Analysis

  • custom tags

    c2suspiciousspywareratexfiltrationevasionantivm

General

  • Target
    eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5.apk
  • Size 10.6MB
  • Sample260819-cbg3mack2s
  • SHA256 eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH

Malware Config

Signatures

  • Cleartext HTTP C2 to a hardcoded public IP literal 1 IoCs

    Embeds an http:// URL pointing at a raw public IP address, frequently on a non-standard port. Modern applications use TLS and DNS names, so a hardcoded cleartext IP endpoint usually indicates a disposable command-and-control host chosen to survive domain takedown.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration 1 IoCs

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection 1 IoCs

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Declares services with permission to bind to the system 1 IoCs
  • Requests dangerous framework permissions 3 IoCs
  • Untrusted Codesign Signers 1 IoCs

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Explorer

  • eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5.apk
    .apk 10.6MB

eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5.apk

  • SHA256 eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP TLSH
  • Cleartext HTTP C2 to a hardcoded public IP literal

    Embeds an http:// URL pointing at a raw public IP address, frequently on a non-standard port. Modern applications use TLS and DNS names, so a hardcoded cleartext IP endpoint usually indicates a disposable command-and-control host chosen to survive domain takedown.

  • Covert microphone or camera capture with exfiltration

    Opens audio or camera capture outside any user-facing recording feature and pairs it with file staging and network transmission. The absence of a foreground recording interface alongside these primitives indicates surveillance rather than a legitimate media function.

  • Root, emulator and instrumentation-framework detection

    Probes for superuser binaries, emulator build properties and dynamic instrumentation frameworks. Malware uses these checks to stay dormant inside analysis environments, so a sample matching this rule with an otherwise empty behavioural report should be treated as evasive rather than benign.

  • Untrusted Codesign Signers

    Codesigned file was signed by an untrusted entity.

File Signature issue

Digest
2ec937b7ebe8ee3e5efae0f9c1665dfdf3fab2b599588fec69ca16e21b4c114e88e8e172c7db913912dd019e4f28215c1f6886ee77c81fc527191feaf4e3d79b
Digest Algorithm
sha512
Digest Matches
Trusted
Not trusted
Signer
CN=Android,OU=Android,O=Google Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US
com.pdfdocuments.quickscannerapp

Android Permissions

eb46541e2991a20c20fca66e51a705a309e6576296c435126ac369ba41e6bff5.apk

Permissions

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

android.permission.CAMERA

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE

com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE