listener abuse for OTP and message theft
Binds a notification listener service and reads posted notification content, optionally dismissing notifications afterwards to hide them. This harvests one-time passcodes and private messages without ever requesting SMS permissions, which is why it has largely replaced SMS interception in modern ban
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Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service
Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.
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Creates a large amount of network flows
This may indicate a network scan to discover remotely running services.
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Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service
Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.
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Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user
Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.
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Queries information about active data network
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Requests changing the default SMS application.
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Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).
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Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v16
MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v16
Defense Evasion
Download New Code at Runtime
1Foreground Persistence
1Hide Artifacts
1User Evasion
1Impair Defenses
1Prevent Application Removal
1Input Injection
1